USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume II > Part 32
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
report upon return, worked closely with the local reemployment com- mittees. Most of the veterans who wished to return to their former posi- tions found that employers welcomed them. Where problems arose in regaining positions, local reemployment committees were successful in resolving 75 per cent of the difficulties. Those not resolved were referred to the next highest authority until, as a last resort, veterans could avail them- selves of the services of the United States Attorney. His services had been enlisted in only one case by March, 1946. To assist a veteran in making those adjustments necessary to holding the job to which he had returned, veterans' counsellors were established in most of the principal industries. Those veterans who desired an employment other than that held when they entered service were referred to such agencies as the Civil Service Commission and the State Employment Service.1 This close cooperation between local, state, and federal authorities was so successful that in February, 1946, the Federal administrative agency responsible for the retraining and the reemployment of veterans suggested that this "Connecti- cut Plan" be adopted throughout the country. It was reported that it was cited by President Truman as "one of the model veterans plans of the nation." 2
In addition, provisions were made for health and medical assistance and for educational opportunities for veterans and aid to their dependents. All veterans who suffered disabilities during the war were entitled to enter the State Veterans' Hospital or one designated by it. Each dependent wife, husband, or widowed mother was eligible for ten dollars in assistance each week from the State; and each child under sixteen, for six dollars. In addi- tion, a $1,000, deduction was allowed on taxes assessed on real property owned by veterans. They were given preference at the University of Con- necticut and at the state colleges, and vocational schools extended their services for their benefit. Under the GI Bill, more than 91,000 veterans were assisted in the educational institutions in Connecticut. War experi- ence was accepted in many cases as the equivalent of a high school diploma and in other cases an equivalency certificate was granted after intensified courses of instruction.3
Although the provision for housing for veterans was far from adequate, it was of great benefit. In response to the demands of the veterans, the Assembly had convened in special session in the spring of 1946 and had
CONNECTICUT AFTER THE WAR (27
provided for the state to assume 50 per cent of the expenses incurred since December 31, 1945, and to be incurred by any municipality in establish- ing any temporary housing project for veterans. As of June 30, 1948, $3,142,579 of the $4,000,000 appropriated had been granted. Two thou- sand and twenty-one housing units had been completed in 20 Connecti- cut communities. More than 60 per cent of these had been erected in the cities of New Britain, New Haven, Hartford, Stamford, and Waterbury. These houses provided housing for many returning veterans who other- wise would have been without shelter.4
Reconversion and Readjustment
At the war's end, Connecticut industry took stock and then moved with a rush to convert factories to peace-time production. The Winchester Arms Company was a model for the state, accomplishing its conversion within two weeks after VJ day. By early October this company had 5,500 employees on its payroll as compared with 3,600 before the war. The gov- ernment assisted some companies, such as Bigelow, to ease the conver- sion to peace time production. In this company blanket production was continued on a diminishing basis until November, and the production of other defense materials was cut on a most gradual basis. With this assist- ance, the company was able to move without interruption to the produc- tion of consumer goods. The big brass factories in and around Waterbury, however, closed the manufacturing divisions to take inventory, and the United Time Corporation sent 2,000 of its 4,000 workers home and gave 15 and 30 day notices to another 400. The greatest uncertainty surrounded the aircraft plants whose expansion was geared almost entirely to the defense effort. A survey of 15 of Connecticut's industrial centers in the early part of October revealed a general spirit of optimism. Reconversion was practically complete in some, and in most it was expected to be completed by the end of the year. By October, the Underwood Corpora- tion of Hartford and Landers, Frary, and Clark of New Britain were at about one-third pre-war capacity; and the A. C. Gilbert Company prom- ised toys by Christmas, but not enough to meet the demands. There were some companies, such as the Yale and Towne Manufacturing Company, which were facing serious labor shortages. It was expected that this would be resolved and that employment would be far above pre-war levels.5
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
The availability of surplus property offered a tremendous benefit to the future expansion of Connecticut industry. An opportunity to replace obso- lete with new machines or to acquire supplementary machinery at dis- count prices was one that enterprising industrialists readily understood. War contracts provided that the surplus machine tools should be re- moved as quickly as possible, at most within 60 days after the cessation of hostilities. Unhappily a great deal of time was lost because of the inability of the Surplus War Property Board to find men with sufficient background to dispose of the property. In the meantime, industries which wished to take advantage of the expected consumer market had to re- tool with maximum speed. Too frequently, then, machines used during the war were moved into unsheltered or poorly protected areas to de- teriorate. Also many industries could not take advantage of the oppor- tunity, because their available capital was needed to reconvert. The total amount, or the dollar volume, of the surplus machines acquired by Con- necticut industry is difficult to determine, but it is almost certain that surplus machines played a significant part in the retooling and/or in the expansion of Connecticut industry, although Connecticut manufac- turers did not show an eagerness to acquire surplus factories. Half of the 16 plants available in Connecticut had been disposed of by July, 1946. Of these, four had been purchased by their occupants and two by out-of-state concerns. Of those available, three were in New Britain, two in Hartford, and one each in New Haven, Southington, and Bristol, and varied in floor space from 17,000 to 650,000 square feet.6
The readjustment of industry to peacetime production was accom- panied by a sharp rise in unemployment as had been expected. There had been a gradual decrease of those engaged in non-agricultural pursuits since June, 1943. By VJ day it was 17.6 per cent less than the high of 805,800. This decrease apparently had been absorbed for the most part in other gainful employment and by the calls for military service, for unemploy- ment remained at about 3,600 until after the armistice in Europe. That 93.8 per cent of the decrease of 141,900 was in the field of manufacturing meant that industry could not begin to absorb the returning servicemen until it could return to peacetime production. In spite of the steps taken to cushion the problem of unemployment through the testing and counsel- ing and other services offered under the Connecticut Plan to assist return-
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CONNECTICUT AFTER THE WAR
ing veterans, through employment assistance to displaced workers and school graduates, the impact of the end of the war on the labor market was dramatic. With the armistice in Europe, unemployment doubled. Imme- diately after VJ day, Paul McNutt identified Hartford, New Haven, Bridge- port, Meriden, and New London as areas where unemployment most likely would prevail, but he did not expect it to reach critical proportions. As 12,000 applied for jobless pay during the month of August, armories throughout the state were taken over for the registration of the unem- ployed. Their number increased to 63,500 in September and it was not until the Spring of 1946 that a gradual decline began. Connecticut labor was unsettled in the first months of peace and there were communities where there were workers and no jobs, and others where there was employ- ment and no takers. Industry itself contributed to the unemployment, not only by its handling of the problems of conversion, but in some cases by refusing to return to production until the approval of the OPA for price schedules which in the words of CMA would enable industry "to break even or even make a modest profit." Unemployment, was inextricably inter- woven with the problems of prices and wages and any general relief would result from the general adjustment of the economy.7
Organized labor made an effort to secure wages at war time levels and in accord with the increase in the cost of living. It was generally agreed that the cost of living during the war had risen approximately 30 per cent, but the determination of the increase of wages during the same period was made difficult by the overtime pay. It was estimated that, including the latter, the gross income for labor had increased more than fifty per cent and when overtime wages were excluded the increase was estimated at 30 to 40 per cent. Most laborers had adjusted their daily living to accord with this higher income. During the reconversion period, labor not only lost overtime and bonus payments, but worked shorter hours. The Connecticut C.I.O. demanded a wage increase of 50 per cent and the maintenance of existent retail prices. Management held that it could not grant the wages without an increase in prices, which were still prohibited in many cases by governing regulations. The Connecticut Manu- facturers Association held in January, 1946, that a 30 per cent increase in wages would result in a 100 per cent shutdown of 68 per cent of the plants. Labor leaders expressed their displeasure at the attitude of gov-
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
ernment as well as of management since VJ Day, and requested that Gov- ernor Baldwin call a special session of the General Assembly in an effort to resolve the wage dilemma. Baldwin refused on the ground that it would be fruitless to do so until the United States Congress had taken action to control prices. To assist in the resolution of the problems of labor and management the Governor appointed a labor-management council with wide representation from both groups.8
In the absence of any general agreement, organized labor turned more and more to the strike as a method of gaining its objectives. Somewhat in anticipation of the growing unrest of labor, the Reverend Russel J. Clinchy of the Center Church in Hartford, a former member of the United States Conciliation Service, pled for what he called a democratic liberalism which would recognize both the rights of labor and of management. Though the Reverend was widely quoted by proprietors his tenets did not advance beyond those of the nineteenth century. To labor, the situation was some- thing more than an academic exercise in patience. Strikes increased dur- ing 1946. Four new strikes were begun each month, with the average number of workers out on strikes reaching 15,279. This represented a loss of over 2,000,000 man hours each month and constituted a loss of two per cent of the estimated work time as compared to a national average of 1.4 per cent. A. C. Fuller of the Connecticut Manufacturers Association lamented the discard of the smoothly functioning machinery which had achieved cooperation in the war period and lashed out at those "who blindly demand 'the last pound of flesh' to satisfy their own lust for power." He charged that "the noose was being pulled tighter and tighter, with every work stoppage, around the way of life for which we have fought two wars in a generation." New Deal labor laws, and particularly their anti-injunction provisions, came under attack. It was "about time," wrote the Secretary of the Connecticut Manufacturers Association "that someone in Government began a real campaign for legislation which will stem the vicious spiral of labor disturbances ... . " In an effort to reduce the danger of strikes and to retain workers necessary to take advantage of the grow- ing market for consumer goods, some companies, such as Bigelow, sought to extend the program of increased wages and better working conditions which had been initiated during the war. In general, however, wage in- creases were granted grudgingly as management sought to exert its influ-
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CONNECTICUT AFTER THE WAR
ence to alter legislation and administrative practices which would permit the increase of prices.9
The drive "to take the government out of business" culminated in the failure to extend effective price controls beyond June 30, 1946. They came to be regarded as antithetical to the Yankee concept of free enter- prise and became increasingly difficult to enforce during the last months of the war. Simultaneously with the news of victory over Japan came the announcement that government was to get out of business. Moral per- suasion to prevent "excessive stock piling, preemptive buying, or the hoard- ing of scarce materials" failed, and by the beginning of 1946, President Truman recognized that inflation was the greatest immediate danger of the period. The creation of the Office of Economic Stabilization early in the year was interpreted by the Connecticut Manufacturers Association as nothing more than the failure of the OPA and the necessity of working out a more workable wage-price relationship. Chester Bowles, who had expressed a fear of spiraling prices in the post-war era, was made director of the new office and caught the imagination of the American people in his campaign on the dangers of inflation. The Manufacturers feared that they had come to look upon any adjustment of prices as contributing to inflation. The legislative battle lines were drawn and the trend was run- ning against a "managed economy." The price control bill passed by Con- gress was so full of holes that Chester Bowles resigned his position.10
The First Post-war Election
In Connecticut's first post-war election, a new generation of Demo- cratic politicians appeared on the scene to challenge the position of the veterans. Nevertheless, Chester Bowles, who had administered the price control program in Connecticut and who had resigned in protest from the Office of Economic Stabilization when Congress passed a watered-down price control bill, was preparing to bid for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination and state leadership. This challenged Brian McMahon's con- trol of the Democratic party in the State. Bowles had the support of John McGuire of Wallingford and John Golden of New Haven. In the first week of September, an atmosphere of uncertainty surrounded his candidacy. Then, approximately a week before the Democratic state convention,
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
encouraged no doubt by a public opinion poll which showed him far in the lead and by the avowed neutrality of Brian McMahon, Bowles announced he would actively seek the nomination. Another possible candi- date was Thomas J. Dodd, who had served from 1938 to 1945 in the Federal Department of Justice and had gained a block of supporters while serving as Chief Trial Counsel in the Nuremberg trials. Bowles' chief opponent, however, was Lieutenant Governor Snow, "a picturesque and pleasant poet from Wesleyan," who was supported by a group includ- ing Raymond Thatcher, Katherine Quinn, John Bailey, and John Tynan. These compensated for Snow's lack of political sophistication. It perhaps would be incorrect to say that Bowles was knifed by McMahon: it was enough for him to stand idly by and watch others do the work. They did it well. Snow gained such a commanding lead on the first ballot that others joined the band wagon. Bowles withdrew from the contest and moved Snow's nomination by acclamation. A writer for a national maga- zine observed that "party bosses do not always play to win, and this was one of the occasions when defeat was figured to be more profitable than victory." To lose the election, it was explained, might mean the temporary loss of the patronage; to win it with a man like Bowles might mean to lose it permanently. New alliances in Democratic politics were forming, which with some alterations were to dominate the Party for the next fifteen years.11
The Republicans gained a smashing victory in 1946 with tested politi- cal leaders. Governor Baldwin had been prevailed upon to make the Senate race, and as titular head of the Party exerted a powerful influence in the determination of the nominee for Governor. The Party organization gave its support to James L. McConaughy, who was described by his detractors as "a cold and reactionary don." He had been President of Wesleyan from 1925 to 1943, during the war had headed China Relief and had served in the Office of Strategic Services. On the eve of the balloting, Joseph Talbot, who had promised to take his fight for the nomination to the convention floor, withdrew and subsequently refused the nomination for Congressman from the Fifth District, because, he stated, he could not "in conscience, run with and become a part of a ticket that is the product of a one-man convention." Neither the party rift, nor the allegation that Baldwin had received a salary of $10,000 a year from the Connecticut Mutual Insur-
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ance Company while Governor, stemmed the Republican tide. Baldwin had been remarkably successful during his administration in retaining the confidence of industry while doing much to destroy the image of the Republican party as an enemy of labor. It was acknowledged that, if the Democrats were to win, they would have to receive the solid support of the liberal elements of labor. Yet, the party had turned its back on the liberals preference for the nomination. Political allegiances of all elements of the population were reforming in the post-war years, and whether labor could have assured a Democratic victory remains a point of conjecture. As Snow observed, "the tide was running against the New Deal," and the Connecticut electorate did nothing to stem its force. Baldwin and Mc- Conaughy, each with pluralities of approximately 100,000, led the Repub- licans to a victory which enabled them to win all the Congressional seats, elect a complete state ticket, and elect majorities to both houses of the General Assembly.12
More Adjustments
The Republican legislature responded to the suggestions of the Gov- ernor with programs of general benefit to the citizenry and of special benefit to the veterans. Group life insurance was inaugurated for state employees and additional workmen's unemployment benefits and old age benefits were granted. For those veterans who had resided in the state at least one year immediately preceding induction, a bonus of ten dollars a month was authorized for each month of service between December 7, 1941, and December 3, 1945, provided that no payment was to be less than $30 nor more than $300. In the first year, the state disbursed approx- imately $50,000,000. Also, in view of the experiences since World War II, there was authorized what must be regarded as a liberal alteration in the Soldiers, Sailors, and Marine Fund. The limit of the fund was raised to $25,000,000 and that portion of the cigarette tax earmarked for the fund netted added from two and one-half to three million to the fund each year until 1955. With other income the total in the fund then approached $25,000,000. The limit was then again raised to $35,000,000 although the amount earmarked from the cigarette tax was reduced to approximately $1,250,000 each year. In the meantime, except for recession years, the dis-
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
bursements for relief generally were below $500,000 annually. As expected, the disbursements increased in the latter years of the decade, but the fund was then in such a financial condition that the receipts from interest on investments were almost sufficient to pay for the necessary disbursements. The attitude was developing among some members of the state admin- istration in 1961 that the fund should be frozen at $35,000,000 and the monies earmarked for it diverted to other tax purposes.13
In response to the demands of real estate groups, the Assembly hastened the removal of economic controls and perhaps by this increased inflation. Rent control boards were to be established in each of Connecti- cut's cities which were authorized to adjust the maximum charged for rent upwards, but not to exceed 15 per cent in excess of the maximum in effect on the last day of federal rent controls. When it could be demonstrated that there was adequate housing in the city, the rent controls could be eliminated.14
An opportunity for the electorate to determine further reorganization and procedure of government was assured by referring to the people for final approval the provisions establishing a four year term for the Governor and for the Probate Judges, arranging for minor court judges to be nom- inated by the governor and confirmed by both houses, and permitting the Assembly to determine the methods by which forfeited rights should be restored.15
Birth Control
Despite the changes which had come to Connecticut society during the depression and the war years, there had been no alteration in the statutory prohibition of the practice of birth control. In the two decades of controversy, Protestant and Jewish clergy and physicians had joined other proponents of birth control who had shifted their position from demanding a repeal of the prohibition to permissive legislation which would enable a physician to prescribe contraceptives, devices, or drugs when it was believed that pregnancy would endanger life. The opposition to birth control was marked by the continued militancy of the Catholic Church and was reinforced by decisions of the state's highest court. The State Supreme Court of Errors in 1940 reversed by a 3 to 2 vote the decision of
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the State Superior Court which had held in favor of three defendants charged with unlawfully prescribing contraceptives to patients. The State Supreme Court reaffirmed its position in a test case in 1943 involving two patients of a doctor of the Yale University School of Medicine. The Court held that the law was not unconstitutional, that it was not a denial of natural rights and privileges, that the General Assembly was not precluded from considering those issues desirable in the interest of morality, and that the failures of the General Assembly to reject the law was "proof that the legislature had no intention of excepting physicians from the law." The court's position was that any change would have to come from the Assembly.16
The divisive effects of the issue on Connecticut society reached their greatest intensity in the 1947 session of the General Assembly. The lead- ing role was played by a "Committee of One Hundred" physicians. At the request of the committee, Representative John D. Alsop introduced a "doctors' and health" bill which he described at the public hearing simply as a health measure. Led by Dr. Herbert Thoms, a Professor of the Yale University School of Medicine, ten prominent physicians representing the fields of psychiatry, pediatrics, gynecology, and obstretics, stressed the medical advantages of the bill. Only one physician Dr. Lewis James, an attendant physician of the St. Francis Hospital, spoke against the bill, and he did not stress medical arguments. Six physicians of Catholic hospitals defied warnings and spoke in favor of the bill. Epitomizing the opinions of the speakers against the bill was the statement "that all the statistics you have heard this afternoon just becloud the issue and confuse the matter. It's contrary to the law of God. That is reason enough and answer enough." Repercussions followed the public hearings. The Hartford Courant, for the first time voicing its opinion on the issue, vigorously supported the stand taken by the majority of Connecticut's physicians. The Catholic physicians who had spoken in favor of the measure were dismissed from the Catholic hospitals. The state's Medical Society reaffirmed its support of birth con- trol by contraception. The Hartford Association of Congregational Churches issued a formal statement declaring "that no hospital which limits the right of free speech of staff members in regard to their conviction on medical matters such as birth control, should be eligible to receive financial support from either the public treasury or from funds received from gen-
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
eral subscription." There was little of a substantive nature which could be added in 1947 to the debates of a quarter of a century. The House passed the bill by a rising vote, but the Senate after a series of fiery exchanges, rejected the bill by a voice vote.17
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