USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume II > Part 6
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Lee moved northward. Hooker moved in the same direction over a more easterly route, keeping his forces between Lee and the nation's capital. The Battle of Gettysburg was precipitated on July 1, when George G. Meade, who had replaced Hooker, ordered the First and Eleventh Corps, which included the Connecticut Seventeenth, to the north of the city. Here the Connecticut troops made first contact with the Rebels. In the face of Confederate fire, the troops were withdrawn. Lee failed to follow up his advantage, and Meade moved his forces into position during the night, placing the troops on the heights south of the city. The Connecticut troops were in strategic positions: the Fifth and Twentieth were on the extreme right, beyond Culp's Hill, the Seventeenth in the right center defending Cemetery Hill, and the Fourteenth and Twenty-Seventh to the left on the same hill. All were engaged on the second, and held their positions intact through the day,
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against the repeated efforts the next day to storm Cemetery Hill, and until the final attack was repelled. The five Connecticut regiments had borne a creditable part in the defeat of Lee's forces, which meant vic- tory in the East.44
In the West, Grant had wearied of unsuccessful efforts to get a force in front of Vicksburg. He crossed the Mississippi above the city, marched on the Louisiana side to a point far below Vicksburg, and waited for the Mississippi fleet to run the batteries. Gunboats and transports had been developed especially for river service, at Lincoln's urging, by Connecticut's Rear Admiral Andrew Hull Foote, the hero of Island Number Ten and Forts Henry and Donelson. By the end of April, these were ready to transport Grant's forces back to the Missis- sippi side of the river. By the middle of May, the city was invested and its surrender was forced on July 4, 1863.45 Meanwhile, Connecticut regiments had been employed since early Spring in supporting Farragut in his attempt to push his way up the Mississippi. Connecticut troops were among those which moved, near the end of May, down the Mis- sissippi from the mouth of the Red River toward Fort Hudson. With its fall, July 9, 1863, it was obvious that the Battle of the Mississippi had been won by the North.46
Connecticut was slow to realize the significance of the victories at Vicksburg and Gettysburg. After the succession of defeats in 1862 and the reversal at Chancellorsville earlier in the campaign, Connecticut was cautious in interpreting the later victories. Then, too, Connecti- cut's regiments, although they made an important contribution at Gettysburg, were not numerous. There were only 45 casualties among the Connecticut troops at Gettysburg and hardly any at Vicksburg. The battles had a minimal direct impact on the state, then. Also, in July 1863 there prevailed among the Connecticut populace a spirit of unrest engendered by the introduction of the Federal conscription law which had been enacted in March 1863.47
As selection was begun under the conscription law there was ap- parent tranquility, but it was feared that the existent current of unrest might erupt into open hostility. That there were names of students and professors from Yale and of socially prominent families in Hartford among the first selectees may have served to allay the bitterness of many
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who had come to regard the war as a poor man's contest. In any event, selection proceeded without incident until news was received of draft riots in New York. The press initially reacted along political lines until it was realized that such riots posed a threat to property. Then the demonstrations were consistently denounced as acts of mobs and un-
(Courtesy Conn. Devel. Comm.)
NEW HAVEN
becoming to a "land of steady habits." As angry men walked the streets of New Haven and stories spread of undercover activity in Hartford, factory owners sought military protection for their establishments. State troops moved quickly to points of rumored disturbance and the threats of open resistance never materialized.48
Opposition to conscription, however, was effective largely because of defects in the Federal law. That draftees were allowed to supply substitutes enabled many to avoid military service and resulted in a thriving business in substitutes. They made their own bargains or of- fered their services through brokers who received a percentage of the
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contract price which fluctuated in accordance with supply and demand. As the brokers gained experience, they became more audacious: men were encouraged to enlist and desert; old men were made to look of military age with the aid of false teeth and dyed hair; and, when sub- stitutes came to be in very short supply, inmates of jails and reforma- tories were used.49 The commutation phase of the Federal law was equally troublesome. Conservatives and radicals alike were frankly dismayed by the provision which would permit a conscript to fulfill his obligation by the payment of $300. This seemed an obvious dis- crimination in favor of the wealthy. The Norwich Aurora announced that "the poor will never allow the rich man's money to be the equiva- lent for their blood."50 Generally, the riots were explained by the commutation provision. Three hundred dollars seemed prohibitive for most of the state's residents. Nevertheless, the Governor reported in May, 1864, that 1,471 residents or approximately three percent of the total in the service credited to Connecticut had taken advantage of the law.51 Such procedures manifestly undermined the draft, which, in addition to being antithetical to the Connecticut tradition of volunteer services, threatened the supply of manpower necessary to man the machines.
In its public and private policy toward conscription, Connecticut mixed a sense of fair play with an eminent practicality. It was obvious that most of the conscripts would be immigrant laborers unable to hire a substitute or to pay a commutation fee. There was also a danger that the families of drafted men might become a public charge and that such expense would exceed the commutation cost. Accordingly, many towns, such as East Hartford, voted sums of money to purchase com- mutations for those who would otherwise be forced into service. Such acts were recognized to be extra-legal, but there was an expectation that such actions would be legalized by the Assembly. This confidence was confirmed, and such actions were applauded by those engaged in the battle of furnishing supplies for profit. The demand for labor in the state provided a degree of security against conscription and a free- dom from the onus of draft dodging.52
As a means of filling the ranks of the army, the draft failed. The first district supplied 1,078 of its quota of 2,162, the second 560 of its
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quota of 1,939, and the third only 400 of its quota of 1,800. The state had provided only about one-third of its quota of 7,600 by the middle of October. As the Federal government requested additional quotas to be filled by January, 1864, the state again sought to attract additional volunteers through bounties.53
An effort was made to standardize the bounty system. The state law had permitted each town to determine the amount of the bounties offered. Spirited bidding had resulted from efforts to attract substitutes from outside the town. In response to the Governor's request, the As- sembly, in special session in November, 1863, prohibited towns from giving bounties and fixed the state bounty at three hundred dollars. Volunteers were credited to the towns from which they were enrolled or to those where they had their residence. In practice, the bounty was extended to those already in the service who reenlisted. The Assembly- men were in a practical mood. Any person who procured volunteers was to receive ten dollars a man. A motion to extend the bounties to conscripts failed, but another bill authorizing the enrollment of negro troops was approved.54
In the Spring of 1863, Governor Buckingham had resisted sug- gestions that negroes be recruited, but by the Winter of 1864 the de- mand for troops and the apparently inexhaustible supply of negroes combined to overcome the Governor's caution. Agents were sent to the South, with cash in hand, to recruit the negroes. The agents too frequently, it is feared, defrauded the negroes of their bounty. Yet, the state recruited about eleven hundred negroes by these means. These were organized into the Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth regiments and by the Spring of 1864, the Twenty-ninth was in the field.55
By these various means the state met its quota, although Niven is of the opinion that few citizens of the state volunteered for service after 1863. However, many of those who had volunteered in the first years of the war reenlisted. Those taken into service after 1863 were, in gen- eral, of poorer quality. The many ways of avoiding the draft resulted in a situation where few other than the mercantiles went into the field.56 The regiments were also sapped by desertion. At the war's end, it was the relative rather than the absolute strength which allowed the margin for victory.
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The military campaigns of 1864 centered around three major ef- forts. Sherman launched his attack on the lower South; Sheridan was occupied with devastating the Shenandoah Valley; and Grant, in com- pany with Meade, opened his attack against Lee above Richmond on
LOUIS TUN
FAMOUS FOR
DRAUGS
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(Photo by James Miller)
TORRINGTON-MAIN STREET, NORTH FROM CENTER OF BUSINESS DISTRICT
May 3, 1864. Forty days of fighting in successive engagements in the Wilderness Campaign and at Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor had not broken Lee's line, when, on June 15, Grant audaciously transferred his whole army south of the James River, took up his position to the east of Petersburg, and prepared to attack Richmond.57 There Grant joined the forces of Ben Butler, which included the Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Connecticut Regiments and the First Connecticut Cavalry. Ben
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Butler, in a drive from Fort Monroe to Bermuda Hundred and on to Drewry Bluff, had threatened Richmond and had prevented Beaure- gard from joining Lee north of the James. Lee crossed the river and drew up his troops before Grant and dug in for the defense of Peters- burg and Richmond.58 Meanwhile, Sheridan had worried Lee's rear with a drive toward Richmond, and, in the Shenandoah, a Federal ad- vance had to be met and was checked by Jubal A. Early, who had been detached by Lee from the main Confederate army.59 Lee, in an effort to relieve his forces at Petersburg, sent Early towards Washington. Early's advance was sufficiently slowed by a hastily improvised Union army commanded by Lew Wallace to permit the Sixth Corps, including the Connecticut Eighteenth, to be detached by Grant and to reach the scene to send Early in retreat after he was within sight of the Capital. Grant immediately dispatched Sheridan in pursuit. With this new commander of the forces of the Shenandoah were the Connecticut Sec- ond Artillery, the First Cavalry, and the Ninth, Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Eighteenth regiments. In the face of the sharp attack, Early re- tired. Because of the onset of Winter, however, the issue of the Valley was not then decided, but Federal forces were in a command position and were growing stronger.60
As Sheridan contested for control of the Valley and Grant pres- sured Richmond, Sherman was preparing his March to the Sea. The Fifth and Twentieth Connecticut regiments had transferred to Ten- nessee in September, 1863, and, in the Summer of 1864, participated in the drive on Atlanta. The drive to the sea was begun in November and the war entered its final stages.61
When operations were resumed in the Spring of 1865, Federal forces were bearing down upon the Confederate Capital at Richmond. Sherman's troops, including the Connecticut Fifth and Twentieth, left Savannah in the middle of January and headed toward the north while the Sixth and Seventh were among those who moved toward Wilmington. The first Connecticut Cavalry was with Sheridan's troops when, in the first days of march, they moved to join Grant's army by the way of the Valley, Lynchburg, Charlottesville, New Market, and Columbia, to the North of Richmond. The Second Artillery joined the First before Petersburg, while the remainder of the troops, with the ex-
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ception of the Sixteenth, were along the line of the James and in the vicinity of Richmond.62 Union troops were relentless in their pressure. Richmond was fired on April 2 and pursuit of Lee's forces was begun the next day. The First Connecticut Cavalry was with Sheridan and the Second Artillery, and the Tenth, Fourteenth, and Thirtieth In- fantry were with Meade. Lee was overtaken within a week, and, on April 9, at Appomattox, he succumbed to Grant's demand for an un- conditional surrender.63
Victory had been achieved with something less than a total effort.
When the contest was concluded, certain of the Connecticut troops were retained in the Army of Occupation, while others returned home to joyous welcomes. The bulk of the Connecticut forces were mustered out by the last of September 1865, but the remnants of the Thirteenth were detained in the service for more than a year after the war ended. The Eighth and Eleventh performed police duty in the vicinity of Lynchburg before arriving in Hartford in December, 1865. The Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth, composed of colored troops, returned to Connecticut in the Fall of 1865, after assisting in crushing the last vestige of the Confederacy in Texas where they had been dispatched after Appomattox.
Although there had been a general hesitancy on the part of the citizenry to join the forces in the field, the populace had been unstint- ing in its efforts to make military service more bearable. In the en- thusiasm which prevailed in the first months of the war, ladies through- out the state knitted socks, rolled bandages, cut uniforms, and in every possible way indicated their solicitude for the departing heroes. When the first troops rendezvousing at New Haven nearly mutinied in protest against the plentiful, but poorly prepared food, the press supported their protest declaring that "it would be quite soon enought to starve the boys" after they were in battle. Delicacies of every sort were sup- plied by the citizens to the "suffering" volunteers, and the city council voted $10,000 to supply some of the necessaries of war.65 Citizens re- sponded similarly to the needs of the men in the field throughout the war. As experience was gained, the assistance offered became more purposeful.66
As the war progressed, there was a tendency for citizens' efforts
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to be carried on through organizations. Soldiers Aid societies were established throughout the state. The most dramatic program, perhaps, was that of Bridgeport's society, which made a successful effort to send a shipload of fresh vegetables to all of the Connecticut troops along the Atlantic coast.67 Relief associations were placed under a general direc- tion centered in Washington in the person of Gideon Welles. True to the state's tradition of independence, there was a tendency for the state to prefer its own relief associations to the Sanitary Commission which was devoted to the relief of all Union forces. However, the Hartford Association gave the major portion of its gifts to the Sanitary Commis- sion and the state made supplementary appropriations for the expan- sion of hospital services at New Haven and for the transportation of the troops home.68 Also, the Chaplains' Aid Society sought to assist the spiritual life of the soldiers by forwarding such materials as books, magazines, and chapel tents.69 The war effort required the enthusiastic and patriotic assistance of the citizens, the determined and heroic ef- forts of the combat troops, and the energetic expansion and productive- ness of the economy. It was in this last aspect of the effort, perhaps, that Connecticut made her most significant contribution to the war.
A rush for contracts accompanied the opening of the war. Horatio Ames, for example, bore down upon Washington with all of his three hundred pounds and furious tenacity to convince the Ordnance De- partment of the value of the wrought iron cannon he was producing. When the Department failed to give him an order, Ames was convinced he had "devils to fight." "To make mockery of war is criminal," he charged, "to sacrifice a Nations [sic] Life for Dollars is Treason." His invective did not secure contracts. When conventionally armed ironclads failed to level Charleston, attention was directed to the pos- sibility of bombardment with guns of great range and power.71 Ames marshalled support from representatives in Washington, including all of Connecticut's representatives, Senators Dixon and Foster, Congress- man Hubbard, and Congressman-elect, Augustus Brandegee. The serv- ices of Horatio Ames' shrewd and calculating brother, Oakes, a Con- gressman from Massachusetts, and those of the Princeton-bred "Pet" Halstead, who knew much of the inner working of the White House, were also called upon.72 Success did not come immediately, and finally,
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Horatio Ames returned to Washington, button-holed Brandegee in the Willard hotel, and insisted that he arrange for a meeting with Lincoln. After this meeting, Ames received a contract for fifteen Ames guns, of 100 pounds or larger, at 85 cents a pound.73
As the war progressed, it seemed increasingly difficult for small businessmen to secure a contract without the aid of a middleman.74 Influence pedlars had flocked to Washington. Members of the state legislature entered into the bidding. William W. Welch, a former Re- publican legislator, was successful in securing a contract for 18,000 Enfield rifles, although he did not possess a factory for their fabrication. The friendship of Cornelius S. Bushnell and Gideon Welles was of value in securing the contract for the construction of the Monitor. Religious affiliations, as well as economic and political relationships, were of importance in securing contracts. In Connecticut, Attorney General Williams and Quartermaster General Hathaway were Baptists, and Baptists seemed to secure more than their share of the state con- tracts until Williams and Hathaway were dismissed from office for negligence or misconduct.75
Industries in the state quickly expanded as army orders flowed into the state. The pressure was greatest on the arms makers. Samuel Colt, with an audacity which shocked his business friends, reclaimed 250 acres of land, attracted five hundred carpenters and laborers, and built a three-story brick structure crowned with an onion shaped gold and blue cupola topped with a charging colt. In a short time he had doubled the potential capacity of his factory. Other factories, such as Christian Sharpe's Rifle Company, which had absorbed the Whitney Arms Factory in 1858, pushed production to capacity.76 The demands for munitions were such and the opportunities for profit were so great that many with little or no experience or capital assumed the obliga- tions of army contracts. James D. Mowry of Norwich secured a contract for 30,000 Springfield rifles and confidently set out to deliver them al- though he had facilities only to make the stocks and depended on sub- contractors for the rest of the parts. William W. Welch, the Norfolk manufacturer, incorporated the Norfolk Arms Company, secured a contract for 18,000 muskets, sub-contracted a portion, while he com- pleted his factory. The factory was completed within three months,
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
and within eight, it is reported that he was producing 1,000 rifles a week.77
Factories which had been devoted to the production of consumer goods were rapidly and with a minimum of difficulty converted to the production of war materials. The Pierpont and Tolles factory at Union- ville, which produced a great variety of products, added gun stocks to their inventory. The iron works in Litchfield County were producing some of the finest ordnance in the world by the end of 1862. The Holley Iron Works of Salisbury, in addition to producing iron and steel, pro- duced light artillery. The Collins Axe Factory delivered 7,500 sabres thirty days after receiving an order. The carriage manufacturers, who had feared ruin through the loss of the southern carriage trade, were soon straining their facilities to produce army wagons. In 1862, the state enjoyed an unparalleled prosperity due largely to the state's war industries. The arms makers, such as Colt's and Sharpe's at Hartford, Whitney's at New Haven, and the Norwich Arms Factory, were work- ing at unprecedented capacity. The Hazard powder works produced more than twelve tons of powder daily, with an annual production valued at $1,000,000.78 New companies entered the munitions field as the economic opportunities of the war were foreseen. In addition to the significant contribution which the munitions industries made to the war effort, the capital amassed and the managerial skill developed in this industry were important to the industrial growth which followed the war.
The immediate impact of the war, except in the field of arms and munitions manufacture, was to reduce markets. The cotton manufac- turers recovered from this loss slowly. Particularly hard hit were those companies which marketed the coarse products used by the slave popu- lation. Some, such as the Union Manufacturing Company of Marl- borough, closed their doors never to open them again. When the orders of the Federal government for heavy cotton products were received, most of the manufacturers quickly resumed production. There was no lack of cotton in the first year of the war as enterprising businessmen, such as the associates of Governor Buckingham, had placed all avail- able coasters in service in the Winter of 1860-61 to build up the supply of cotton.80
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In general, the textile manufacturers were operating profitably. Tailors were able to adapt quickly to machine cutting processes, and the Charles Company of Hartford, for example, quickly delivered 20,000 uniforms by August 1, 1861. These were of poor quality, as
(Courtesy Fairfield Historical Society)
FAIRFIELD-SOUTHPORT HARBOR
were some of the other goods produced under pressure, but in the early months of the war the need for production in quantity exceeded the demand for quality.81 As the supply of raw cotton became exhausted in 1862, the manufacture of other textiles was emphasized. Silk manu- facture benefited from the demand for luxury goods. An effort was made to meet the demand for woolens by adding machinery and in- creasing the labor supply, but there was no general expansion of the mills. Woolens benefited from a wartime tariff and an expanding mar- ket. The manufacture of "shoddy," material made from reclaimed
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wool, although bitterly complained about by the troops, returned un- believable profits. Unlike the pattern in Massachusetts, Connecticut cotton factories did not convert to the production of wool. Instead, when the supply of cotton was exhausted, the cotton mills were closed to await more favorable conditions. As Federal forces gained control of cotton producing regions in the deep South, cotton gradually again became available.82 In 1863-64 discerning businessmen began to pour capital into the industry. Significant in the expanding industry were the Ashland and the Occum companies, and the Donemah, the Sprague, and the Mason mills. In the last two years of the war, approxi- mately one-third of a million new spindles were put into operation in eastern Connecticut alone. The state had benefited from wartime de- mands, an expanding population, increased consumer demands, a growth of capital, knowledge of machine techniques, and a favorable tariff policy, all of which had enabled the establishment of an industry of importance in the development of the nineteenth century economy.83
Shipbuilders benefited immeasurably from government contracts during the war. Mystic, which was the center of shipbuilding in Con- necticut, is credited with having constructed 30,000 tons of shipping during the war, including more steamers, it is claimed, than Maine and Massachusetts combined. In addition to the yards at Mystic, where the Grossmans and the Mallorys were the leaders, shipping yards along the Connecticut River were reopened. Except for Gildersleeve's at Portland, which could produce shipping of any size, most of the river yards produced only vessels for commercial purposes. Connecticut shipyards doubled their production during the first year of the war, trebled it by 1863, and maintained the same level of production throughout 1864.84
The established shipping industries had sought to maintain a monopoly of the water carrying trade. To check the ruinous rate wars which had followed the Panic of 1857, the leaders of the industry had acted in consort in 1860 to exclude new competitors, divide the traffic, and fix rates. The war had the effect of stripping Connecticut waterways of steam powered vessels. Those available at the beginning of the war were sold at a handsome profit or leased to the Government on even more attractive terms. To provide the inland transportation necessary
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