USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume II > Part 33
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Hopelessly bills were introduced each session, and public hearings held as an empty formality. Legislators, Catholic and non-Catholic, could count the number of Catholic voters and estimate the hard core of their militant conformity to priestly instruction. There was more than incidental importance, perhaps, in the observation that in 1947 there were "600,000 Catholics in the state and we ... demand our representation." That the Catholics were exercising a determining force in Connecticut politics was dramatically demonstrated in the 1957 session of the Assembly on the issue of providing transportation at public expense for students attending private schools. Also, in 1961, in his quest for the gubernatorial nomina- tion of the Republican Party, John Alsop sought to minimize his connec- tion with the issue by reminding the citizenry that he had submitted the "doctors and health" bill only "on request." In 1961 proponents of birth control once again turned to the courts to secure those permissive rights denied them by Connecticut statute. A case was taken by a doctor and his patient to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court, how- ever, refused to rule on the case on the ground that there was no evidence that the law was enforced, despite the fact that the existent law had served as a deterent to the establishment of clinics for the propagation of information on birth control. The subsequent establishment of a planned parenthood clinic in New Haven resulted in the arrest of those responsible. Their subsequent conviction of violations of state statutes has been appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.18
State Aid to Education
The provision for state aid for elementary and secondary education was the culmination of two decades of controversy. Beginning in 1927, seven succesive sessions of the General Assembly rejected plans for the state to participate in the financing of public education below the college level. Support was gained for the idea in 1939 by the doubtful expedient of identifying the primary purpose of the bill as relief from the alleged
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excessive burden of the property tax. The proposal was defeated, however because of the inability to agree on whether the plan should be financed by a sales or an income tax. The number enrolled in public schools had actually decreased from 310,000 in 1939 to 289,000 in 1947, but the increase in birth rates during the period emphasized the need for increased edu- cational opportunities in the future. Then, too, the possibility of shifting a portion of the tax for education from the property tax was almost irre- sistible. The dominance of the small towns in the Connecticut General Assembly was evident in the educational aid program enacted in 1947. By a sliding scale arrangement, school districts with an average daily attendance of less than one hundred, for example, were to receive $110 per pupil, those with an average daily attendance of 750 were to receive $90 per pupil, but those with an average daily attendance above that figure, which included all the more urban areas, were to receive only $30 for each additional pupil.
The bill did tend to equalize educational opportunities. Inasmuch as no effort was made to equalize the method of assessment in arriving at the grand list, there was little relation between the amount received and the ability to pay. The legislation did insure the continuation then of small towns as educational units. As a result of the legislation the towns received from the state in 1947-48, $11,000,000, or approximately 22 per cent of the total expended for public education, as compared to $3,500,000 the previous year, or 8.5% of the total expended. As the public school enrollment reached 380,000 and as the total cost of public education in the state increased to $101,000,000 by 1955, the state proportion decreased to less than 15 per cent. In that year the first important supplement was made to the state aid formula. Twenty-one dollars was added to the basic grant thereby continuing the scale favorable to the small towns, but not increasing the margin. An additional grant of $9.50 in 1957 eased the prob- lems of continually mounting school costs. As the public school enroll- ments exceeded 450,000 and total expenditures exceeded $150,000,000, concern developed that some of the school districts were not providing locally monies for education in accordance with their ability to pay. There- fore a uniform effort was called for by the Commissioner of Education. The Assembly, however, in 1961, chose, to continue the established plan presumably while a basis for equalization of the tax effort was studied.
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The aid was modified to increase to $161 for the first hundred pupils in average daily attendance and to decrease proportionately until $111 was provided for the sixth hundredth students and $96 dollars for each hundred additional students.19
Minority Rights
The efforts in Connecticut to apply the democratic ideals implicit in a world conflict for the freedom of people revealed a dichotomy in theory and practice in the treatment of minority groups usually associated with other regions and, at one and the same time, the necessity and limita- tions of legal provisions. The Fair Employment legislation enacted in Con- necticut in 1947 gave force to the Inter-Racial Commission established in 1943. The proposals brought forth predictions of dire results such as walk- outs, demonstrations, and loss of patronage to those establishments which would permit the employment of minority groups on an equal basis with other elements of the population. In atmosphere of emotion, the Fair Employment Act was passed and provided that it shall be unfair "for an employer ... because of the race, color, religious creed, national origin or ancestry of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against him in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." The purpose of the act, as defined by the Inter-Racial Commission which was to administer it, was to provide qualified persons equal opportunities for employment. Nevertheless, the act was interpreted by the President of the Connecticut Manufacturers Association as "little less than a slap in the face to industry." The threat of legal reprisal, it was held, would simply open the door to troublemakers. The personnel of the Inter-Racial Commission, it was charged, was itself discriminatory. There was a com- mon area of agreement, however, between these views and those of the proponents of the legislation, that is, that education was necessary to the achievement of the objectives. The Inter-Racial Commission believed that "legal sanctions . . . are necessary to complement its efforts in meeting situations where recalcitrance and disregard for the law are patent." 20
Steady progress was made in achieving greater employment oppor- tunities for minority groups during the next decade, but the opportunities in the higher paying jobs were limited. The almost immediate voluntary
CONNECTICUT AFTER THE WAR (39)
compliance was the most significant development in the first year the act was in force. The Southern New England Telephone Company employed Negroes as telephone operators for the first time, several towns employed Negro school teachers, insurance companies began using them as office workers, and establishments throughout the state added them to their sales force. Nevertheless, discrimination was found in two out of every three cases submitted to the Commission. Connecticut, by its decision in 1949, was the first of the states to prohibit the exclusion of the Negro from the National Guard, and by 1952 discrimination was eliminated in Connec- ticut's Organized Reserve. The safeguarding of employment rights entered a new phase in 1952. Thereafter emphasis was no longer on merely secur- ing a position, but on securing one in accordance with aptitude and ability. Although employers were loathe to upgrade Negro employees, by the middle of the decade the major concern of the Inter-Racial Commission shifted to discrimination in housing.21
The protection of minority rights was furthered through the extension of the Public Accomodations Act first passed in 1905 and amended in 1949 to include housing. With Hartford and New Haven leading the way, marked progress was made in breaking down the barriers to minority groups in public housing, but as late as 1954 "segregation patterns" were found in 40 per cent of the public housing projects with no pattern evident in 20 per cent of the cases. It was learned that it was difficult to break down patterns once established. In the projects established since 1949, integration was relatively easier. In activities not covered by the law, such as private schools, it was learned that discrimination took on more subtle forms through the use of gentlemen's agreements, quota systems, and token placements. Summer resorts were identified in 1951 as the chief violators of the law, and the next year it was learned that 90 per cent of the convalescent homes and homes for the aged would not admit Negroes. Such practices were less frequent after the strengthening of the law to include all types of establishments which offered goods or services to the public. The extension of the principles to private housing was slowed because relatively few of the Negroes by the mid-fifties could afford homes in middle class neighborhoods. Only one third of those who purchased homes paid more than $15,000. As late as 1957-58 some families were spending more than half of their earnings for shelters and living in condi-
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tions dangerous to the health of all who lived there. Some landlords it was reported charged a "finders fee" of from $25 to $125. There remained neighborhoods in New Haven and Hartford which were almost totally Negro. The enrollment of one school in New Haven was 90 per cent Negro; and of two schools in Hartford, 75 per cent.22
By the end of the decade, there prevailed a discrepancy between public morality and private practice. Redevelopment projects focused fur- ther attention on the problems of Negro housing. Inasmuch as in many instances the inhabitants of the less desirable residential areas were Ne- groes, they frequently were the ones who were forced by redevelopment to move. To assist in alleviating the difficulties, the Public Accomoda- tions Act was strengthened and citizen's committees supplemented public efforts to secure adequate housing for the displaced. In Hartford the force of public opinions was directed against those who charged excessive rents in those areas where Negro population was most dense. Even so, the time had not yet come when Negroes could purchase homes from real estate agents or directly from owners without, in the opinion of Negroes, experi- encing unpleasantries. Yet, Yankee prudence would not cause interference with the granting of mortgages by lending institutions. The vast majority of Connecticut residents were still not ready to engage in interracial activ- ities with the Negroes. No more than 25 per cent were willing to engage in activities within the home and less than 20 were willing to engage in any type of interracial activity outside the home. In the area of personal services, such as barbering, the dichotomy appears even greater. The issue was more clearly drawn in the smaller communities, such as Plainville, where the Negro population was not large enough to support separate shops. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People planned a demonstration in Plainville which it was hoped would have national significance. Negroes "have considerable difficulty in getting hair- cuts," it was charged, and were usually told "to come back later, to come back on Sunday or after hours." The barbers were informed by Attorney Milton Koskoff, counsel for the Negroes, that effective May 1, 1962, the Negroes would patronize Plainville barber shops without regard to past discriminatory practice. Though progress was slow, there was evidence that Connecticut was bringing its social practices to accord with its exxpressed social theory.23
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The Sales Tax
To provide the funds necessary for the legislation enacted and to meet the financial needs of the post-war years it was necessary to find a new source of revenue. The expenses of the State's government had increased to 113 million in 1947 as compared to 69 million in 1945 and to 34 million in 1929. The taxes introduced during the depression years, those on beverages and cigarettes and the corporate business tax, proved inade- quate for the needs of government in the years after the war. Although greater revenues from the expanded war economy together with a curtail- ment of expenditures had produced a surplus, it had been acquired at the expense of state services. Governor McConaughy in 1947 summarized his discussion of the state's fiscal condition with the observation that the only alternative to an increase in taxes was the further elimination of cer- tain state services.24
The Republicans "jammed through" the sales tax in the 1947 session of the General Assembly over bitter protests. It was generally agreed that additional revenue was a necessity, but there was a sharp difference over whether this should be derived from a sales or income tax. The opposition to the sales tax was voiced by representatives of diverse segments of the population: the A. F. of L. and the Connecticut Manufacturers Associa- tion, the C.I.O. and the Retail Merchants Association, the International Office Employees and 600 students at Trinity College all recorded opposi- tion. To the charge that the tax was regressive, it was replied that it was necessary; and in answer to the proponents of the income tax, it was stated that this tax would not produce the requisite revenue. A basis of compromise had not been reached as the date for the adjournment of the Assembly approached, and on May 26 Governor McConaughy made a radio appeal to the public. In the formal debate which followed, the Democrats seized the opportunity to portray theirs as the party of the peo- ple and the Republicans as that of special privilege stating that the income tax was the only fair and equitable tax and the sales tax was discrimina- tory. The Republicans contributed to the acrimony by presenting for vote a sales tax bill modeled after the California plan, whereas the public hear- ing had been on a proposal paralleling that in use in Ohio. More than
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once the opposition was "gavelled" into silence as the bill moved toward a roll call vote amidst cries of "vicious," "shameful," and "a Frankenstein monster." The Republican dominated House favored the bill 150 to 103. The donnybrook continued in the Senate where a limitation was imposed on debate for the first time since 1863 to stop the filibuster of the Minority Leader. Only one Republican joined with nine Democrats in opposing the bill and it passed. In addition to the three per cent sales tax, the bill also provided for the abolition of an old age assistance tax and the elimination of $1,250,000 taxes on towns. A first step had been taken toward broaden- ing the tax structure.25
A move for repeal was launched almost immediately. The Hartford Times charged the Republican leadership with "bungling" and "derelic- tion" in its handling of the bill and the Courant editorialized that "the General Assembly has given about as classic an example of how a legis- lative body should not tackle its problems as one would wish for." The Connecticut Manufacturers Association charged that there was no rela- tion between the taxes finally adopted and the needs of the state. The Connecticut Public Expenditure Council which had been organized in 1942 estimated that the tax would yield 50 million dollars, rather than the 26 million which it was estimated was needed. In the first quarter, the tax actually yielded $9,551,944 which was three million above the estimate. The American Federation of Labor called for repeal, and the Democratic Party joined in the demand. The Republicans, realizing they had made a serious mistake in public relations, undertook a program of education, and Governor McConaughy announced that if the returns justified it he would call a special session of the legislature. It was con- vened February 17, 1948.26
When the battle was resumed it was along familiar lines. The Demo- crats charged the Republicans with support of "class legislation." Organized labor marshalled forces in favor of an income tax. The Public Expenditure Council opposed the income tax, asserting "it found no group . . . favor- ing it." It was feared that rates on high income groups would be prohib- itive. To give the dignity of expertese to its views the legislative committee employed a special consultant to study the sales tax and to make recommendations. He did not disappoint the committee. He was strongly opposed to the income tax. As finally altered, the tax was reduced to one
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per cent for the remainder of the biennium and was to be raised to two per cent for the biennium starting July 1, 1949.27
The political advantage for which the Democrats had hoped was not forthcoming. After the battle of words had subsided and the tax was permanently established, it was almost unnoticed by the public. In the gubernatorial campaign of 1948, Chester Bowles made the sales tax an issue with uncertain results. In his inaugural in 1949, he called unsuccess- fully for its repeal, but on his advice it was dropped from the Democratic platform in 1950. The costs of government continued to increase and the needs for revenue were even greater. The rate was restored to three per cent in 1953, and when a further increase in the existent taxes became imperative, the sales tax was increased to three and one half per cent in 1961. Once the sales tax was established, each Party refused to risk its political fortune by support of an income tax preferring instead to support increases in the sales tax.28
Housing
The Republicans made a beginning on, but did not solve, the hous- ing problem, which in many respects was the most vexatious of the post- war issues. To provide moderate rental housing, the state guaranteed, by an act of 1947, the notes and bonds of local housing authorities to the extent of $15,000,000 for a period of not to exceed 35 years. As of June 30, 1948, 1,568 dwelling units were under construction. The next day the State Housing Administrator notified Governor James C. Shannon, who had succeeded Governor McConaughy following his untimely death on March 7, 1948, that 3,000 additional units were needed beyond those which could be provided with the available funds. On the eve of the election of 1948, the Governor called a special session of the Assembly for August. The amount of the guarantee for rental housing was increased to $45,000,000 and the period of the guarantee was extended to 50 years. The program lagged, however, partially as a result of the failure of the local authorities to secure adequate sites, and partially because of the complicated administrative procedure involved in the program. By June 30, in the next year, 16 projects were under construction; one of which
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was occupied and four partially occupied. Housing had become a central issue in the 1948 gubernatorial campaign.29
Election of 1948
The platforms of the respective parties revealed their basic strategy. The Republicans endorsed as their candidate the incumbent, Governor Shannon, who most observers believed would win easily. The G.O.P. had won handily in 1946, and 1948 was viewed as a Republican year. The Party was content, therefore, to run on its record: to continue those programs enacted, to study those about which it was not convinced, to propose to balance the budget without new taxes, to oppose Communism, and to permit the Democrats to take the initiative. This was implicit in their liberal platform. A break with tradition was contained in the Democratic proposals for more equal representation in the General Assembly and a direct primary for the selection of state and local officials. The suggested seventy-five cents minimum wage and the extension of workmen's com- pensation insurance were recognitions of labor's hopes and of its political strength. The recommended repeal of the sales tax hit at an issue which had at least been troublesome for the Republicans and the proposal to modify the eviction laws and to build 65,000 low rent housing units was pointing toward issues which had been most difficult to them. The program which was "long on promises," wrote Keith Schonrock of the Courant, but in Bowles the Democrats had one who could articulate these prom- ises and invigorate the party.30
The relentless attack of this novice campaigner shook the Republicans, belatedly, from their complacency. The proposal for the repeal of the sales tax brought uncertain responses. Shannon met successfully Bowles' program for labor by the observations that the minimum wage law in Connecti- cut was far in excess of that of the Federal Government and that the unemployment compensation tax in the state "was the most liberal in the United States." A break came late in September with the withdrawal of the third, Wallace Party candidate, Thomas L. Emerson. Bowles refused the endorsement of the party, but accepted the potential votes. His idea of voluntary price controls by which the grocers and housewives would agree to price lists to force prices down created greater political fire than
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the proposal merited. When Shannon took the position that nothing could be done about prices on the state level and refused to debate the issue publicly, charging his opponent with a bold-face attempt to deceive the Connecticut people, Bowles characterized the Republican leaders as "a tired group of little, frightened people taking refuge in the past and never talking about the present or the future at a time when the demand of the times is for dynamic, forward-looking, liberal leadership." 31
As he outlined his Party's position, Bowles struck "pay dirt" on the housing issue. After Bowles presented at New Haven in mid-September five living victims of the unfortunate housing plight, the Hartford Times warned the Republicans that "it could be that the attempt to just laugh Mr. Bowles off won't be too successful." Until the last of October, Shannon seemed content to blame the shortage of housing on the blunderings of the Truman Administration. When the Governor undertook to defend the housing program, there developed a sharp difference of opinion on the number of units needed. Shannon estimated that 14,500 would be adequate while Bowles called for more than twice that number. To Shannon's asser- tion that the housing problem was being licked, Bowles charged that "a thousand Connecticut families who are doubled up with their relatives, and the thousands more who are facing eviction will still see the same ugly housing shortage." 32
The campaign evolved into bitter acrimony in the last days of the campaign. Republicans accused Bowles of being sinister and dishonest, and the Democrats replied with charges of "smears, innuendoes, and dis- tortions." The visit of Thomas Dewey and President Truman to the state in late October indicated that the state had slipped into the doubtful category. Dewey, however, could not rally the party to a last great effort. The pollsters had predicted certain victory for him and in a very real sense he symbolized the spirit of confident complacency characteristic of the state party. Truman, like Bowles, had been told he couldn't win, but with an energy which matched that of Bowles he carried the issue to the people. On the eve of the election it was admitted that Bowles had "peddled his panaceas for human and household ills with a suavity that cannot be denied," and that he had pounded hard on the issues he pre- sented. It was doubted, however, that he could deliver on the program, but it was admitted that there were a lot of people who might benefit
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from its implementation. There were enough in fact, to give Bowles a narrow victory of 2,225 votes and the Democrats a majority of 23 to 13 in the Senate. The Republicans controlled the House by the margin of 179-93.33 There is no doubt that labor played an important part in Bowles' victory and the withdrawal of the Wallace Party candidate had its effect. In a contest in which the margin is so slight, however, almost any event or circumstance of any political significance might have turned the victory to Governor Shannon. The one thing which stands out from a reading of the press reports on the campaign is the enthusiasm and energy of the Democratic candidate and his ability to transmit this to the Party and concurrently to elicit from the voter a response indicating confidence in him as a candidate. The Connecticut Manufacturers Association saw in the election "an object lesson" for all; "he who has faith in his cause and is willing to fight for it with all the wisdom and energy he possesses, has a good chance of winning in spite of seemingly impossible odds."34
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