USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume II > Part 5
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58 Ibid., pp. 79-80; Noonan, Nativism, pp. 293-94.
59 Ibid., pp. 293-301; Lane, Political History of Connecticut, pp. 79-88; West, Gideon Welles, p. 73.
60 Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Connecticut, May, 1857 (Hart- ford, 1857), pp. 338-41.
61 Roy Franklin Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy (New York, 1948), pp. 132-34.
62 Ernest Morgan, ed., Connecticut as a Colony and as a State, Vol. III (Hartford, 1904), PP. 207-15.
63 Lane, Political History of Connecticut, pp. 100-08; Noonan, Nativism, pp. 316-22; Samuel G. Buckingham, The Life of William Buckingham (Springfield, Mass., 1894), PP. 31-42.
64 Lane, Political History of Connecticut, pp. 109-13; West, Gideon Welles, p. 77.
65 Lane, Political History of Connecticut, pp. 110-14.
66 Ibid., pp. 114-22; Noonan, Nativism, pp. 323-34; West, Gideon Welles, pp. 80-83.
67 Lane, Political History of Connecticut, pp. 122-38.
68 Ibid., pp. 122-30.
69 Ibid., pp. 132-35.
70 Ibid., p. 139.
71 William John Niven, "The Time of the Whirlwind: A Study in the Political, Social, and Economic History of Connecticut from 1861 to 1875," (Doctoral thesis, Columbia University, microfilm, c. 1954), pp. 8-9.
Chapter XXIII
The Civil Conflict
E VEN AFTER SECESSION had become a reality, Connecticut supported compromise efforts, but would not countenance full appeasement of the South. The limits of conciliation imposed by the various segments of the population paralleled the several po- litical sympathies. The Democrats recognized the need for keeping the border states within the Union, preached the doctrine of non-coercion of sovereign states, and insisted that the repeal of the personal liberty laws should be a part of any compromise attempt. When the course of events made this position untenable, this party suggested the peaceful dissolution of the Union. The conservative Republicans were solidly behind the early compromise efforts, but when the Crittenden Com- promise failed to solve the issue of extending slavery in the territories, these conservatives moved toward the position of the radical Republi- cans and dropped conciliatory attitudes. At the beginning of the com- promise efforts, the members of the Connecticut congressional delega- tion seemed divided in their sympathies, with Senator James Dixon the most extreme. He was apparently so intent on avoiding war that he was accused, perhaps with some truth, of favoring the Southern position.1
Connecticut's Republican administration sent representatives to the Washington Peace Conference in February on the insistence of Gideon Welles that the Union viewpoint should certainly be repre- sented. The delegates were instructed by Governor Buckingham to give no "sanction ... to measures which shall bind the government to new guarantees for the protection of property in man."2 The failure of the Peace Conference was not lost on the Connecticut Democrats, and, as the crisis mounted to open conflict, they espoused "an honorable
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THE CIVIL CONFLICT
termination" of the troubles. In their call for a state convention they pledged that the party would "consider and consult upon the dangers that imperil the welfare of the country and the unity of States."3
The Connecticut electorate disregarded its fear of a long tenure for a Governor and selected, for a fourth term, William A. Bucking- ham, who was destined to be Governor for the duration of the war.4 Buckingham had entered public life as a compromise candidate of the Republican-Know Nothing coalition in 1858. Then a political novice, but of "eminent moral worth" and with a reputation of great integrity, he inspired confidence during the years following the economic distress of 1857. His determined stand against the extension of slavery in the territories established him as a standard bearer of Republican princi- ples. The most important issue in 1861 was union and peace or dis- union and war. The Democrats voiced a strong states' rights position while calling for the. Crittenden Compromise and a repeal of the per- sonal liberty laws. The Republicans denounced secession and accused the Democrats of giving aid and comfort to the enemy. A vote for the Republicans, it was said, was a vote for Lincoln. Buckingham secured 43,121 votes to 40,896 for James C. Loomis, the Democratic candidate. The Republican vote was less than in 1860, but the Democratic vote showed an even greater decrease. The latter was far from dead, how- ever, and remained a strong political force throughout the war.5
During the first months of the war, partisan politics was made sec- ondary to the national interests. However, to those who were not con- vinced of the necessity of the war, the defeat at Manassas was a signal for a drive for peace. The Democrats took the lead in this determined effort to stop the war. What was advertised as a grass roots movement had been carefully planned in the closing days of the last session of the General Assembly. The leader was William W. Eaton, "a successful lawyer, able debater, and prominent politician."6 In the first days of August, peace meetings were held throughout the state. These meetings featured white peace flags and staged passionate speeches. It was hoped that they would stem enthusiasm and the peace-makers even encouraged desertion. Since there was a definite pro-war sentiment in the cities, an attempt was made to appeal to the farmers, who were facing de- pressed prices at the time. It was asserted that the movement sprang
582
HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
from "the hearts of the honest farmers,"7 and it is true that the move- ment was supported by the Bridgeport Farmer. The offices of "that most infamous and mendacious sheet" were mobbed, peace flags torn down, and peace meetings disrupted or prevented by violence as well
(Courtesy Conn. Devel. Comm.)
CLINTON-TOWN HALLS
as countered by pro-war meetings. The Governor called upon the peo- ple to abstain from any act which would encourage the conspiracy, and ordered the police to arrest "those who are guilty of sedition, and of those who are embraced in combinations to obstruct the executions of the laws."" Thereafter, the actions and expressions of the proponents of peace conformed to the limits of the legal circumscription. The intense feelings occasioned by the peace movement in the Fall of 1861 were short-lived and were superseded by a general desire to give unlimited support to the Federal Government.9
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THE CIVIL CONFLICT
The Union Party, which emerged in 1862, was intended to pro- vide an affiliation for War Democrats who did not wish to be incor- porated in the Republican Party and it was hoped that a majority of Republicans would also join. The Republicans did not wish to give up their independent organization, but did nominate the same slate of candidates as the Union party. This slate was composed of the incum- bent officers except for two changes. The Democrats emphasized the preservation of the Union as their first objective. They went through the form of framing a platform which contained the usual criticisms of the Republicans. There was such a general awareness of the political temper of the times, however, that neither William Eaton, the recog- nized head of the party, nor any of its candidates troubled to address the convention. Buckingham carried every county in the state and secured the largest majority ever over Loomis, again the Democratic nominee. Events of the Fall of 1862, however, removed any self-imposed restraints on criticism of the Government and resulted in a period of partisan bitterness.10
The period which followed was "the darkest period of the war" for Connecticut.11 Buckingham's successive victories were gained amidst increasing acrimony. To the disappointment of the military de- feats of 1862 was added the bitterness resulting from Buckingham's at- tempt to strengthen the militia through the draft and Lincoln's an- nouncement of his intention to emancipate the slaves. Also, the Democrats had become critical of the Republicans' policy of financing the war through borrowing to avoid levying taxes. Although the town elections in the Fall of 1862 did not record a decisive victory for the Democrats, the voting did suggest a trend which prompted Republi- cans to extreme measures.12 As Commander-in-Chief of the state forces, the Governor was in a position to exert a powerful influence on ambi- tious officers who could be counted upon to inform their men of the correct positions on the issues. There was uncertainty as to whether enfranchisement of the volunteers necessitated a constitutional amend- ment. Without concern for constitutional propriety, the volunteers were enfranchised. The 900 who returned, it was said, to cast their vote for Buckingham do not account for the 2,700 majority he received, but did accomplish further embitterment of the Democrats.13 The Demo-
584
HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
crats forced the judiciary to review the law enfranchising the volun- teers. Despite forewarning that judges who voted against the law would be purged, the law was declared unconstitutional. Therefore, by a straight party vote, a constitutional amendment was passed in a special session of the Assembly in January, 1864.
With an eye on the post-war period, each party was seeking to broaden the franchise, but was concerned with the enfranchisement of a different segment of the population. As a result of the emancipa- tion of the slaves and the military victories of 1863, there was a tend- ency to interpret the war in terms of humanitarian ideals. These could be expressed and political advantage gained, perhaps, by the Republi- cans if they secured voting privileges for the negro. The total negro male population in the state was small, but if it proved to be properly distributed might be decisive in a closely contested election. The Re- publicans were aware that the only course open to them was constitu- tional amendment. When the proposed amendment came up for vote in June 1864, the Democrats sought to strike out the word "white" from Article 6, section 2, of the proposal. This would have had the ef- fect of repealing the literacy test which had been passed in 1855 and would have enfranchised three or four times more immigrants than there were negroes in the state and would have benefited the Demo- crats. The Democratic tactic was unsuccessful and only the negroes would be enfranchised by the amendment if it were passed again in the next assembly and finally ratified by the people.15
Politically, the war had been translated into negro rights, but these had been at least of secondary importance in 1861 when the states had responded rather to a call to preserve union.
The careless optimism of the national administration in the days after the fall of Sumter was compensated for by the determined leader- ship of state governors, such as William Buckingham, and the enthusi- astic response of the populace.16 On Saturday, April 13, crowds gathered in anticipation of the report of the firing on Fort Sumter. On Sunday, the pulpits echoed with calls to arms, and within a week war meetings were held in towns throughout the state. Banks immediately extended financial aid, and ladies provided the auxiliary services necessary to the mobilization effort. As volunteers far exceeded the need, Bucking-
585
THE CIVIL CONFLICT
ham sought unsuccessfully to make an agreement with the War De- partment to accept extra regiments.17 Connecticut regiments rendez- voused at New Haven, where they were instructed in the rudiments of military duty. The populace was sympathetic to the soldiers' com-
(Courtesy New Britain Chamber of Commerce)
NEW BRITAIN-CENTER OF CITY
plaints about food and contributed generously to the collection of supplies.18
Despite the enthusiasm of the populace, the state was not yet willing to make a total effort. Buckingham, in anticipation of the course of events, had sought in January, 1861, to improve the militia, which was far from adequate when the war began. The legislature was not convinced of the necessity of building up a pool of manpower. Not until July, 1861, was a new militia bill passed which permitted the Governor to draft citizens into the militia. This was encumbered with
586
HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
so many qualifications that it was rendered useless. All who could pay one dollar tax were exempt, for example, and it was established that members of the active militia were liable for Federal duty only on the direct requisition of the President and Governor. The Assembly did authorize enlistments up to 10,000 and a bond issue of $2,000,000 to support these enlistments.19
Not only did a fighting force have to be prepared, but provisions had to be made for the social and economic dislocations to be expected because of the war. The legislators were aware of the veterans of the Mexican War who were treated with "callous indifference" as they walked the streets in hunger. A bounty of ten dollars a month was voted for the three month volunteers, but, when an effort was made to extend it to the three year volunteers, the bounty was changed to thirty dollars a year. In addition, an allowance of six dollars was granted to each wife or adult dependent and two dollars for each child under ten years of age, but with a maximum of ten dollars permitted for each family.20
Connecticut troops were quick to face the test of battle. By the last of May, three regiments had arrived in Washington. They re- mained in nearby Falls Church until July 16, when they were moved into position before the Confederates at Bull Run. The troops were thrown into battle in mid-morning on July 21 as Federal troops crossed a stream to attack. The battle was joined at about eleven o'clock and Federal troops held the initiative until one in the afternoon, when Confederate reenforcements forced their retreat. In the general rout which followed, Connecticut forces provided effective cover as they beat an orderly retreat. On the day after the battle the troops returned to Washington, and then home, where they were mustered out of the service. The lessons of Bull Run were not lost on the nation or on Con- necticut. The period of optimism had passed: it was no longer expected that ninety day volunteers would suffice.21
In response to the exigencies accompanying military defeat, toler- ance of opposition to the war effort was limited and the state extended additional powers to the Governor. He was authorized to receive an unlimited number of volunteers and the $2,000,000 appropriated for the first year of the war was doubled. By Fall, Connecticut had nine
587
THE CIVIL CONFLICT
regiments in the field. To supplement the available supplies, Con- necticut joined the search for arms in Europe. Those secured were of poor quality, but their procurement prevented their falling into the hands of the Confederacy.22 The extent to which these arms helped to meet the immediate need was reduced by the accompanying faulty distribution, waste, and wrong-doing.
Avarice and graft raised their heads while the populace was at- tempting to recover from the bitter disappointment of Manassas. John M. Hathaway, Connecticut's Quartermaster General, was forced out of office. The accusations went beyond the questionable conduct of mem- bers of his Department to involve the General himself. Hathaway was accused of accepting a check from the Sharp's Rifle Company and of unjustifiably charging the state for rations. Also, although it was not discovered until after the war, the State Treasurer, G. W. Coite, uti- lized his office for personal gain and admitted having bilked the govern- ment of $12,000. Neither of the officials was prosecuted, but the diffi- culties in the Quartermaster Department lessened confidence in the administration at a time when it appeared that New England might become a theater of conflict.23
The knowledge that England was preparing to send troops to Canada spurred the Governor to new, but unsuccessful, efforts. In- formation of this British intent served to sober the Governor who had joined in the general rejoicing over the news that Captain Charles Wilkes had intercepted the English mail packet, Trent, removed the Confederate Ministers to Britain and France, James Mason and John Slidell, and imprisoned them in Fort Monroe. The Governor, to im- prove the state's defenses, acted under a law of 1851 and ordered a draft to fill the rolls of the state militia. Although the militia was solely for defensive purposes, it was generally believed that its members were subject to Federal orders. Various methods were used to evade the draft and towns refused to fill their quotas. After two weeks, Buckingham rescinded the order amidst the criticism of Republicans and Democrats alike.24
As the Union forces engaged the Confederates on the periphery of their defense in the early months of 1862, Connecticut troops took up positions along the extended Federal line. The eighth, tenth, and
588
HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
eleventh regiments participated in the combined naval and military operations in February and March of 1862 along the coast of the Caro- linas, and, as a result of the capture of Roanoke Island and New Berne, tightened the blockade on Southern ports. A near mastery of the South Atlantic coast line was achieved by the Union when its forces, including
(Courtesy Conn. Devel. Comm.)
WEST HARTFORD
the sixth and seventh regiments of Connecticut, in April, 1862, seized Fort Pulaski, which commanded the city of Savannah. The encircle- ment was almost complete when, in the latter part of the same month, New Orleans fell to the Federal forces. Among those at New Orleans were the ninth, twelfth, and thirteenth Connecticut regiments. As these outposts of the Confederate line fell, Connecticut troops joined in the attack on the Confederate capital.25
The successes of the Federal troops in the Spring and early Sum- mer had been transformed into bitter disappointment by the end of 1862.26 The Connecticut First Heavy Artillery joined Mcclellan near Yorktown, Virginia, on April 12, in preparation for the peninsular
589
THE CIVIL CONFLICT
campaign. The battery of heavy guns was immediately brought into service in the siege before the capitulation of the Confederate works. Valuable time had been lost. Stonewall Jackson had aroused fears for the safety of Washington during April and May by his hit and run tactic through the Shenandoah Valley. The Connecticut Fifth, which had crossed the Potomac, March 1, advanced into Virginia as a part of Nathaniel Bank's command and joined his advance guard in battle against Jackson at Winchester, Virginia, on May 25th. The Federal troops fell back, but after being reenforced sought to contain Jackson in the Valley. He escaped, however, and joined Lee's forces in the de- fense of Richmond. The Seven Days' Battle, from June 25 to July 31, 1862, during which the Connecticut Fifth provided artillery cover, particularly at Chickahominy and Malvern Hill, was judged a Northern victory, yet the army's failure to take Richmond resulted in a bitter disappointment for the populace.27 Disappointment deepened when the Second Battle of Manassas and Antietam were no better than draws.28 "The Nadir of Northern depression seemed to have been reached," when Burnside, who had only shortly before succeeded to the command of the Union forces, "committed one of the colossal blunders of the war in bringing on the disastrous defeat at Fredericksburg."29 Early on the morning of December 11, the hazardous task of building a pontoon bridge across the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg was begun with 100 men of the Connecticut Eighth taking their turn at construc- tion under the sharp and accurate Confederate fire. The crossing had been completed by the next day, and, on the morning of the thirteenth, Federal troops, including the Connecticut Fourteenth and Twenty- Seventh Volunteers, poured out of the city, across the plains, and into the death trap before Marye's Heights, into which Burnside had di- rected them. "The magnitude of the blunder seemed to be equalled only by the magnitude of the losses."30
The military reverses of the Summer of 1862 dampened the war spirit. Quotas were filled only under the threat of a draft and the offer of bounties. Connecticut had met the quota of the first 300,000 called in the Spring of 1862, but volunteers to meet the second call were lag- ging. To encourage volunteering, the legislature approved a bounty of 50 dollars. Later, towns, eager to avoid a draft, increased the bounty
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
to $150. Buckingham had established August 15 as the deadline for meeting the quota by volunteers.31 When the quota had not been met on this date, the deadline was advanced first to September 1 and then to September 10. The state was enjoying the profits from its wartime in- dustry. The home front was filled with gaiety and entertainment. "Un- precedented numbers played at Saratoga," Lane points out, and "when the draft was announced in September, many of the potential con- scripts were away in the Mountains of New England."32 Prosperity turned men's minds from the responsibilities of the time. Some, whose entry into the forces was anticipated, went to Canada, others secured medical exemptions. Hartford and New Haven tried coercion by pub- lishing the names of draft dodgers. Public men appealed to pride and patriotism. At least one industrialist gave employees who would enlist one-third pay during their absence and the assurance of a job on their return. Although violence was expected, 1,212 men were conscripted without any disturbance. 33
Conscription, too, failed. "As practiced and enforced, evaded and obstructed," conscription, according to Randall, "was one of the crying scandals of the war."34 In Connecticut, as throughout the nation, the supplying of substitutes became a profitable business. In New York, it was charged, a substitute for a Connecticut draftee could be secured for $300. The prices fluctuated, however, so that a Wesleyan student first sold himself and then hired a substitute to make a $100 profit. Bounty jumpers were abundant since the opportunity to sell one's services had tempted some to sell themselves more than once. As a result of bounty jumping, medical exemptions, and desertions, only 135 of the 1,212 draftees ever reached camp, and 81 of those who reported sub- sequently deserted. Such wholesale defiance could have prevailed only if a general concurrence existed in the state. The citizens' rebellious op- position to the draft is indicated by Wethersfield, where it was resolved in town meeting that the town would not have a draft and that the town would pay any fine imposed by the State for the Selectman's failure to impose a draft.35
The emancipation of the slaves in January 1863 gave new purpose to the war. The Republicans had been divided on the issue of abolition since the beginning of the conflict. The radicals had consistently advo-
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THE CIVIL CONFLICT
cated emancipation, but the conservatives had initially refused to sup- port this. As the war progressed, conservative thought altered, and by March 1862 had come to support Lincoln's plan for compensated emancipation. Yet, in September 1862, when Lincoln announced his
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F.
#####
(Courtesy Fairfield Historical Society)
FAIRFIELD-TOWN HALL
intention to free the slaves, the Courant reported that the conservatives were not ready for radical measures. The Democrats held that the pro- posal was unconstitutional. The different views on emancipation made it extremely difficult for the parties to cooperate in the prosecution of the war. Nevertheless, emancipation provided the war with a moral cause, the freeing of the negro, which was more compelling than partisanship or legalism.36
The dreariness of encampment in the Winter of 1862-63 was in-
592
HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
terrupted by picketing duties, marauding parties, and occasional thrusts at the enemy's position. The main body of Connecticut troops re- mained with the Army of the Potomac.37 The Sixth and Seventh Regi- ments maintained their position off the Georgia coast and five regiments of Connecticut's Nine Months' Volunteers strengthened the estab- lished forces in the Gulf and assisted in patrolling the waters, occupying New Orleans, and raiding Confederate strongholds along the Mis- sissippi.38
The course of the decisive campaigns of 1863 was indicated early in the year. Hooker, who had replaced Burnside, continued to pose a threat to the Confederates in the Valley and, as a result of the transfer of the Ninth Corps39 to Newport News and then to Suffolk, kept pres- sure on the Confederates before Richmond and threatened to strengthen Federal forces in Kentucky.40 Lee, understanding the diffi- culty of a simultaneous defense against the Federals on all fronts, planned the invasion of Maryland.41 Meanwhile, in the Susquehanna Valley, Hooker launched his anticipated attack on Lee on April 29. Five Connecticut regiments were with him.42 Hooker's advantage of numbers was dissipated by his permitting Stonewall Jackson to out- flank his troops, which forced Hooker to retreat and resulted in heavy losses. Among the Connecticut troops, there were 200 casualties and 500 captured.43
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