USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume II > Part 28
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The flood of 1936 emphasized the need for flood control, but the fear of the encroachment by the Federal Government delayed the effec- tive realization of the idea. Flood control projects were among the most favored projects of the WPA. When the floods began to mount in the early part of March, consideration was given to the erection of a dike along the Connecticut River to protect the business district of Hartford. After the crisis of the eighteenth, WPA agreed to make available im- mediately $3,000,000 for works in the stricken area. When the first
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allotment was received work was begun on the Park and Colt dikes. The flood had not subsided, however, when a movement was launched to establish an interstate plan. The Flood Control Act of 1934, which was the first explicitly to recognize flood control as a function of the Federal
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STAFFORD SPRINGS
Government, was conceived as a cooperative effort with the Federal Government bearing most of the cost, but with the state retaining an absolute veto over any project. The Connecticut Valley Authority, under which identification flood control was planned in New England, received a tremendous boost as public officials surveyed the damages of the 1936 flood. After numerous proposals were discussed, the plan of controlling the Connecticut River by means of a series of reservoirs on its upper tributaries was agreed to by the states. In accordance with legislative provisions, the states were to provide the land and the Fed-
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eral Government was to bear the cost of construction. Although the General Assembly of Connecticut hesitated, as did the legislatures of other New England states, to approve the plan for fear that it would result in the loss of some part of their sovereignty, it was finally ap- proved. The Federal Power Commission then gave substance to their fears. It asked whether, if Federal funds were used if the project should not then come under the authority of the Federal Power Com- mission. Its opposition was sufficiently strong to prevent the Congress of the United States from approving another arrangement. The Con- necticut Valley Authority was dead. Construction of the Clark and Colt dikes, the construction of the South Meadows and Deeney Lane pump- ing stations, and the enclosing of the Park River conduit were com- pleted with the assistance of the PWA.58
However much the fear of encroachment by the Federal Govern- ment discouraged cooperative efforts with the State, the election of 1936 was a sweeping endorsement of New Deal measures. After the usual biennial political aspirations had subsided, Cross was renomi- nated by the Democrats and Roraback's choice, Arthur M. Brown, the State's Attorney for New London County, was nominated by the Re- publicans. They erred, however, in their judgment that there had been a reversal of public opinion against the New Deal. Cross attacked suc- cessfully the plank in their platform which criticized "the use within Connecticut of Federal funds to purchase a surrender of the rights re- served to the states." In the emergency the Governor was "ready to lay the unsubstantial ghost of state sovereignty," and was "ready to accept funds for the aged, the unemployed, dependent children, the blind and the crippled, for humane and educational institutions, for school and other buildings, for the extension of highways, and even for the ex- termination of mosquitoes." In lieu of federal aid, Cross held up the even more ominous spectre of higher taxes.59
The issue of the New Deal in Connecticut was drawn even more pointedly since 1936 was a Presidential election year. In Alfred Landon the Republicans had a candidate who symbolized the antithesis to the relief and recovery program of the last four years. He represented, too, the thinking of segments of the Connecticut population, but his was a political philosophy, as it proved, which was outworn and lacking in an
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appeal necessary for political success. The trend against the Republi- cans was given the final push by Roosevelt's visit to the state on Oc- tober 22. During this he urged the completion of the flood control pact between the New England States. The election results convinced even the stalwarts among the Republicans that the party which stood for progressive legislation had the greatest appeal to the voters. Roosevelt carried the state by over 100,000, the entire state Democratic ticket won by more than 90,000, and the Congressional delegation was solidly Democratic. The Hartford Courant soberly conceded that nothing could have been done to have averted defeat. The press of the state confirmed the Courant's judgment that the Republicans had done little to attract the liberal voters. A reorganization of the Republican party was needed. It was made necessary and possible when Roraback, Con- necticut's dominant political figure of the twentieth century, died the following May.60
Not only had the Republicans failed to identify themselves with liberal programs, but the state's failure to pass unemployment compen- sation forced the calling of a special session of the Assembly. Unemploy- ment insurance proposals had been introduced in successive sessions of the General Assembly since 1931. Once regarded as "a vicious and un- sound piece of legislation," the idea had gained support gradually. The Governor had appointed, in 1935, a Commission on Unemployment. Shortly thereafter, in August, 1935, the Federal Social Security Act was passed, eliminating the frequently expressed objection that unemploy- ment insurance would place employers of a state which had unemploy- ment compensation at a competitive disadvantage with those states not having the provision. Effective January 1, 1936, a tax of one percent was placed on employers. It was to increase to two percent in 1937 and to three percent in 1938. Since the employer could deduct this amount from the federal tax, a state which adopted an unemployment compen- sation plan could, in effect, keep more money in the state. The Unem- ployment Compensation Commission believed "it would be to the advantage of the State of Connecticut to adopt an Unemployment Com- pensation Law before the end of 1936" and supported its claim with evidence that the state stood to lose over $4,000,000 by the end of the year.61
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A special session of the Assembly was obviously necessary. Unem- ployment Compensation, even in 1936, must not have been a popular move. The calling of the special session was postponed until two days after the election and then reason was given as the necessity of bringing the date of choosing Connecticut electors in conformity with the Presi- dent's assuming office in January rather than in March. The Commis- sion's recommendation was submitted as better "than any other method yet devised . .. such as the made work, or a dole . . . " and as pref- erable to losing $4,000,000 by inaction. In the words of the Courant stated as the conservative view a belief "that the act should be fought in Washington ... while in Hartford the effort should be simply to protect ... Connecticut's contribution." The bill was compulsory for all employing more than five persons and on an increasing scale to a maximum of 2.7 percent. Benefits which were to start in 1938 were to range from $7.50 to $15.00. By July 1, 1938, 500,000 Connecticut work- ers were covered, and 250,000 initial claims had been filed.62 In the same session authorization was granted to begin slum clearance in Bridgeport.
When Cross was inaugurated for the fourth time as Governor of Connecticut, he believed that the time had come to accomplish a basic reorganization of the administrative structure of the state. The General Assembly had created a Reorganization Commission in 1935 charged with reviewing the governmental machinery and with recommending changes in it. The Commission had reported to the Governor in Jan- uary, 1937, proposing that the 116 administrative departments be reduced to 18 in which related activities would be grouped, that by Con- stitutional amendment the offices of Treasurer, Comptroller, and Sec- retary of State be made appointive under the control of the Governor, and that the Governor's veto power be enlarged. They suggested, too, that the Attorney General be appointed by the Judges of the Superior Court. Cross had considered the powers of the Governor so inadequate during his first terms as to make the title empty. He commented sub- sequently that the Commissioners, who were critical of his policies, seemed to regard themselves responsible to their particular partisan political machinery, not to the Governor. Cross pointed out that the Governor appointed directly very few of the administrative heads;
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others were appointed by the Governor and legislators; and many re- ceived their appointment from the Assembly. The factional strife which existed in Cross's party involved him at every convention in a struggle to secure running mates of his choice, and may have lessened
SIMSBURY
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SIMSBURY
his influence upon the selection of appointees and his control of those appointed. Colonial Connecticut, however, had begun with a fear of a strong executive, and although many previous Governors had ad- vocated the strengthening of the powers of the executive, few laws had ever extended his authority.63
At this time, nevertheless, the Assembly moved with dispatch to effect the organizational changes recommended, which entailed the passage of 107 separate acts, although it refused to reduce the number
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of elective offices and guarded its own legislative powers. As Cross stated, "though the General Assembly could not count on a majority to discontinue two small ferries across the Connecticut River, ... it encountered but faint opposition to the abolition of the great Board of Finance and Control."64 A Department of Finance and Control was created in its stead. That the Governor was given direct control over this department, which was responsible for budgeting and procure- ment, and over the Personnel and Public Works departments was of utmost importance. The Governor's power in fiscal matters was further extended by the creation of a bond commission, chaired by Cross and authorized to issue bonds in the amount of $25,000,000 and by the designation of the Governor as the administrative agent of the State to apply for and receive Federal funds. It was at this time that the Gover- nor was directed to establish quarterly, rather than annual, allowances for departmental expenditures; empowered to reduce or withhold ap- propriations for general purposes at his discretion; given a $100,000 emergency fund each year; and, when the Assembly was not in session, authorized to buy, sell, and exchange land; and specifically empowered to suspend or remove "any officer, commissioner, or deputy, for mis- conduct, material neglect of duty or incompetence in the conduct of his office." The Governor was placed in control of the executive branch both by the definition of responsibility and by his power over finances.65
The Assembly was less eager to effect an extension of the Gover- nor's power as it related to the Assembly, and refused to require a two- thirds vote to override a veto, leaving the requirement of a simple majority in force. There was established, however, a Legislative Coun- cil of five members, including the four floor leaders of the House and Senate and the Governor. The Council was expected to continue to review the administrative machinery and to propose needed changes to the Assembly. This allowed the Governor some voice in planning a phase of the legislative program in consultation with leaders of both parties. Several bills to make further improvements in the administra- tive machinery of the state were drafted before the next session of the Assembly.66
In the reorganization, Cross had secured the power and the ad- ministrative machinery he desired. As he continued his administration,
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however, he was beset with a bitter quarrel between two of his Depart- ment heads and scandal reached high into the executive branch. One new factor, the developing strength of organized labor, had to be faced. This factor, perhaps, was shaped by the depression and the resultant federal and state measures. One old factor, ravaging nature, again, took a disastrous toll. All this, along with a recession, combined to limit Cross to the completion of his term and to allow the decade to be ended, as it began, under the aegis of the Republican Party.
Organized labor was exerting an increasingly greater influence in the state. Its bargaining position had been greatly strengthened as a result of the guarantees established to protect the rights of collective bargaining and the establishment of the Committee for Industrial Or- ganization in November, 1935. The extension of labor activity is indi- cated by the increase in the number of cases brought before the Board of Arbitration and Mediation. These raised from 11 in 1935 to 32 in 1936, and involved 9,474 strikers in the latter year as compared to 4,246 in 1935. The six strikes in which the efforts of the Board were unsuc- cessful were disturbing. The most serious of these was that of the workers of the Remington Rand Company in Middletown. The Gov- ernor, at the request of the Mayor of Middletown, sent State Police to assist the local police in the maintenance of law and order. Inasmuch as the company was incorporated in Delaware and had plants in New York and Ohio, where workers were also on strike, the company, by denying the jurisdictional rights of any body, state or national, success- fully avoided any negotiation. The strike continued without interrup- tion until it erupted in violence on July 8 as strikers and strike breakers conflicted. Difficulties reached a climax in September when the state police used tear gas to break up a conflict in the streets of the city. The American Federation of Labor insisted that the troops be withdrawn, while the Mayor requested that the National Guard be called. The Governor acceded to neither request, but the presence of police was continued to maintain law and order.67 The Remington Rand strike continued until 1940 when the operations of the company were trans- ferred out of the state.
The Governor, however, did not favor labor under all circum- stances. When in February 1937 the strikers at the Electric Boat Com-
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pany in Groton sought to enforce their demands by a "sit down" strike, the Governor acted with determination. He interpreted the right to strike guaranteed by the state as not extending to the right to seize an- other's property, and the State Police, armed with bench warrants
(Courtesy Conn. Devel. Comm.)
1 MIDDLETOWN
charging the strikers with trespassing on the company's property, evicted the strikers from the plant.68 The issue which further projected labor into the center of public interest was the bill presented unsuc- cessfully to the 1937 session of the General Assembly to establish a forty hour week. John J. Egan of the Connecticut Federation of Labor warned that, if the bill were not passed, Connecticut might expect difficulty as serious as that which had paralyzed Michigan. The prin- cipal issue, as represented by Charles W. Eyanson of the Connecticut
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Manufacturers' Association, was the recognition of the unions them- selves. He concluded, "We anticipate an epidemic of strikes."69 In 1937, the number of strikes, in which the Board of Arbitration and Mediation was asked to intervene, increased to 80 and involved 13,000 employees. The major factor in this increase, in the opinion of the Board of Media- tion and Arbitration, was the validation by the Supreme Court of the United States of the Wagner Act, which gave legal sanction to collective bargaining.70 At its 1937 convention, the Connecticut Federation of Labor recorded that it would work for "the defeat of the enemies of labor legislation" and attempt to secure "the nomination in the pri- maries and the election of legislators who will carry through the man- date of the people when in office."71
The rivers and streams of the state were already at flood stage when a devastating hurricane struck on September 21, 1938. Heavy rains beginning September 17, particularly in the area east of Hartford, were followed by a deluge during which rain fell at the rate of two inches an hour in some areas. The greatest volume, 17.07 inches, was recorded at Portland. At a season of the year "when every natural deterrent to a great flood was present," the rivers and streams in the eastern part of the state "raged through their valleys . . . , wrecking many dams, bridges, highways, railways, and other structures while inundating new areas of land." In the western sector, new flood records were established and the Connecticut River approached the record level of 1936.72 Routine warning of a hurricane 500 miles off the Leeward Islands on the 16th were changed to storm warnings along the eastern seaboard on the morning of the 21st as the "eye" of the storm altered its course while increasing its speed to up to 60 miles an hour. It reached the vicinity of New York around 2:30; within another hour it reached New Haven; and, at 4:17, the center of the storm passed to the west of Hart- ford.73
With the record of the havoc of the hurricane and the flood there was mixed the heroic with the tragic, the bizarre with the credulous. Western Connecticut suffered severely, but far less than the eastern sector where gusts of wind increased in velocity up to 100 miles an hour. Along the shore there was left a strip "pock-marked with disaster." At Savin Rock the Thunderbolt, "New England's most thrilling ride,"
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was a mass of twisted steel. A conductor of the New Haven near Ston- ington, while the waters were rising in the floor of the train, herded the passengers into a single car, and the engineer nosed the engine through debris and fallen wires across the perilous causeway. In the wake of the storm firemen battled the flames in what seemed a hopeless effort to protect New London's business district, when the wind changed and averted further damage. The next day the National Guard arrived to afford protection and to assist in cleaning up the area. Along the Con- necticut River 100 families in Middletown lost their homes, while the residents of Portland and New Britain lived in fear that the dams restraining the reservoirs in their cities would not hold. In Hartford five persons lost their lives and 22 were injured. As the hurricane roared through the city the capitol grounds were ravaged. Hundreds of men joined in their efforts in building dikes to protect the Colt's Fire Arms Company and the next day they were joined by the National Guard. In Rockville, the waters raced through the sluiceway of the mills and the employees of the woolen mills crossed to safety on narrow planks. The dairy and the chicken farmers were hard hit; the orchards and the tobacco sheds were destroyed. Losses mounted in the millions. The damage to state buildings was severe and the loss in private property even greater. Thirty-eight bridges had been destroyed on major high- ways and 50 or more dams had been damaged. The state parks and forests were hard hit. Over 100,000 public shade trees were lost and as many more privately owned. It is almost impossible to tabulate all of the ma- terial losses, but greatest of all were those for which there is no material equation, the 80 or more lives.74
For the second time in thirty months the strength of the popula- tion was pitted against the forces of nature. As citizens and local govern- ments moved to meet the crisis the resources of the state and federal governments were called upon to relieve the destitute and to assist in the recovery. A meeting of local officials to survey the damage preceded a conference of New England states where Harry Hopkins offered the resources of the WPA. Twenty thousand WPA workers were made available to aid in reconstruction, with 500 or more working on the highways alone. The telephone companies mobilized to restore service and ham radio operators assisted. The forests were closed to hunting
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and recreation as state and federal monies were provided for their restoration. The people and the communities battled so heroically that their efforts, in the words of a national magazine, "revealed anew Yankee courage and ingenuity."75
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MOOSUP
"Premonitions," wrote Governor Cross, "of a storm brewing over the Highway Department came in the spring of 1937" when reports were received of the "very high prices" being paid for land acquired in the construction of Merritt Parkway. The new Public Works Depart- ment, however, provided a means whereby the necessary corrective measures could be taken without arousing an unsuspecting public. The legislation establishing the department gave it jurisdiction over the
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real estate of the state, but without specific mention of the Highway Department. The Attorney General ruled that the main intent of the legislation was to place the highways under the jurisdiction of the new department, thereby reducing the Highway Commissioner to a sub- ordinate position. The Superior Court, however, in October reversed the view of the Attorney General. Meanwhile, apparently on the as- sumption that he would have administrative responsibility, Cross re- quested the Commissioner of Public Works, Robert A. Hurley, to in- vestigate the business methods of the Highway Department, and after the Superior Court's decision, Hurley continued the investigation. On January 6, he submitted a scathing denunciation of the operations of the Highway Department, especially as these pertained to the Merritt Parkway. McDonald, the Highway Commissioner, replied with an equally strong defense and the Governor was in the position of having two of his department heads at swords points as a result of a circum- stance which he had helped to create. The evidence of wrongdoing could no longer be disregarded. Three days before Hurley submitted his report, the Attorney General submitted the record of 200 real estate transactions, in some of which criminal actions were evident. A grand jury investigation was ordered, and in it unusual real estate dealings were revealed. In one instance, where nineteen acres of land were sold for $96,621, a palatial home was moved to a new site. The rights-of-way here were given to the parkway, and two years later the new site was sold for $148,000 including the right-of-way. More than 50 cases were reported indicating that G. LeRoy Kemp, the state's purchasing agent, provided two broker associates with advanced information concerning the route of the parkway, which assured them lucrative profits. All three were indicted, and Kemp subsequently served a term at Wethers- field. The Highway Commissioner was so severely criticized that, ironically, the man who had been largely responsible for the develop- ment of the Merritt Parkway was forced to resign before the first section was completed. On June 29, 1938, Governor Cross officially dedicated the eighteen miles from the New York line to Norwalk.76
At the very time the story was breaking on the difficulties within the Highway Department, the new Comptroller of the city of Water- bury, Sherwood L. Rowland, announced that he could not find any
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complete financial records of transactions since 1930, that is, during the term of his recent Democratic opponent, Daniel J. Leary. Frank Hayes, then mayor of Waterbury and Lieutenant Governor, sought to block the investigation. His reasons were suggested when it was disclosed that a very large fee had been paid to the Waterbury group by lobbyists while Hayes, as Lieutenant Governor, presided over the Senate. The report of the Grand Jury investigation was published May 20, 1938, and charged that, during the administration of Hayes, the city of Waterbury had been swindled out of "millions of dollars .. . by a powerful, ruthless, and corrupt group of men who had managed the affairs of the city for personal financial gain and political advancement." The im- mediate arrests and prosecution of 27 persons on the charge of con- spiracy to defraud was demanded. There were countless instances of disguised financial dealings wherein the city was charged for services never rendered and others of overcharging, with Leary, Hayes, and their accomplices pocketing the difference. Leary had sought to extend his activities by persuading the Senate Chairman of Public Health to in- troduce into the Senate, over which Hayes presided, a bill making it man- datory for all public places to be equipped with an electric steam steri- lizer which didn't sterilize. The Grand Jury revealed that, in promoting his scheme, Leary secured as lobbyist the services of Charles E. William- son, a former State Senator, and the backstage assistance of Harry Mac- kenzie, second in command of the Republican Party. To make the job easier 2,700 stocks were distributed among five members of the Senate, three Democrats and two Republicans.
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