USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume II > Part 27
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The works program authority was again transferred on December 31, 1935, this time to the Works Progress Administration. The greater degree of Federal control exercised under the Works Progress Admin- istration did not deter Connecticut from securing additional monies from Washington. Although Harry Hopkins, in March 1935, called upon Connecticut to assume a greater proportion than the 34 percent of the total which she was then contributing toward relief, she in fact provided an even smaller share under the WPA. Of the 50 million dollars expended by June 1937, Connecticut had contributed only 17.6 percent of the funds. The 2,500 projects varied widely, but approxi- mately one-third of the total amount was spent for streets and roads,
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
and another seven and one-half million for sewer improvements. There were among the projects those frequently the brunt of jests, but appre- ciated by the beneficiaries as in the case of the eleven paintings by well- known artists received by the State Library. James Brewster, the Li- brarian, candidly stated these could not have been acquired out of regular appropriations. As economic conditions gradually improved the need for relief lessened only to mount again with the recession of 1937. Work relief continued in Connecticut until the very eve of World War II, the greater part, however, being partial rather than full relief. In the later years the numbers of projects ranged from 1,000 to 3,000, and by March 1941, there were fewer than 500.40
The business-minded Yankee judged work relief vastly superior to direct relief if the projects were carefully screened; otherwise, work relief was considered too expensive. Mayor Spellacy of Hartford was convinced that Hartford could do more with $1,000,000 of its own money than with $5,000,000 of federal funds. It seemed difficult for the Yankee to value a project as relief apart from judging it by its end product. To an extent the Federal government moved toward this position as it changed to an emphasis on useful public works.41
When inaugurated, relief programs were intended to effect recov- ery on the premise that "industry could not be stimulated solely by slogans of confidence." The projects undertaken under the aegis of the Public Works Administration inaugurated in June, 1933, as a part of the National Industrial Recovery Administration, included the im- provement and construction of non-federal installations as well as those owned by the federal government. Although the facilities of the federal prison at Danbury were improved under the PWA, programs in Con- necticut were almost entirely those wherein monies provided by the Federal government were used to assist the state and local communities in the construction of public works. They included repairs to school buildings, libraries, town halls, and fire houses. Among the larger projects were the construction of Kenney Park Club House in Hart- ford, a sewage disposal plant in Putnam, and an athletic field in Shelton. Also, a grant of $2,576,000 was made to the Mansfield Training School, and monies were provided for the improvement of the New Haven Railroad.
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Due to the lack of previous planning, to financial difficulties, and to administrative controls, projects under the non-federal grants were slow to start. Connecticut seems to have done better, however, than the country as a whole in the completion of projects. Eighty percent of the
(Courtesy Conn. State Lib.)
MILFORD-TOWN OFFICE BUILDING
261 projects begun had been completed by June, 1939, which was 15 percent more than the average for the country as a whole. There re- mains a wide difference of opinion as to the effectiveness of the WPA either as an agent of relief or recovery. Its effect on the Connecticut economy must not be judged solely, however, by the number of proj- ects, the men employed, or the $28,000,000 the Federal Government poured into the state. An indeterminable amount of indirect benefits accrued to the state as orders poured in for the hardware, copper prod-
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
ucts, and electrical supplies needed for the completion of WPA projects in other regions. Shortly after the administration was transferred to the Federal Works Agency in June, 1939, Connecticut industry once again turned to producing the materials of war.42
The NIRA was of greatest significance, perhaps, as a symbol and force for change exerting a pressure on social legislation and exercising regulatory functions. At this the time when the importance of increas- ing the purchasing power of the consumer as a first step in recovery was being stressed in Washington, legislation introduced in the 1933 session of the General Assembly to establish a minimum wage for women and children was held in the Labor Committee. Franklin D. Roosevelt, in a telegram to Cross, as to 11 other Governors, expressed his interest in the state's passing minimum wage laws. The Assembly responded with half a loaf. The legislation was passed, but monies were not supplied for its effective enforcement. The principle of a minimum wage for certain elements of the state's population, however, had been estab- lished. In subsequent weeks, NRA codes went into effect and increases in wages and reductions in hours were noticeable. This was due in part, too, to the effective bargaining of labor with management. The state Board of Arbitration and Mediation, created in 1895, had "never func- tioned with any success," it was said. Appointments to it had been dis- continued for some time, when they were resumed by Cross in 1931. After the right of collective bargaining was strengthened by the NRA, a state Labor Relations Board was established at the request of both labor and management. The Labor Commissioner was to act as arbi- trator in the first instance in all labor disputes in the state. Within the first five months of operation, 31 strikes were adjusted satisfactorily, and 34 were referred to the regional board of operation.
The famed Blue Eagle did not settle over Connecticut without protest. Some employers refused to submit their disputes to arbitration; others, after apparently reaching agreement, refused to take back the employees involved and, to avoid the charge of discrimination, dis- missed some non-union members. Such resistance aroused the ire of General Hugh Johnson, the Federal Administrator, and caused sharp exchanges between him and the Governor. As a result of impetus from Washington, the State's employment service was completly reorganized.
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THE NEW DEAL IN CONNECTICUT
The state legislature, in 1933, anticipating the passage of the Wagner Peyser Act, approved the state's entering into an agreement with the Federal Government. This was formally accomplished in November. According to the NRA, all jobs on public works were to be secured
(Courtesy Conn. Devel. Comm.)
WATERBURY
through the state employment offices. Through a federal grant, extra personnel was appointed in each of the six state offices, their personnel was selected by the merit system, new locations were procured, and the methods and procedures of the offices were revised.
The regulations imposed by NRA corrected some of the worst of the existent labor conditions. The public had been shocked at the conditions found to exist in the dress industry and the legislature had responded with regulations requiring the registration of new em-
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
ployees, prohibiting locked doors on industrial establishments during working hours, providing for weekly payment of wages, and demanding work certificates for minors under 18 years of age. Further regulations under NRA "altered the situation so markedly" that within two years the dress industry was no longer considered a sweated industry.43
In the campaign of 1934, above the strident clamor of the office seekers, a recognition of issues was voiced. The Democratic program of reform was submitted amidst Republican warnings of the menace of Washington to Connecticut life and institutions. The Courant re- minded its readers, "This is 1934," and that the policies at Washington and Hartford "are undergoing an examination that is by no means as comforting as our Democratic friends like to assume." There were, however, sufficient professions of commitment to legislative reforms in both the platforms to "impress" a national liberal magazine with the "extraordinary program" being advocated by men who could not by the greatest imagination be branded as Reds. The struggles within the parties, however, remained the same. Cross was, again, forced to beat back the "old guard" to secure the nomination of a ticket of his choice. The Republicans brushed aside Levitt's query, "Who owns Connecti- cut?"and nominated as their candidate the courageous and hard-hitting attorney of Hartford County, Hugh M. Alcorn.44
Throughout the campaign there were reverberations of the labor incident which had impelled the Republican Lieutenant Governor, Roy C. Wilcox, to call out the National Guard to quell the most serious of the textile strikes which occurred at Danielson and Putnam in the Fall of 1934 when Cross was out of the state. Labor understood the advantage offered by compulsory arbitration and increasingly utilized the strike as a means of securing wage demands and of eliminating the "stretch-out" system. The disturbances at Danielson and Putnam had been made more severe by "flying squadrons" of organizers. Eventual successful mediation by the Commissioner of Labor, Joseph M. Tone, did not erase bitterness. When the Republican candidate declared that the New Deal was making "mendicants and beggars" of the people, he made what Cross regarded as the fatal error of the campaign with this "cruel insult to a hundred thousand workers in the state who had lost their jobs." Cross, for his part, found the old charge that the Repub-
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THE NEW DEAL IN CONNECTICUT
lican candidate would merely be a front for those behind the scenes less effective than before, and he drew a stinging rebuke from the Courant for thus challenging the independence of Alcorn. Cross had the tre- mendous advantage, despite his own lack of boldness, of the programs for the unemployed initiated by the Federal Government. He mollified the cities by blaming the Assembly for the failure to come to their as- sistance. The electorate expressed its confidence in the state's participa- tion in the federal programs by electing a Democratic Senator and four Democratic Congressmen as representatives in Washington and by electing Democrats to all of the state offices. The House remained Re- publican, but a new balance of power appeared in the Senate in the three Socialists, who, as a block, could be decisive on any straight party issue, inasmuch as there were 17 Democrats and 15 Republicans.45
After his reelection, when Wilbur Cross addressed the General Assembly in 1933, he sounded like a New Deal Democrat. In the con- tinuing "period of storm and stress" there remained no question in his mind of the part the Federal Government should play in the relief of the unemployed or in stimulating recovery. He was lavish in his praise of the beneficences Connecticut had received and urged that the Assembly pass the legislation necessary for the state to take further advantage of Federal aid. To provide the necessary matching funds he now suggested that six million dollars be diverted temporarily from the highway income and asserted in support that for a state to spend nearly as much on highway construction as on all other phases of the govern- ment was "not a good distribution of income." He recommended that the emergency legislation, such as that concerning banks, become perma- nent. In the field of welfare, the change in his position since 1933 was almost revolutionary. "The time had come," he stated, "for the state to assume a large part of the cost of relief which has been borne by the municipalities." To give emphasis to this idea, he pointed to the report of the Special Tax commission, which recommended that "an appropri- ation be made by the State from its general fund for expenditures for local outdoor charitable relief." In a similar vein, he submitted that in order for all children to have an equal opportunity for acquiring an education it was "necessary for the state to assume a larger share than it is now doing in the total cost of public education." The institutional
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building program which had been delayed for want of funds was to be resumed. The completion of Fairfield Hospital was of utmost urgency and the provision of a new training school for the imbecile and a vet- erans' home of almost equal importance. To finance this and other programs, Cross advocated the introduction of a two percent sales tax and a five percent tax on the interest and dividends received by the citizens of the state. He repeated his request for stricter control of the public utilities, and asked for additional controls of the milk industry and for a clarification of the liquor laws. To further the position of the workingman, he recommended a 40 hour week regardless of age or sex; the regulation of private employment agencies; and the appointment of a commission to study unemployment insurance. A more careful study of the man and the times will be necessary to determine whether he was a liberal at heart, but political realist enough to know that in Con- necticut, particularly as a Democrat, he must make haste slowly if he wished to be returned for another term; or, whether, in spite of his urbanity, he was provincial in his political philosophy, but was swooped up by the energy of the New Deal and carried as a leader of liberal re- form.46
In the structure and operation of government, Cross outlined a political philosophy that has characterized his party to the present time. He believed or he came to believe that the ultimate responsibility for the affairs of state rested with the Executive. A step had been taken in this direction in his first administration by extending the appointive power of the Governor to the Courts of Common Pleas. In 1935, with an appeal to take the courts out of politics, he urged that judges of town, city, borough, and police courts be appointed by the Governor. It is obvious that this would have transferred, rather than have elimi- nated, patronage, and that its merits would rest upon evaluations of the appointive authority. He joined with the Judicial Council in looking forward to the time when all courts would be brought under the Su- preme Court of Errors. To increase the power of the Executive, he repeated his request that a two-thirds majority of both houses be re- quired to override a Governor's veto. To promote efficiency in govern- ment, he requested that a comprehensive survey be made of the business of the State with a view toward the reorganization of government.47
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The business of politics in the Assembly had already begun. Cross, it was assumed, was in a weaker position because his plurality of 8,599 (the result, the Governor believed, of the 38,000 votes cast for Jasper McLevy), was not only less than in previous elections, but was less than
(Courtesy Conn. Devel. Comm.)
WILLIMANTIC
the margin of victory held by the rest of the State ticket. A fight erupted over the organization of the Senate where neither of the major parties had a majority, and the balance of power was held by the Socialists.48 After 109 efforts to organize the Senate, the Socialists threw their votes to the Republicans. To the cry of "deal," Jasper McLevy replied that the Socialists had "thrown responsibility to the Republican Party for real progressive legislation."49 The factional fight among the "Old and New Guard," it was suggested, made an arrangement with the Demo-
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crats impossible, but, in fact, the Socialists followed a course outlined by Bridgeport Times Star as "Play with the Roraback machine, give the machine control of the State Senate in return for . .. legislation for Bridgeport."50 Bridgeport was rewarded by the state's assuming the cost of bridges which bore heavily on the city's treasury, removing the re- ceivership into which the city had gone as result of exceeding its capacity to borrow, and establishing a Civil Service System.
As the Assembly turned to the business of legislation it resumed its traditional state's rights position in opposition to New Deal measures. To alleviate the problems of relief in the cities, an attempt was made through Federal financing to encourage the rehabilitation of rural areas. Cross proposed the establishment of a Connecticut Rehabilitation Corporation. Protests arose from the tenement house owners who feared the loss of rents, from the Grange which feared the production of surplus products, and from the Socialists who branded the program as discriminatory in that it would benefit only about 250 families. The opposition was sufficient for the Republicans to make it a political issue. Herman Kopplemann of the First District added fire to the dis- cussion, in what was an unusual action for a United States Congress- man, by charging that the hostility to Federal Aid was solely political. "Connecticut couldn't save the people from starvation so the Govern- ment stepped in with relief." It is strange, he said, "that now a delib- erate anti-administration effort is being put forth to stop another phase of the program for the rehabilitation of some of the needy of Connecti- cut."52
With the explanation that such a program would be an encroach- ment of the sovereign rights of the state, the Republicans and the Social- ists combined to defeat the bill in the Senate and gained the unre- strained praise of Governor Herman Talmadge of Georgia. The As- sembly refused to provide the necessary funds for the extensive building program or for the diversion of highway funds to match Federal monies. Cross estimated that this failure cost the state ten million dollars. On the other hand, the state accepted Federal assistance for relief and pub- lic works projects. Although there was a certain consistency in frugality in public expenditures and opposition to Washington's intrusion in state affairs, state's rights do not appear to have been an absolute de-
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terminant of political philosophy, but rather a rationale advanced when practical and convenient, as in justification of a lower, tax rate or in anticipation of political gains.53
Whereas the State did not take advantage of all permissive legisla- tion or adopt all social measures suggested by the Federal Government, it did, after customary deliberation, eventually adopt measures in ac- cord with the developing attitudes of the time. The opposition of the Manufacturers' Association had been sufficiently neutralized by 1932 that both parties included old age pensions in their political platforms. In the 1933 session, however, enabling legislation failed to pass because of differences over details. "Due to the exigencies of the times," the Department of Welfare reported, "the laws of Connecticut relating to the poor and relief are being examined more critical [sic] perhaps than ever before." It was agreed that some of the laws were archaic and that some injustice prevailed. The problems were resolved in 1936 and a bill providing for seven dollars a week for all indigents over 65 was passed with only one vote in opposition. A Bureau of Old Age Assistance was created and merged with the Department of State Agencies and In- stitutions and with the Department of Public Welfare to form the Of- fice of Public Welfare. Also, a Public Welfare Council was created, one of the functions of which was the care of dependent children. Closely related was a grant by the State of cash assistance to the. blind.54
Significant but measured advances were made in the legislation for labor. The Board of Arbitration and Mediation, which Cross had earlier sought to revive and which had been given new status through the NRA, was now made "a workable agency for the settlement of strikes and labor disputes." The hours of labor for women and children were reduced from 55 to 48, but with the proviso that in emergencies or at the peak of a season they could work 52 hours a week. Industrial home work was further controlled, but not outlawed. It was permitted to continue in certain areas under licenses granted. Because of the pres- sure of the agricultural and newspaper interests, it was charged, the State never ratified the Child Labor Amendment. Instead, legislation prohibited the employment of children under sixteen, but those en- gaged in industrialized agriculture, domestic service, or street trades were excepted from supervision.55
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
Not only the structure of government, but the very strength of the people themselves was tested when the tragedy of the flood of 1936 added to the economic trials of the time. In early March thawing tem- peratures were accompanied by heavy rains and smaller streams over- ran their banks. In the first stages of the flood the Red Cross and the Civilian Conservation Corps forwarded foodstuffs and supplies and per- formed multifarious other services to the towns in Tolland and Wind- ham Counties and to the hard pressed towns west of Hartford. Prop- erty damage in Farmington, Unionville, and Collinsville was estimated at a half million dollars and merchants along the east side in Hartford were moving their goods to higher ground. The snow continued to melt and light rains fell over the state on the 16th and 17th. The next day a storm reached New England and the rivers and streams were incapable of handling the increased volume of water. There followed one of the most disastrous floods in the state's history. Dams broke, bridges were swept away, and communications broken. The waters engulfed the streets on the lower east side of Hartford until one-fifth of the city was inun- dated. Here havoc was wrought in the state business district of Hart- ford as the water rushed into the storage basements and 5,000 families of the city were affected. Many smaller towns were completely engulfed and 2,250 evacuees were housed and thousands of others fed and clothed by the Red Cross.
An emergency committee was set up in the Governor's office to co- ordinate all relief efforts. Hundreds and hundreds volunteered. The Red Cross and the Civilian Conservation Corps continue their services, and the American Legion, American Radio League, and the Works Progress Administration helped. The Coast Guard and the Naval Militia patrolled the river, and with citizens risked their lives to save others. Unhappily there were those who sought to profit from the distress. Boat owners in the East Hartford area were apprehended for charging ex- orbitant prices for rescuing stranded persons. Their racket was short lived as the city of East Hartford hired a fleet of six large boats to con- tinue the rescue service. As the Connecticut River crest of 35 feet was neared on the nineteenth the essential services were maintained only on an emergency basis and the next night they were entirely out of com- mission. Friday the twentieth was the night of greatest fear. Rumors
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THE NEW DEAL IN CONNECTICUT
spread that the inmates at Wethersfield were in wild insurrection when in reality they were repairing the wall along the river which restrained them. To assist in the protection of property 1,000 national guardsmen were pressed into service to prevent looting. It continued, however, and
(Courtesy Conn. Devel. Comm.)
WATERTOWN
the retailers pressed for greater security. When it was not forthcoming, they dramatized their need by forming their own protective force. Gov- ernor Cross responded by requesting Federal troops. The river re- mained near its peak through March 23. A curfew was imposed on the city and remained in force for five days. As the waters began to recede, river rats invaded the area, and, added to the damage they wrought, was the danger of typhoid. As it increased, inoculation posts were estab- lished. By the end of the month the essential services were restored and Hartford and other cities along the river began to remove the debris.
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The CCC assisted in this and in disinfecting the houses. As conditions returned to normal the Red Cross began to leave, having spent $2,500,- ooo for aid, and by June 1 most of the traces of the flood had been eradi- cated except along the banks of the rivers.56
The catastrophe caused tremendous damages and excited the co- operation that only such a holocaust can command. The State Director for the National Emergency Council reported the role of federal agen- cies, calling attention to the WPA and the CCC, the two with man- power at their command, who assisted first with flood control and then with flood relief and reclamation. As many as 1,800 CCC workers were engaged, and, on April 1, 3,767 men were employed in 36 communities by WPA. The WPA employed women of relief families in sewing proj- ects in which 30,000 pieces of wearing apparel were made and the serv- ices of WPA educational leaders, nurses, and household aides were made available to officials of stricken areas for rehabilitation work. The Federal Government, when the floods first hit Connecticut, made $220,- 000 available and later increased this to $500,000. In addition, the Fed- eral Government appropriated $3,000,000 for permanent repairs and reconstruction. The Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation sup- plied car load lots of food and an army convoy of 73 trucks brought blankets, beds, and mattresses. The Resettlement Administration assisted in farm and rural areas, and federal resources for loans were available to home owners and industries. Direct damages were estimated at from $25,000,000 to $35,000,000, with 784 buildings in Hartford alone damaged. The indirect damages borne by individuals could not be as- sessed. In effectiveness in combating such tragedy, Connecticut was eminently successful: only one life was lost in the entire state as a result of the flood.57
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