USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume II > Part 40
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Reorganization of the Courts
The reorganization of the minor courts was perhaps "one of the
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most sweeping judicial reforms in the state's history." The Democrats proposed bringing all the municipal courts and trial justice courts into a single integrated court system consisting of 44 full time judges. The Republicans favored a less sweeping reorganization which would include only the municipal courts. Inasmuch as the Democrats held unchallenge- able control of the Senate, the most the GOP could hope for was a compromise on the plan. The success of such a hope was dependent upon defections of the Democrats in the House from the party's posi- tion, while the Republicans went "down the line." A superficial evalua- tion of the situation, particularly early in the legislative session, provided some basis for such hope. The trial justice courts had been historically important patronage plums, particularly in the small towns. Many of these small towns had elected Democrats to the House for the first time in years. Obviously with Democrats in control it was to the interest of these Democratic representatives to continue the trial justices. If these small town Democrats voted their interest, as small town Republicans were inclined to do, the Republicans might be able to alter the plan for complete reorgnaization.1
As events were to prove, however, there were errors in this reason- ing. Although the Governor had said that he would appoint the same number of Republicans as Democrats, he was not bound to those sug- gested by the Republican leadership. There were then 22 appointments which could be used to gain Republican support. Indeed, it was charged on one occasion, that the Governor would not appoint as a Judge any- one from a district whose representative voted against the reorganiza- tion bill. It would be inaccurate to suggest that politics was the only criterion used in the ultimate selection of the Judges, but it would be naive to assume that political considerations were of no importance. Any plan to defeat or alter the Democratic proposal had to consider the fact that in the past Bailey and Brennan had worked closely on major policy decisions oftentimes to the embarrassment of the official GOP position and the possibility that they would cooperate again. Also, the Fairfield County leader still had faithful followers, such as Rodney Eileson of Trumbull, the defeated candidate for Comptroller, who could benefit from a court position. Edwin H. May, in the first months of his tenure as Chairman, might have interpreted Brennan's resignation as Fairfield
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County leader and his absence from the Capital during the first two months of the legislative session as indicating that he had in truth retired from politics. When the court issue was at its highest, however, the veteran politician made his appearance at the capital. He went into conference with "Cappy" Baldwin, had lunch with a few friends, hud- dled with a few more, and then announced that he supported the Gov- ernor's court plan. There were cries of "deal," accusations that Bailey, Ribicoff, and Brennan were "under the same blanket." An electrically charged Republican caucus reaffirmed its faith in the party leadership, but when the appointments were made the Brennan influence was clearly evident. More surprising, perhaps, is the fact that the legislative leaders did not follow the counsel of such Republican leaders as William H. Mortensen of the Executive of the Connecticut Citizens for Better Courts who was in opposition to the party's position and actually mobil- ized support for the Governor's plan. In contrast to the tendency of Republican members of the House to act independently was the party discipline which Bailey was able to exact from the Democratic mem- bers. Within the Democratic Party, the issue was difined as one of party leadership. The word went out that court reorganization was a "must" bill. The language came to be understood even by those who were novices in party politics.2
Technical errors in the drafting of the bill provided the Republican leadership with an opportunity to extricate themselves somewhat, from the unhappy position in which they found themselves. The provision of the proposed bill which gave the Chief Justice the authority to assign a Circuit Court Judge to the Superior Court Bench was contrary to the provision that a Superior Court Judge could be appointed only by the Governor with the confirmation of the Assembly. The Superior Court, it was pointed out, was a constitutional court and the method of appoint- ment of its Judges could not be altered by statutory provision. Further, it was provided in the proposed bill that cases transferred or appealed from the Circuit Court to the higher court could be tried by a six man jury whereas twelve man juries also tried cases in the Superior Court. These changes were made by those drafting the administration bill, but Republican leaders immediately charged that the Court reform bill pro- posed by the Democrats had faults. They held that the bill as drawn
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did not give the Circuit Courts the power to hold Jury trials of any kind and therefore made them incapable of rendering final judgment in any critical case. Under such circumstances, they argued the proposed Cir- cuit Court was little more than a carbon copy of the municipal courts. In this substantive criticism there was actually provided a basis for compromise. On the day the bill was to go to the Senate for a vote John Alsop, who had met with Mortensen a week earlier, judged somewhat belatedly it would seem, that it was politically prudent to support the Governor's proposal. The same day Ernest S. McCormack, Chairman of the State Bar Association, appeared at the Democratic caucus room with a proposal that jury trials should be held in Circuit Courts. Just as the Senate was prepared to discuss the bill, Bailey, May and others met and worked out a compromise providing that jury trials would be held in the Circuit Courts and that one-third of the fines collected in Circuit Courts for motor vehicle violations would be returned to the towns. The latter provision, it was hoped, would make the proposal more palatable to the small towns. There was some bitter criticism of the Republican leadership for having agreed to this compromise, but the party caucus supported it by a 57 to 35 vote. The bill was rushed through the Senate on Tuesday of the next week and was transmitted immediately to the House for action. There small town Republicans made one last deter- mined effort to delay the passage of the bill, seeking unsuccessfully to block the suspension of the rules which was necessary for the bill to be considered immediately. They failed by four votes. After five hours and forty minutes of "tense and often bitter debate," the bill was passed.3
As soon as court reform had been legislated claimants pressed for appointment, individually, in groups, and through friends and political allies. One wife of an applicant appealed directly to the Governor. There were more than 300 applicants for the 44 judgeships. "It was not a pretty sight," wrote one reporter, to see judges and prosecutors lined up to see the party leaders. It was stated that at least four of the appointees did not get top rating by the Connecticut Bar Association and of the 22 Re- publicans named it was estimated that not more than 14 had been named by the chairman of the Republican Party. There were suggestions, too, on the basis of the first months of operation, that the Circuit Courts were cumbersome and that they removed to a great extent the human
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factor in the adjudication of misdeameanors. In general, however, the view prevailed that the establishment of the Circuit Courts furthered the principle of government by law.4
An effort to effect a further improvement in the court system failed in the next session of the legislature. The docket of the Superior Court had become jammed, and it was reported in January, 1961, that some cases were delayed from 24 to 35 months. The Republicans took the position that the situation could be improved by merging the Common Pleas Courts and the Superior Courts and introduced legislation to that end. This was not a new idea. It had been advocated since 1950 by practically every committee which had studied the court system and had been supported by the Connecticut Bar Association. Ernest S. McCor- mack testified that there was no longer any justification for continuing the Common Pleas Courts. Chief Justice Raymond Baldwin meanwhile had made known his opposition to the merger and favored instead an increase in the number of Superior Court Judges from 22 to 29. The Republican members of the Judiciary Committee, consisting of 10 or 12 young lawyers, favored Baldwin's proposal. Bailey appeared willing for the Democrats to support the plan jointly with the Republicans, and Edwin H. May seemed initially to agree. Other Republican leaders, with an eye to the 1962 campaign, reasoned that the Democrats would be the chief beneficiaries and recommended waiting until 1963 when a Republi- can might sit in the Governor's chair. They and the Republican members of the Judiciary Committee met in a vain effort to resolve their differ- ences. The Democrats refused to assume sole responsibility for the bill, and any alteration of the Superior Courts was delayed.5
The Abolition of County Government
Second only to court reorganization in the reform legislation of the 1959 General Assembly was the abolition of County Government. The historical predominance of the town in Connecticut had resulted in lim- iting the function of county government to little more than the administration of the county jails. The power to appoint the three com- missioners and the subordinate attendants in each county, however, con- tinued to be a valuable political plum to be dispensed by the party
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which controlled the General Assembly. As a result of their perennial control of the House this had been of greatest advantage to the Republi- cans and the favorite target of the Democrats. Now, however, the situ- ation was altered. The Democrats controlled both houses of the legislature for the first time in three generations, and, inasmuch as two of the three commissioners in each county were up for appointment, the Democrats could control the County Governments. As the bill lan- guished in committee, it appeared as if the Democrats were going to succumb to the temptation and continue the county system. Yet, there remained the possibility that greater political advantage could be gained by eliminating the county as a unit of government, particularly if the personnel were transferred to the state payroll. Despite the fact that many of the small towns stood to gain materially from the relief from taxes collected to support the county organization, the Republicans were generally in opposition to the bill.
In the belief that the measure was dead, it is reported, the Chair- man of the Republican Party publicly twitted his Democratic counter- part for not pushing the county reform measure aggressively. The inci- dent occurred at a meeting of the Laurel Club, where at an annual festive meeting members of the press and politicians conventionally ex- change political barbs. The challenge was accepted by Mr. Bailey, and the bill was promptly pushed through the Senate where the Democrats exercised complete control. The real test came in the House where the Republicans failed by seven votes in their effort to kill the bill under the guise of creating a commission to study the subject. Then, in what was an obvious effort to strip the bill of its patronage value, they like- wise failed by a narrow margin of two votes to reduce to $500.00 the salaries of County Sheriffs, who were to be absorbed in the state gov- ernment. When the Governor signed the bill on May 12, 1959, an insti- tution which dated from 1666 was to come to an end. "A milestone in Connecticut's history" wrote the Courant, "for which the people can be grateful." 6
Reorganization of State Government
The elimination of county government and the alteration of the courts were significant reforms, but the governing agencies reorganized
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constituted something less than the "top to bottom" reorganization which the Governor had promised. He altered, or called off altogether, those plans for reorganization where the clamor in opposition was the loudest. When the details of the plans became known, there began a terrific be- hind-the-scenes struggle on the part of members of citizens' boards and commissions who sought to retain their perogatives, on the part of agency heads who sought to retain their positions, and on the part of others who believed sincerely that the functions of the agencies concerned would be severely hampered by the proposed alterations of structure or responsibilities. In the face of strong opposition, principally by Miss Ethel Mecum, the Superintendent of Long Lane School, who held stead- fastly to the view that Long Lane was not a penal institution, the pro- posed Department of Corrections was referred to the Legislative Coun- cil for study.7 Although the idea was presented again to the 1961 General Assembly, the legislators failed to act favorably on the proposal. Exten- sive lobbying efforts on the part of the pharmacists of the state pre- vented the Pharmacy Commission from being absorbed by the proposed Department of Consumer Protection for other than house keeping pur- poses. The Board of Education objection to the divided authority that was implicit in the provision that the State Library and the Education of the Blind be responsible to the Commissioner of Education while continuing their established boards resulted in the continued independ- ence of the two agencies.
Nevertheless, certain significant changes were accomplished in the structure and administrative responsibilities of government. Those responsible for directing the legislative program wisely capitalized on the desire of parents and friends to have an office of Mental Retarda- tion established by choosing the proposal to reorganize the Department of Health, of which the proposed office was to be a part, as the first of the reorganization plans to be submitted to the legislature. The support of the reorganization of this Department to include a program relating to mental retardation had developed gradually and represented accept- ance of a compromise as to the status of the state unit which would be established and charged with responsibility for the state program for the mentally retarded. To the 1957 session of the General Assembly, Ribicoff had proposed the establishment of a Department of Mental
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Retardation. The issue had become involved in differences between the various groups of parents and friends of the retarded and the Republi- can dominated Welfare Committee had followed the predisposition of its chairman to kill the bill. The committee contended that there was not sufficient evidence upon which to commit the state to the expenditures which would be entailed. The idea that the state should assume some greater degree of responsibility in the care of the retarded, however, was implicit in an appropriation of $7,500, secured through the efforts of J. Fred Pope, the House Majority Leader, for a study of the "adequacies of facilities and supervision available to the mentally retarded residents of the state."8 The Legislative Council and the Welfare Committee, under whose aegis the study was conducted, had then recommended the establishment of a Division of Mental Retardation in the Department of Mental Health. The view persisted, however, among the parents of the retarded, that the care and treatment of retardates had to be specialized and required the inclusion of an emphasis upon training which it was believed would not be accorded by the established Mental Health De- partment where the major focus and basic orientation was toward psy- chiatry. Parents hoped for more. They wanted attention to physiological causitive factors and assistance with the development of the child. They thought no established department with a particular major focus would suffice. They wanted, therefore, a separate Department of Mental Retar- dation as recommended initially by Ribicoff. The sweeping Democratic victory in 1958, in view of Ribicoff's recommendation in 1957, would seem to have assured the realization of this objective, but the Governor was on record in favor of reducing the number of separate Departments in the state's government. At a meeting in late November, 1958, with repre- sentatives of the Connecticut Association for Retarded Children, the Governor pointed out the obvious inconsistency in this proposal and his earlier recommendation. He suggested, therefore, making retardation the responsibility of the Department of Education. The Association's repre- sentatives countered the Governor's proposal by recommending plac- ing retardation in the Department of Health, if a separate Department were not possible. This did not avoid a division of responsibility in a total program for the retardate, but chose a focus upon physiological factors in retardation as more basic than secondary emotional ramifica-
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tions or consequential intellectual characteristics. This was agreed to by the Governor on condition that he could make administrative changes in the Department of Health. In an emotionally packed hearing held subsequently in the Hall of the House, parents and friends of the re- tarded strongly supported the proposal in opposition to the members of the Welfare Committee and the "professional opinion" of the Depart- ment of Mental Health. The bill as finally passed added also, to the Department of Health, the Office of Tuberculosis Control in addition to other administrative and fiscal responsibilities.9 Other important organi- zational changes included grouping the activities of the State Food and Drug Commission, the State Athletic Commission, the office of the Com- missioner of Weights and Measures, and various other inspection respon- sibilities in a Department of Consumer Protection. The Mystic Oral School became the responsibility of the Department of Education; and the Office of Civil Defense became a division of the Military Depart- ment. The number of independent commissions and offices was thus reduced. There remained some doubt, however, if the reorganization would result in increased coordination and efficiency. The Department of Agriculture, for example, which was renamed the Department of Agri- culture, Conservation and Natural Resources was to assume the responsi- bility for coordinating the activities of the Board of Fisheries and Game, the Commission of Parks and Forests, the Water Resources Commission, the Natural History and Geological Survey, the Connecticut Marketing Authority, the Shell Fish Commission, and the Interstate Sanitary Com- mission, questioned whether the Department had the "statutory authority to engage in active programming, planning, and direction. .. . " Apparently the desire to clarify this in the 1961 Session of the General Assembly did not materialize. However, the Interstate Sanitary Commission was re- moved from the Department and word "conservation" dropped from its title so that it was thereafter to be identified as the Department of Agri- culture and Natural Resources. An effort to have the Board of Fisheries and Game removed also from the province of the Department failed.10 Legislation for the Mentally Retarded
One of the most dramatic social advances of the Fifties was that in the area of mental retardation. As a result of the dedicated efforts of
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the parents and friends of the retarded and especially of the intellectual stimulus provided by Eric Sandahl, a parent of two retarded children and at the time the Editor of the Bridgeport Herald, the needs of the mentally retarded were brought to the attention of the public. Their efforts culminated in the enactment in the' 1959 session of the General Assembly of multiple legislation to provide a broad and planned pro- gram in retardation, in addition to the establishment of the Office of Mental Retardation. Perhaps of greatest long range significance was the provision making it mandatory that school districts provide educational opportunities for the mentally retarded between the ages of six and twenty-one. Under the voluntary program endorsed by the State Depart- ment of Education in which special education for retardates might be provided by school districts, opportunities for the retarded had increased. Under this permissive legislation, there still remained school districts where opportunities were lacking and where school boards refused to make provisions. The Governor indicated his interest in the program if it met with the approval of the Commissioner of Education. He, per- haps with the thought that the Office of Mental Retardation was to be placed in his Department, gave verbal approval to the plan, with the proviso that it be made effective in September, 1961. He continued to support it, however, after it became apparent that the administrative responsibility for the Office would be assumed by the Department of Health. A measure of the effectiveness of the legislation is suggested by statistical records of implementation under the two contrasting provi- sions.
When the mandatory bill was passed in 1959 there were approxi- mately 200 classes in the public schools for the mentally retarded which had been developed over a period of years. By 1962 there were 343 classes. In the absence of enforcement regulations, there remained school districts which continued to fail to provide the required opportunities or made only token compliance. In recognition of the fact that voca- tional training would be of special benefit to the mentally retarded, monies were provided for the establishment of sheltered workshops, and the on-the-job training program initiated at New Haven was described in 1961 as most rewarding. That legislation which was of most signifi- cance to the alteration of the method of care and treatment of the re-
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tardates was perhaps contained in the provisions that the Office of Mental Retardation was to develop community day care programs, six hundred and thirty-five mentally retarded persons had benefited from the program by June, 1961. To assist parents in the early diagnosis of chil- dren suspected of being mentally retarded, three diagnostic centers were authorized, and in 1961 the numerical limitation on these was eliminated.
Also, in 1959, parents or those legally liable were relieved of the possibility of a life-time burden of supporting those mentally retarded who were residents of institutions. The idea that the State should assume full responsibility for the care of these unfortunates had been proposed by Ribicoff during his 1954 campaign. In 1955, the Assembly passed a "Fair Care Bill" under which the maximum amount of charges which could be billed was limited to $18.75 per month. When the limitation expired, however, in September, 1957, the maximum which was billed increased until in 1959 it reached $26.95. Theoretically, under the fair care principle the amount one was actually billed depended on one's ability to pay. In practice, however, when the maximum increased there was a tendency for the scale of payments at all levels to advance. The parents of the retarded residing at the Mansfield Training School and Hospital spearheaded a drive to alter the length and rate of payment. With the guidance of Secretary of State Ella Grasso, who frequently combines good programs with good politics, the bill was passed by voice vote, but not without the struggle in the caucus rooms and the corridors usually reserved for the money and patronage bills. It was provided that the "liability of legally liable relatives shall cease when the patient has reached the age of twenty-one or when support has been paid as charged for a period of sixteen years, whichever occurs later." Also the maximum as it then existed was frozen. Although thus to fix the maximum seems to contradict the central concept of Fair Care, the dichotomy between the theory and application of the law had resulted in a modicum of injustice. The tendency to secure from a family all possible funds for care without regard to losses to society from the consequent depriva- tions of opportunity to members of the family was too much a part of the Yankee character and too entrenched legally and by convention in the Welfare Department to allow a realistic expectation of change in attitude without the new corrective legislation.11
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