USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume II > Part 18
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It was the spirit of laissez-faire which came to characterize the period. By the time of Morgan Bulkeley, Andrew's ideas found only
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faint echo when Bulkeley reminded the legislators that people must be protected during the consolidation of capital.7 Caution derived from the realization of the importance of manufacture to the welfare of the state persistently and effectively blocked stringently restrictive legisla- tion.
(Courtesy Conn. Devel. Comm.)
HARTFORD-STATE LIBRARY AND SUPREME COURT
The political leaders of the state, nevertheless, gave some evidence of the awareness of the demands of the society of which they were a part in the establishment of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the regula- tion of the saving banks, the support extended to the hospital for the in- sane, and the recommendation to expand the normal school. Extension of these services, however, was restrained by a fiscal prudence calculated to eliminate the public debt and to permit a reduction in taxes. The Republicans, moreover, refused to countenance any innovation which
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
would require an alteration of the existent framework of government, such as modification of the basis of representation.9
The Governors, in fact, exercised only advisory or persuasive power over the legislative process. The right of veto amounted to no more than an opportunity for the Governor to express an opinion, inasmuch as only a bare majority was required to pass a bill over his veto. The Governor's signature to a law was "merely perfunctory, but by no means necessary,"10 except if the legislature adjourned and left the final disposition of legislation contingent upon the Governor's approval. Governor Thomas Waller protested that except in extraordinary cir- cumstances, such an eventuality should never occur. Waller, a Demo- crat, void of any real power as Governor, was seeking to fix in the public mind that the responsibility for legislation rested with the enacting body.11 Connecticut's traditional fear of a too-powerful executive is re- vealed not only in the fact that no Governor was elected to succeed him- self during the period, but also by the circumstance that no Governor even received the renomination of his Party.12
The power of the legislators was not limited to legislative matters, but extended, for example, to the actual selection of the Governor. Of all their powers, that which was most frequently abused, was that of granting special charters to private and public corporations. The right to elect the Judges of the minor courts had come to be regarded by many as one which should be exercised only on the recommendation of the executive. It was charged, too, that the selection of County Commis- sioners by the legislature resulted in the Commissioners' not being responsible to anyone for the discharge of their duties.13 When no guber- natorial candidate received a majority of the total votes cast, the Assem- bly "by joint ballot of both houses" was to proceed, without debate, to choose a Governor from the two with the highest number of votes. In the elections of 1884, 1886, and 1888, no candidate received a majority of votes, and in 1890 the count of votes was contested. Although in each instance, the Democratic candidate received a plurality of from 1,000 to 3,000 votes, he was denied the Governorship by the General Assembly.14
The election of 1890 was one of the most bitterly contested in the state's history. The candidates were Luzon B. Morris, Democrat; Sam- uel E. Merewin, Republican; Henry C. Baldwin, Labor; and Phineas
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REPUBLICAN YEARS
M. Augur, Prohibition. The Board of Canvassers, composed of the Sec- retary, the Treasurer, and the Comptroller, reported on the first day of the session that Luzon B. Morris had received 67,662 votes or twelve more than necessary for a majority of the 135,298 cast. The House, in which the Republicans had a majority of ten, refused to accept the re- port of the Canvassers as final. After appointing a committee to investi- gate alleged election day irregularities, the Assembly recessed, thereby avoiding any technicality which might be raised as to its legal responsi- bility to examine and act at once upon the results of an election. The Senate, in which the Democrats had a majority of five, swore Morris into office in the Senate Chamber. They locked the doors of the Senate Chamber and Morris retired for the day. Bulkeley, acting on an amend- ment adopted in 1884, which provided that state officers should hold their office for their duly designated terms and "until their successors are duly qualified" continued to serve as Governor for the next two years.15
The arguments which followed centered around the right of the General Assembly to investigate election returns when they had been confirmed by the canvassing committee. The Republicans held that the Assembly was invested with this right; the Democrats held that the Assembly had no right except to examine the lists of persons and the votes ascribed to each as presented to it by the Canvassers. In three ar- ticles which appeared in the New Englander and Yale Review the con- stitutional and historical basis of the problem was aired.16 In one of these, Simeon Baldwin cited precedent for examining ballot boxes by authority of the courts and reached the conclusion, with which there seemed to be general agreement, that there was no power to compel the General Assembly to declare the true result of an election.17
The issues in the disputed election of 1890 were perforce matters for legislative attention. Yet, the Assembly did not rush to alter the method of electing state officers. The Democratic Governor, Luzon B. Morris, in 1893, warned the members of the legislature that "if we are to retain popular government in Connecticut, the Constitution should be so changed that the votes of the people as cast on election day should have their full effect."18 Morris contended that there was "no good rea- son" for not electing the executive officers of the state by a plurality
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
vote.19 An amendment designed to extend the principle of plurality to the election of state officials was passed by the 1893 session of the Assem- bly, in 1895, when the Republicans controlled both branches of the Assembly and the Executive Branch, and the amendment was de- feated.2ยบ Governor Coffin reminded the Assembly in a cold and matter- of-fact way that an amendment relating to the election of state officers would come before the legislators for approval. Both houses responded by defeating the amendment. However, the action of the 1895 Assembly was reversed by the 1899 Assembly and when the measure came up for final action two years later, Governor George P. McLean recommended the plurality method of electing state officers as "more satisfactory" than the existing "ultra conservative method." The amendment was ap- proved and subsequently ratified by the people.21
This concession toward political reform did not allay the persistent demands which had swelled since the election of 1890 for a constitu- tional convention. There had been an attempt to arouse the people to demand this in 1873. Small concessions had thereafter been granted in amendments of 1874 and 1876. The former granted two representatives to each town with a population of 5,000, and the latter required both a newly incorporated town and the town from which the major portion of its territory was taken to have a minimum of 2,500 population.22 No radical change had occurred since to negate Luzon B. Morris' declara- tion that the constitution which had been adopted "during the stage- coach era" had become outmoded in an industrial society.23 The ex- hortations of a Democratic Governor fell on the deaf ears of Republican Assemblymen. It was a political necessity for the impetus for a constitu- tional convention to come from the Republican Party.
The disproportionate representation, which was the most fre- quently articulated argument presented for the calling of a constitu- tional convention, was at the same time the least feasible politically. Statistic after statistic was presented to show that the less populous re- gions had a disproportionate representation in both the House and the Senate. On the basis of the census of 1890, it was revealed that towns having less than 15 percent of the population could elect a majority to the lower house. Slight concessions had been made previously in recog- nition of the growing disparity in population, but the realization that
(Courtesy Conn. Devel. Comm.)
NORWICH
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
the strength of the Republican Party rested with this unit representa- tion remained a basic determinant.24 It was charged that representation in the Senate was similarly disproportionate. Tolland County, for ex- ample, had two Senators, which gave it a ratio of one Senator for each 12,057 population, while New Haven County had four Senators, which constituted a ratio of one Senator for each 39,131 population. The ex- tent of representation achieved in the Senate represented a greater di- vergence of theory and practice than did the representation in the House, for the town and not the individual was the theoretical unit upon which representation in the House was based, but representation in the Senate was supposed to be based upon population.25
It was becoming more and more apparent that there were practices in the operation of the Connecticut system of government which were sorely in need of remedy. Although the Constitution of 1818 repre- sented an attempt to strip the legislature of some of its power, the As- sembly had remained an oligarchy in control of the functions of the government. Excesses of the legislature challenged the moral sensibili- ties of the public in an era when a greater morality was being called for in public affairs and provided the impetus for another constitutional convention. Charges of corruption made by political partisans could be discounted; when corruption centered in the legislature and was evi- dent in its work, as in the granting of special charters, the need for re- form pointed to an alteration of the basic structure of government and became of crucial concern.26
In 1895, Governor Coffin noted the "trading of votes between members, with or without reference to the merit of measure," and charged that "some of the influences accompanying, and to a greater or less degree shaping, the legislation of the State have been now and then for years of such character as to constitute a serious offense against the rights and interest of the people."27 Succeeding executives did not direct attention to reform until George P. McLean became Governor. Gover- nor McLean insisted that reform was necessary and held that a proposal to increase the size of the Senate would not suffice, but he opposed the calling of a constitutional convention, expressing the fear that it would "open the door to guest and stranger alike." He attempted to persuade the Assembly that "nothing is so destructive of ... the general well-
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being of society as constant modification of fundamental law, and in- justices in a constitution offending theory only may well be preferred to experimental attempts at impossible ideal."28 Perforce, however, re- form of the legislature had to await the will of the legislature to reform itself and had to assume the form chosen by the legislature.
Three amendments were presented formally in the General As- sembly. Interests of small towns were protected in the proposal that a town with less than 2,500 inhabitants be entitled to only one representa- tive and in another proposal suggesting that two representatives be al- lowed for the first 2,500 inhabitants and one additional representative for each additional 20,000 inhabitants. Interests of urban centers were focal in the proposal to allow one representative to each town with less than 5,000 inhabitants, two to towns with 10,000 inhabitants, and an additional representative for each additional 10,000 persons or fraction thereof. Agreement could not be reached on acceptance of one of these plans and the Committee on Constitutional Amendments reported in favor of a constitutional convention if this were approved by the elec- tors. Governor McLean decided to support the recommendation of the Committee, believing a convention to be less dangerous than a lack of any action. The Governor, himself a resident of a small town, warned that if small towns ever lost their right of representation it would "be due to their own refusal to so exercise that right that it can be defended by its best friends."29
If the rural towns heeded this warning, it was as interpreted in a vote to keep what they possessed as is indicated by the distribution of the vote on the calling on a constitutional convention. In the popular vote, 47,317 favored and 26,745 opposed the calling of the convention. The affirmative margin was derived from the large vote in urban cen- ters, however, for in only 39 of the 168 towns did a majority vote for the convention. Not only did a majority of the towns with a population numbering between 2,500 and 5,000 oppose the calling of a convention, but in only five of the 86 towns which had fewer than 2,500 inhabitants was there a majority vote for the convention. These five towns were Cromwell, Sprague, East Lyme, Burlington, and Colchester. All of the large cities favored the convention by overwhelming majorities, and in only two of those with a population of more than 10,000 were majority
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
votes cast against it. Although popular vote determined the calling of the convention, membership was composed of one representative from each town. A projection of the town votes, then, indicated that the con- vention was doomed to failure.31
Circulars were distributed throughout the country towns calling upon the residents to protect their birthrights and not allow themselves to be robbed by the cities. It was charged that eight county courts were going to replace the 11 1 probate courts. Emotions were aroused to such a pitch that some suggested that the convention should adjourn sine die as soon as it was organized.32
The delegates met in Hartford, January 1, 1902. Among the dele- gates were two former Governors, two former Speakers of the House, four former Secretaries of State, two former Comptrollers, two former Congressmen, one former Chief Justice and the Attorney General. Of the 166 delegates, 102 had served in the legislature; 17, in both houses. One hundred and thirty-eight of the delegates, from the standpoint of ability and experience, were eminently qualified for the service they were delegated to perform. It was this very experience, however, which tied them with the past. Many, in their official capacities, had resisted the very changes which were now being suggested. That there were 122 Republicans and only 44 Democrats among the delegates also assured that the Convention would be dominated by the same political philos- ophy as that which had controlled Connecticut politics for the last 20 years.33
The work of this Constitutional Convention was inevitably tied to the history of the Commonwealth. Charles B. Andrews, formerly Governor and Chief Justice, was elected President of the Convention. He reminded its members that in America a constitution is regarded as fundamental, or basic to the structure of government, and is intended to be permanent. Andrews asserted that since the days of Thomas Hooker, Connecticut had held the foundation of authority to be the consent of the people and thought "it was difficult for the student of history" to see where the Fundamental Orders were ever replaced. He pointed out that changes in fundamental principles could not be made without changing the structure of government and asserted that such changes should not be made "except for the very highest reasons." In
(Courtesy Conn. Devel. Comm.)
NEW LONDON
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his judgment: "the principles as well as the details of the government under which we have thus far lived are not radically defective. It will be ours to enlarge and confirm rather than to overthrow or deny. . . . Antiquity of time affords added stability to the State and added security to life and possessions." He did not define the purpose of the conven- tion as reform, but rather as consideration of "whether or not any changes should be made" in the constitution, and, if so, what those changes shall be.3+
The rules adopted for the conduct of the business of the conven- tion further foredoomed any radical departure from the prevailing governmental arrangements. A crucial decision was made by the adop- tion of the rule "that no vote adopting any portion or the whole of a proposed constitution shall be passed except by the majority affirmative vote of all of the delegates elected and sworn," rather than by a majority of those meeting quorum requirements and present. This meant that absent delegates cast a negative vote. The vote on the question of allow- ing one representative from each town and establishing a membership of 60 for the Senate was decided negatively on a vote of 81 affirmatives and 73 negatives: this was four votes short of the 85 necessary for pas- sage.35 The refusal to delegate work to committees and the insistence upon sitting as a committee of the whole encumbered the procedures and impeded the work of the convention. In retrospect, it is appar- ent that a more expeditous consideration of proposals might have en- hanced the chances of the adoption of some.36 The frequent caucuses of the delegates of the several counties flaunted the intent of seating the delegates according to numbers drawn by lot, rather than by the area they represented.37
Of central importance was a decision to determine the formula for representation in the General Assembly. On January 7, it was agreed that the Convention would confine itself to the subject of representation until this was determined. Resolutions on all other questions were tabled and a multitude of proposals, reflecting every shade of opinion on representation, were offered. In February, in the Convention which was sitting as a Committee of the Whole, proponents of equal represen- tation in the House beat back twelve amendments to establish this principle without deciding the number of representatives.38 Angry pro-
(Courtesy Conn. Devel. Comm.)
WATERBURY
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
test followed. It was proposed that the Convention be disbanded and that the Governor call for a new election of delegates to represent num- bers of electors rather than the electors of towns.39 On the next day agreement was reached on the principle that the Senate should be based on population located in contiguous territory.40 Again the determina- tion of size was not made.
When the delegates had convened, prevailing sentiment had sup- ported a plan which came to be known as the Sixty and One, which con- templated one representative from each town and a Senate of 60 mem- bers. As the debate wore on, the delegates of the larger towns became disenchanted with the idea, and the proposal lacked newspaper support. By the time the issue was submitted for a formal vote, the chief momen- tum for the idea was provided in the Convention itself.41
A committee of 24 was appointed to resolve differences, but was discharged the day after appointment without reaching a consensus. Eventually a committee of nine members, of whom six were from towns which had voted against the calling of the convention, formally recom- mended on March 12, the Sixty and One Plan. That portion of the reso- lution pertaining to the Senate passed by the comfortable margin of 101 to 86, but that pertaining to the House received a vote of 84 to 75, one short of the necessary majority of all delegates prescribed by the Con- vention rule.42 Agreement was reached on the other sections of the resolution which were to comprise section three of the Constitution.
Maltbie of Granby then moved the adoption of the article as the vote was 79 to 66 and the motion lost. A move for reconsideration pre- vailed, however, and the question was made the order of the next day's proceedings. There followed a parliamentary hassle when friends of the article sought to divide it and vote on three separate sections, the last having to do with the method of representation in the House. The Chair ruled in favor of separation and the motion carried by a margin of one on a vote of 86 to 66. A corrected vote the next day added an affirmative vote. This razor-thin margin was almost lost on the motion to act on the resolution as a whole. It was saved, in fact, by the Presi- dent's ruling that the reconsideration of the several sections was tanta- mount to reconsideration of the resolution as a whole and Mr. Maltbie was permitted to withdraw the previous motion to that effect.43
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It was a Pyrrhic victory. Those who favored the arrangement sought to conclude the Convention quickly. A motion to appoint a committee of five to engross the constitution, to recess until April 3, and to adjourn sine die when the committee had reported was de- feated.44 A committee was appointed on April 2. Since efforts to limit debate failed,45 the committee did not report until April 30. On the next day, Sections Three and Four of Article Three, pertaining to repre- sentation in the House and Senate, were joined and submitted to vote. A vote of 81 to 70 was four short of the number required for passage, a motion to reconsider failed by a vote of 81 to 73, and a committee charged with resolving differences failed to do so and was dismissed. Tempers were obviously short and apparently were not improved dur- ing a week's adjournment. Plan after plan was submitted and defeated. On the last day, when it seemed that the Convention would adjourn without having formulated a plan for submission to the electorate, the President of the Convention spoke in favor of the adoption of a plan submitted by Mr. Bissel of Suffield. This would increase the Senate to 45 and decrease the House by one under a reassignment of representa- tives in which New Haven would have gained two; Hartford, Bridge- port, and Waterbury, one each; 30 small towns would have lost one representative; and 24 small towns would have gained one. When the plan was submitted, 85 irritated delegates had stalked from the Hall but were persuaded to return. The resolution to submit this plan car- ried over the opposition of the very large and the very small towns. There was no commitment to support the plan being submitted, nor the enthusiasm necessary to win the support of the electorate.46
The proposal was not only the "ridiculous mess" which it was called by a correspondent of the New York Evening Post, but also so infeasible that it had no chance for success. The plan submitted to the electorate provided for one representative from each town under 2,000; two for each town of from 2,000 to 50,000, three for each town with a population of from 50,000 to 100,000; four for each town from 100,000 to 150,000, and an additional representative for each additional 50,000 population.47 The failure to make any real concession to the large towns assured the defeat of the proposal and a victory for the small towns. Only 15 percent of the electorate voted as compared to 35 percent which
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voted on the convocation of the convention. There were 10,377 votes in favor of the proposal and 21,234 votes in opposition.48
The failure to ratify the proposed constitution meant more than just the failure to alter the plan of representation. Among the other provisions of the proposed constitution there were many which were progressive and meritorious. For example, the word "religious" was substituted for "Christian" in the Bill of Rights, legislators were denied the privilege of receiving any civil appointments from state officers; the term of probate court judges was to have increased to four years; and the issuance of bonds for municipalities was made dependent upon a vote of the local electorate. In addition, because of the tensions which prevailed over the issue of representation, other ideas of value had been peremptorily tabled. Among these was one suggestion to relieve the legislature of the right to issue special charters; others included initia- tive and referendum and woman suffrage. Critical journalists have charged that "the cult of conservatism" had disqualified the state "for appreciating the need of adaptation to new conditions." Connecticut chose to recognize "tradition and sentiment" and proceeded to alter, to patch, but not to change the basic framework of government.49
The Assembly was not responsive in 1903 to Governor Abram Chamberlain's request that it frame an amendment which would pre- serve representation for each town, but which would enable the more populous towns to exercise proper influence on all matters of interest to them.50 The idea was dead by 1905. Governor Henry Roberts as- sumed that the reapportionment of the Senate accomplished in 1903 had provided the representation which the more populous areas were demanding and that no further change in the fundamental law was necessary. The reapportioned districts actually varied in population from 19,000 to 42,000. In consequence, in the three most populous counties, three of every four persons elected but two of every three senators.51 With this settlement, posterity was bequeathed a political imbroglio which is still awaiting the day when those in public life will place political democracy before party.
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