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Although it had not achieved as large a dollar volume as the brass industry, the industry which was most deeply rooted in the economic history of the state was hardware. Centered in this industry were an
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THE POWER OF WEALTH AND INDUSTRY
unaccountable number of products developed from the handicrafts born of Connecticut ingenuity and adapted to a factory system. The in- dustry, including cutlery, tools, and saddlery hardware, grossed over 23,000,000 by 1900. This represented an increase of more than 50 per- cent during the last 20 years.75 The growth of the industry was marked by a series of inventions which increased the productive capacity many fold. Special machinery was introduced for straightening wire, for ex- ample. Also, an automatic staple machine for making buckles and rings at the rate of from 75 to 175 a minute and machines for making barbed wire were introduced. These last cut, bent, sharpened the staples, tied them into knots on strands of wire, and ran them off in reels at the rate of 100 knots of barb a minute. The full benefit of machinery, however, was not realized by the industry because of the prejudice of many of the operators. For certain operations, sub-contracting and piece work re- mained characteristic of the industry. As a result of the labor saving machines used, there developed a uniformity of production, although a fine tolerance was not generally required by the nature of the prod- ucts.76 New Britain continued to be the center of the industry, and here was produced more than half of the hardware articles made in the state.77 The Russell and Erwin, P. & F. Corbin, Stanley Rule and Level, Landers, Frary and Clark, and North and Judd companies and the Stanley Works all added to their facilities, introduced new products, expanded their markets, and refined the industrial processes through research and managerial improvements. To the production of these leaders of the industry was added that of many others, including the Union Hardware Company of Torrington, the Wallace Barnes, the Ses- sions Foundry, and the Horton Manufacturing companies of Bristol, the A. P. Plant Company of Plantsville, the Clark Brothers Company of Milldale, and the Peck, Stowe, and Wilcox Company of Southing- ton.78 As products bearing Connecticut trademarks were sold through- out the world, the legend of Yankee notions was altered and extended.
As Connecticut was extending its reputation in hardware, the state was becoming known, too, for its excellence in precision machinery. It was through machine tools that the industrial processes were trans- formed from one of approximation to one of minute precision. In Connecticut, this development was closely allied with the manufacture
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
of fire arms and of sewing machines.79 A machine tool is one which guides or impels minor tools in the cutting or shaping of metal.80 In the making of the band wheels of a sewing machine, for example, the wheel was first chucked, that is, placed in a rotary holder, and then acted upon by five tools in a turret head. A tool actuated by a handle was then pushed forward through a power spindle to face off the back of the hub, after which a groove in the rim was turned by a tool rest at the side.81 By this machine operation, 110 band wheels could be pro- duced in the same time as had been previously required to produce 25. Another indication of the effect of machine tools on productive ca- pacity is indicated by the turret lathes used in making screws, which turned out from eight to 20 times as many screws as hand turned lathes, although these had been a great advance over the hand turret lathe, itself a labor saving machine. Improved flasks and molding machines enabled one man and a boy to mold 300 balance wheels for sewing machines in one day, whereas a skilled workman could produce but 65 ten years previously. Whereas one skilled laborer in 1870 produced from 35 to 50 arms for a sewing machine in a day, a comparatively un- skilled laborer in 1880 could, with the use of an improved hinged flask, produce 112 a day.82 The process of foundry work was further speeded by the use of tumbling barrels for cleaning. The machine tool industry together with the foundry work grossed almost 19,000,000 in 1900. A measure of the precision of the tools is provided when it is remembered that the acceptable tolerance had become one and one- half thousandth of an inch by 1870 and one-half of one thousandth of an inch by 1880.82a Elisha K. Root, who was primarily responsible for the design and construction of the equipment of the Colt Arms Factory, was a leader in the development of machine tools and was responsible for training a host of mechanics who introduced machine tools in vari- ous industries throughout the state. Among the early leaders in the construction of machine tools were the Walters Brothers' Company and the Pacific Iron Works of Bridgeport, and the Billings and Spencer, the Hartford Machine Screw, and Pratt and Whitney companies of Hart- ford.83
Other established industries continued to add to their gross prod- uct. The silver industry continued to be centered in Meriden and Wall-
(Courtesy Chamber of Commerce of Greenwich, Inc.)
GREENWICH-INDUSTRIAL VIEW, SHOWING THE ELECTROLUX CORPORATION
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
ingford, but shops could be found throughout Hartford and New Haven counties. Most of these shops, no doubt, produced the cheaper white metal, or Britannia Ware. Their total gross product increased from six million in 1880 to about nine and one-half million in 1900.84
(Courtesy Conn. State Lib.)
MANCHESTER-CHENEY BROS., WORLD'S LARGEST SILK MILLS
The Mallory Hat Company was the largest of the 33 hat factories lo- cated in Danbury in 1895, but other companies which were to become important in the industry were organized in the last quarter of the century. These included the D. E. Loewe & Company, which was begun in 1879, and the Frank H. Lee Company, which was established in 1885.85 Collectively the industry produced hats and allied products valued in 1900 at $7,546,882, which represented an increase of more than 70 percent in a 20 year period. The rubber industry, which in its
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THE POWER OF WEALTH AND INDUSTRY
formative years was dependent almost entirely on the need for rubber shoes and garments and for elastic webbing, was by the end of the cen- tury beginning to benefit from the demand for pneumatic tires. In 20 years the value of rubber goods produced in Connecticut increased al- most 400 percent, from $1,710,761 in 1880 to $8,246,240 in 1900. The firearms and ammunition production, which had declined after the Civil War, was stimulated by the materiel needs of the Spanish-Ameri- can War.
Not merely did established industries expand, but others were established to produce new articles in response to the demands created by the rapidly developing urban society. The leaders in electrical sup- plies were the Bryant Electric Company of Bridgeport (1880), the Hart and Hegeman Company of Hartford (1890), and the Trumbull Electric Company (1899). The gross product of electrical supplies in 1900 was $3,167,842, which was about three-quarters of a million dollars less than that of products of plumbing, gas, and steam heating.87 The im- portance of fashion in the Gay Nineties was reflected in the growth of the corset industry. Connecticut's domination of this industry was due to the doctors I. De Ver Warner and Lucien C. Warner, who designed the original "health corset" and began a company at Bridgeport with a capital of $2,500. In 1900, the product of the corset industry in Con- necticut amounted to almost seven million dollars.88 Although the type- writer industry achieved great volume only in the twentieth century, the gross product of the industry in Connecticut in 1900 was three- fourths of a million dollars.
As Connecticut industries continued to increase their production, there was a trend toward consolidation. To an increasing extent, the personally owned shops were being combined under the management of large corporations. The American Brass Company, organized in 1899, brought together the shops of Waterbury, Torrington, and An- sonia.90 The Russell and Erwin Manufacturing Company and the P. & F. Corbin Company were combined as the American Hardware Company in 1902.91 The process of combining the many silver Britannia companies, which had begun in 1852 when several of these companies in Meriden combined, was completed by the formation of the Interna- tional Silver Company in 1898.92 The Willimantic Linen Company and
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
the American Thread Company of Holyoke merged in 1898.93 For the most part, however, Connecticut industries remained under the man- agement of Connecticut citizens, who contributed the largest portion of the capital.
The growth of Connecticut industry was interrupted only slightly and temporarily by the Panic of 1893. There was, however, a noticeable decline in the production of Connecticut industries during the Panic. The depression is generally considered to have covered the period from June, 1893, to September, 1894. The lowest points in general were in January and July, although the low point for a number of industries was the Fall of 1893. The estimated production was about three-quar- ters of the normal in the manufacture of shoes, buttons, brass goods, cast iron, corsets, hardware, hosiery, rubber goods, silk, and wood- working. Production did not fall this low in clocks, cotton goods, and cotton cloth, but fell below 60 percent of normal production in wool, cutlery, and firearms, and achieved only about two-thirds of normal production in silverware, wire goods, carriage making, and machine building.94
NOTES-CHAPTER XXVI
1 Public Documents, 1877, Report of the Railroad Commissioner p. 7.
2 George Pierce Baker, The Formation of the New England Railroad Systems.
3 In addition to the main line, the company leased the Norwich and Worcester and the Dutchess and Columbia, held charter rights for the extension of the road westward to the Hudson and for the completion of a road from Willimantic to New Haven, which the company had no immediate desire to exercise. Ibid., pp. 50, 52-54.
4 Baker, New England Railroad Systems, p. 55; Niven, "Time of the Whirlwind," pp. 302-303.
5 Ibid., pp. 297-300; Baker, New England Railroad Systems, pp. 80-81.
6 Ibid., p. 55.
7 Public Acts, 1883, pp. 267-69.
8 Niven, "Time of the Whirlwind," pp. 297-98.
9 Ibid., p. 293.
10 Ibid., p. 299; Baker, New England Railroad Systems, p. 62.
11 Quoted in ibid., p. 68.
12 See reports of Railroad Commissioners for the period.
14 Niven, "Time of the Whirlwind," pp. 300-18.
15 Public Documents, 1877, Report of the Railroad Commissioner, p. 77.
16 Ibid., 1878, Report of the Railroad Commissioner, p. 3.
17 Public Acts, 1883, p. 320.
19 Public Documents, 1875, Report of the Railroad Commissioner, pp. 15-16.
20 Ibid., 1878, Report of the Railroad Commissioner, pp. 4-6.
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THE POWER OF WEALTH AND INDUSTRY
21 Public Acts, 1878, p. 47.
22 Baker, New England Railroad Systems, pp. 60-61.
23 Ibid., 1885, Vol. I, Report of the Railroad Commissioner, p. 39; Public Acts, 1885, P. 452.
24 Report of the Railroad Commissioner, p. 37.
25 Public Documents, 1882, Vol. I, Report of the Railroad Commissioner, p. 17.
26 Ibid., 1885, Vol. I, Report of the Railroad Commissioner, p. 35; Public Acts, 1885, P. 451.
27 Public Documents, 1875, Report of the Railroad Commissioner, p. 21; Ibid., 1880, Vol. I, Report of the Railroad Commissioner, p. 33; Ibid., 1882, Vol. I, Report of
the Railroad Commissioner, p. 11; Public Acts, 1879, p. 12; 1881, p. 12; 1882, p. 170. 29 Public Documents, 1885, Vol. I, Report of the Railroad Commissioner, p. 40.
30 Ibid., 1888, Vol. I, Report of the Railroad Commissioner, p. 40; Public Acts, 1887, p. 665.
33 Ibid., 1875, 1880, 1885, 1890, 1895, 1900, Reports of the Railroad Commissioners, passim.
35 Ibid., Report of the Railroad Commissioner, p. 30.
36 Public Acts, 1889, pp. 81, 134, 167.
37 Ibid., 1893, pp. 362, 409.
38 Public Documents, 1875, 1880, 1885, 1890, 1895, 1900, Reports of Railroad Commis- sioners, passim.
39 Public Document, 1882, Vol. I, Report of the Railroad Commissioner, p. 25.
40 Ibid., p. 39.
41 Public Acts, 1882, p. 148.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., 1878, Report of the Railroad Commissioner, p. 6.
44 Public Documents, 1877, Report of the Railroad Commissioner, pp. 7-12; ibid., 1879,
Vol. I, Report of the Railroad Commissioner, p. 36; ibid., 1880, Report of the Railroad Commissioner, p. 31.
45 Ibid., 1879, Vol. I, Report of the Railroad Commissioner, pp. 36-39.
46 Ibid., 1888, Report of the Railroad Commissioner, p. 16; ibid., 1889, Report of the Railroad Commissioner, p. 61.
47 Baker, New England Railroad Systems, pp. 82-85.
48 Ibid., pp. 82-87.
49 Ibid., pp. 59-70.
51 Public Documents, 1878, Special Message from the Governor concerning Joint Capital Stock Corporations, pp. 3-6.
52 Ibid.
53 Public Documents, 1880, Vol. I, Governor's Message, 1879, pp. 6-7; ibid., 1880, Vol. I, Governor's Message, pp. 13-15.
54 Public Documents, 1880, Vol. II, Report of the Board of Commissioners . .. to Ex- amine and Revise the Joint Stock Laws of the State, pp. 3-97.
55 Ibid .; General Statutes of Connecticut, revision of 1866, p. 170.
56 Public Acts, 1881, pp. 18-19; 1889, p. 37.
57 Public Acts, 1880, pp. 32-61.
58 Twelfth Census, Manufactures, Part 2 (Washington, 1902), p. 75.
59 Ibid., pp. 76-77; Tenth Census, Manufactures, p. xxi.
60 Public Documents, 1880, Vol. II, Report of the Board of Commissioners ... to Ex- amine the Joint Stock Laws of the State (Hartford, 1879), p. 4.
61 Twelfth Census, Manufactures, Part 2, p. 80.
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
62 Twelfth Census, pp. 80-82.
63 Ibid., pp. 83-85.
64 Ibid., p. 80.
65 Twelfth Census, 1900, pp. 79-81.
66 Ibid .; Chandler, "Industrial History," in Osborn, ed., History of Connecticut, Vol. IV, pp. 266-67.
67 Ibid., pp. 284-85; Pliny Leroy Harwood, History of Eastern Connecticut, 3 vols. (Chi- cago, 1932) Vol. 2, P. 592.
68 Twelfth Census, 1900, Chandler, "Industrial History," in Osborn, ed., History of Con- necticut, Vol. IV. pp. 250-54.
70 Twelfth Census, 1900, p. 86; Clark, History of Manufacturing, Vol. II, p. 181.
71 Penrose R. Hoopes, "Early Clockmaking in Connecticut."
72 Eleventh Census, 1890, p. 86.
73 Chandler, "Industrial History," in Osborn, ed., History of Connecticut, Vol. IV, pp. 70-76.
74 Clark, History of Manufacturing, Vol. II, p. 369.
75 Twelfth Census, 1900, pp. 87-89; Tenth Census, 1880, pp. 33, 45, 79.
76 Tenth Census, 1880, pp. 5-12.
77 Twelfth Census, 1900, p. 84.
78 Chandler, "Industrial History," in Osborn, ed., History of Connecticut, Vol. IV, pp. 91-153.
79 Ibid., pp. 390-91.
80 Ibid.
81 Tenth Census, 1880, p. 38.
82 Ibid., p. 36.
82a Tenth Census, 1880, p. 36.
83 Chandler, "Industrial History," in Osborn, ed., History of Connecticut, Vol. IV, pp. 390-401.
84 Ibid., pp. 165-70.
85 Chandler, "Industrial History," in Osborn, ed., History of Connecticut, Vol. IV, pp. 307-10.
87 Chandler, "Industrial History," in Osborn, ed., History of Connecticut, Vol. IV, pp. 358-61.
88 Ibid., pp. 291-92.
90 Chandler, "Industrial History," in Osborn, ed., History of Connecticut, Vol. IV, p. 75.
91 Ibid., p. 103.
92 Ibid., p. 165.
93 Ibid., p. 285.
94 Public Documents, 1895, Vol. II, Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1895, pp. 167-264.
Chapter XXVII Agriculture, Labor, and the Foreign-born
I N THE period of readjustment following the American Civil War, industrial management had completely dominated labor, taking advantage of the glutted labor market to enforce its will. Manufacturers' leagues had been organized to check the nascent labor movement and strikes were quickly concluded by cutting off credit at the company store.1 Despite legal restriction, political coercion appar- ently had not been abetted. It was alleged, for example, that a repre- sentative of the Sprague Mills stood guard over the ballot box at elec- tion time, checking off the company's employees as they came to vote. The arrogance of industry had been painfully obvious in its control of some of the municipal elections.2
Labor was disheartened at the barrenness of its attempts to improve its position in society.
The leaders of labor reform turned to political action. Despite earlier failures, the increase in the number of unions from six in 1865 to 27 in 1871 provided hope for success. However, not all of the work- ingmen were convinced of the wisdom of political action. Some pre- ferred to continue to regard the labor reform movement as a social and benevolent impulse. Others were fearful of irritating their employers. As an independent political group, labor made little headway. Its politi- cal convention was poorly attended, and its treasury was short of funds. It was a sufficient challenge to the established parties that the Democrats absorbed many of the principles of the labor party in their platform. An independent labor party, however, was regarded as a threat to the very stability of society, and, thoroughly discredited, made a pitiful
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
showing on election day. The General Assembly ignored pleas for the suspension of the law which designated certain labor efforts as a con- spiracy, for repeal of the contract labor law by which foreigners had been imported, it was alleged, to swell the labor market in the state, and for enactment of legislation to outlaw political coercion. The only tan- gible positive result of labor's efforts was the creation of a Bureau of Labor Statistics.3
This Bureau virtually died a-borning. The legislature made a niggardly appropriation of $1000. to cover expenses including salaries for a Commissioner and his assistant. Also, the Bureau lacked power to enforce its requests for reliable statistics. The first Commissioner, James Babcock, who has been characterized as a political hack, could not over- come the operational difficulties. The second Commissioner, Samuel J. Starr of Middletown, suggested that the industrialists' deep absorption in business explained their failure to supply the necessary information. In fact, a deep opposition to the Bureau had swelled within the ranks of management.4 Governor Charles R. Ingersoll, who had not been overly sympathetic with the Bureau from the beginning, stated, in 1875, his belief that the work of the Bureau did not justify its con- tinuation. The General Assembly, at a time when labor had been fur- ther depressed by the Panic of 1873, abolished the Bureau.5
Wage earners were hard hit by the Panic of 1873. The number of unemployed became larger than in any recent former year. Many fac- tories worked part time and others with a reduced labor force. Because the supply of labor permitted it, from 1873 to 1875 wages were reduced from five to twenty percent, even in industries, such as firearms and silver, which enjoyed full production. No single wage increase was re- ported during the period. In general, the workingmen did not resort to strikes, yet one of the most severe strikes in the state's history did occur in the textile mills at Taftville.6
The employees at Taftville struck on April 1, 1875, when the company refused to restore more than one-half of two cuts of twelve percent. These had been made at the beginning of the panic and when the company had sought to break the workingmen's union which had been organized at the factory. Immediately when the strike began, the company employed new workers and directed the former employees to
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AGRICULTURE, LABOR, AND FOREIGN-BORN
vacate company houses within one month. The strike produced only the necessity to seek work elsewhere.
Some of the difficulties at Taftville devolved from the company store operation which was characteristic of Connecticut industry in this
0
(Courtesy Danbury Chamber of Commerce)
DANBURY-FAIR GROUNDS
period. Technically, the store was owned by the treasurer of the Com- pany, but for all practical purposes, it was operated by the company. The operatives, who received from $8.25 to $9.00 per week for 67 hours of work, were convinced that the Company was determined to regain all of the wages paid. In addition to withholding one month and three days' salary at the outset, the company retained on each payday sums to cover rent and the store bill. One worker stated that he drew but four dollars from February to April, although he and his daughter to-
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
gether earned fifteen dollars a week. The Company also refused to ad- vance payments to any worker no matter how great the emergency. The Commissioner of Labor concluded that the Company treated the employees like children or rogues under a policy "calculated to make the operatives completely dependent upon their employers."7
The most disturbing evidence of the plight of laborers was the situation of those who wandered from town to town, ostensibly, it was said, to seek employment, but actually to subsist on charities. The head of the Bureau of Labor was careful to distinguish between the common tramp and this new group of vagrants. The General Assembly, however, responded with a severe tramp law, which, in application, seemed to make little differentiation between the two.8 Any transient person was subject to arrest without warrant. Those who asked for food were re- quired to work not later than eleven o'clock of the succeeding day. Re- fusal to perform the labor assigned could result in a jail sentence of not less than thirty days.9
One of the most perplexing of labor problems was that of the em- ployment of children. It was common knowledge in the 1870's that children under fourteen, particularly in the smaller villages, were em- ployed in violation of schooling requirements. Both employers and parents shared responsibility for this. For example, some textile mills reported instances where heads of families would accept employment only on the condition that their children would also be employed. Often, children's ages were misrepresented. In some instances, when employers insisted that children go to school, parents would find em- ployment for the children elsewhere. Some employers, on the other hand, sought to take advantage of the cheaper wages which were paid children.1ยบ In no case did an employer increase the wage rate in order to enable a single member of the household to earn a sum sufficient to provide subsistence for the family and make multiple earnings unneces- sary. School attendance was invariably higher during periods of eco- nomic distress.11
In 1882, children under 14 years of age were required to have re- ceived 60 full days of instruction within the twelve months preceding the month of employment.12 It was apparent that any law designed to control child labor would have to carry with it the power of enforce-
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AGRICULTURE, LABOR, AND FOREIGN-BORN
ment. When the permissive age of employment was reduced to thirteen, the law provided for the appointment of inspectors charged with its enforcement. Enforcement, however, was opposed by some parents and by towns which feared that families would become pauperized by it,
(Courtesy Conn. State Lib.)
CANTON CENTER-A. L. MILLS IN A 1902 TOBACCO SCENE
and its effectiveness was limited thereby.13 A climate favorable to the control of child labor had not then developed.
Gradually, a shorter work week came to prevail, although the eight hour law remained a mockery throughout the century. Employers gen- erally used the convenient clause, "unless otherwise agreed by the par- ties," to escape application of this shorter day. A single exception was the cigar making industry, which, it was explained, was little affected by the introduction of machinery and was supervised by the Federal Government. Nevertheless, the percentage of establishments in which
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
the daily hours of work were ten or less increased from 79.61 in 1860 to 82.81 in 1880. A slight improvement was noted after 1887 when a law was passed limiting the employment of women and children to ten hours a day.14 It was suggested that this law had the effect of limiting the hours of work for men as well.15 In general, however, the law seems to have been successfully evaded whenever the needs of the company purportedly demanded it. It was charged that it was applied when it served the interest of the employer.16 By 1892, less than two percent of the factories worked more than 60 hours a week. Thirty-five percent of the establishments had adopted the short Saturday, and a few were granting 60 hours' pay for 59 hours' work. The shortening of the work week was the most concrete benefit which had been achieved for labor.17
Laborers, in the 1880's, had been indifferent and apathetic about their status. A feeling prevailed that their condition was bad, but not likely to improve. There was a general attitude that someone, other than themselves, was responsible for their unfavorable circumstances.18 Of the laboring class it was said that they, possessing "no great quantity of real estate . . , find it difficult to maintain a permanent home. Their engagement is by the hour; by the hour they are paid ... ; they are at work with machinery and must work when the machine runs, and stop when it stops. ... They have perfect liberty of con- tract, can go when they will, and can be discharged at the will of the employer. . . The bright, intelligent man finds himself distanced in the race for a job by the ignorant and less competent, whose principal qualification is his ability to live and work on small wages. The worst feature is their lack of hope."19 Employees were so afraid of retaliation by their employers that they were hesitant even to furnish information concerning industrial conditions to the labor commissioner. Some re- quested that envelopes bearing the identification of the Bureau not be addressed to their place of employment. Others would receive this mail only at a post office other than the one nearest their home. There were manufacturers who had a horror of any statement of grievances and any employee who submitted such did so at the risk of being discharged. Once discharged, it was difficult to secure employment. The blacklist was, perhaps, not used so extensively as labor claimed, and, doubtlessly, there were instances when its use was charged as a cover-up for in-
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