USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume II > Part 23
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39 | Part 40 | Part 41 | Part 42 | Part 43 | Part 44 | Part 45 | Part 46 | Part 47
Until the depression of 1929, the condition of the New Haven ap- peared to improve. Dividends on common stock were resumed in 1928, and it was reported that the road had no important debts maturing until 1940. There had been by 1929, a 10 percent reduction in the total operating costs as compared to that of 1922. During the same period, the company had spent $92,000,000 for the improvement and better- ment of the road which was reflected in improvements in the most critical measurements of efficiency. The total tax payments actually in- creased during the period from approximately five million in 1922 to eight million dollars in 1929.44
It boded ill for the future, however, that the New Haven was not keeping pace proportionately with the industrial expansion in the state but was losing important traffic to the motor transports. The increase from 130 to 142 million dollars, reported in the operating revenue from 1922 to 1929, represented only about a 10 percent increase while the gross industrial product of the state had increased approximately four times as fast. The New Haven Company had entered the motor trans- port service belatedly and with uncertain success. Its first motor truck service was begun in 1929. Still lacking in the company's service, how- ever, was the pick-up and delivery service for stores, which was advocated by some as necessary to compete with motor transportation. It would seem that the New Haven had merely been carried along by the indus- trial expansion of the state. That its operation remained marginal was apparent as the depression deepened: the road was incapable of sur- mounting the problems of a depression decade.45
813
THE BUSINESS MAN'S COMMUNITY
Labor
As Connecticut management resisted the federal government's pro- posal to further entrench its position by consolidating the railroads it resisted strongly the interference of the federal government in such matters as regulation of the hours of labor. During the war, the federal government had exerted some control over industrial affairs through such agencies as the Board of Conciliation and Arbitration and by such arrangements as the cost-plus contract. The intercession of the federal government in such matters was completely antithetical to Connecticut beliefs and was considered to breed labor trouble and discontent. The Industrial Investigator was in agreement with the views of the indus- trial-commercial element of society when she wrote that "federal inter- ference in state and private business is dangerous." Nothing in the wartime overseeing of business, in her judgment, would "lead anyone to believe that the adoption of any suggestion from the Federal govern- ment as to how to run a business" would increase the general pros- perity.46
The orientation of government to business was not so extreme as to disallow the right to strike, which had been assured by a law of 1878, but neither had the state extended any real legal protection to the striking worker. In subsequent amendments, penalties for intimidation and for injury to property, particularly as interpreted by the courts in the twenties, effectively limited union activities. Workers could not be forced to join a union nor could a company be forced to permit the organization of its workers. Employers persistently equated the right of individual bargaining with democracy and identified the effort to maintain the open shop as the American Plan in an interpretation not unlike that of the Anti-Boycott League of previous years or the "right to work" movement of a later period. Open shop organizations were established throughout the state and when an industrial dispute arose, the Chamber of Commerce, often with the assistance of the Committee on Industrial Relations of the Connecticut Manufacturers, would offer assistance to the company experiencing labor difficulties. It proved pos- sible to replace workers on strike in about two strikes out of five. In other instances the work was transferred to a different plant. Of the
814
HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
195 strikes reported during the twenties, the owners' will prevailed in over 65 percent, compromises were negotiated in 25 percent, and the workers' demands were granted in only 19 instances or in 10 percent of the strikes. In the climate of opinion of the twenties, strikes did not prove an effective instrument of enforcing labor demands. There was a noticeable decline in the willingness of labor to use the strike in resolv- ing its differences with management. The first two years of the decade saw 63 strikes; the last two years, only two.47
Organized labor had made important gains during the war, but once the war was over organized labor lost favor and declined in in- fluence throughout the decade, remaining relatively strong only in the building trades. The Connecticut Federation, with an effective mem- bership of probably no more than 10,000 and a depleted treasury, was ill equipped to fight labor battles. Moreover, the objectives of organized labor were limited and pacific. The militancy necessary to combat the apathy of the General Assembly and the opposition of industry was lacking.48 Employers, through the extension of paternalistic practices, through their own organizations, and by virtue of the favorable legal structure, were able to reduce the strength and independence of labor.
By voluntarily providing improved conditions, companies could dull the laborer's interest in organizing. If organized labor were not by this stripped of its raison d'être, yet urgency was removed. In the years following the war, companies, such as Yale and Towne of Stamford, New Departure of Bristol, and the Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Company, provided low-cost housing and recreational facilities and employed wel- fare workers to improve the moral and physical conditions among em- ployees. By 1928, however, only a fraction of the work force of the state benefited from welfare programs. Out of an average work force in the state of 250,000, sickness and accident plans, which were in force in 44 plants, covered 59,953 employees; group life insurance plans in 150 plants, 61,523 employees; and pension plans in 79 plants, 116,583 em- ployees. Such programs, undertaken at the volition of the employer, could be terminated at his discretion, but they delayed the introduction of a formal program of employee benefits.49
The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1913, which had gained acceptance in principle, was not broadened significantly during the
815
THE BUSINESS MAN'S COMMUNITY
twenties. A 1919 amendment had been interpreted in the courts so that the term "injury" had come to be defined as including any disease "due to causes peculiar to the occupation" and had come to cover a number of occupational diseases by the mid-twenties. In 1926, employers and insurance companies both believed that the Act should be amended and each drafted proposed changes. The Federation of Labor proposed a third variation which would have increased the scope of the Act to cover more employees. This was lost as the three groups agreed upon a compromise measure which passed the Assembly. The Federation had wanted accident insurance to be mandatory for all employers of three workers, rather than for the five as provided originally, and the Com- pensation Commissioner was in favor of having the Act cover all em- ployees. At first it was thought that the opposition centered in the rural representatives, but they charged that it centered in the professional group who did not want their assistants involved.50 In any event, the Act was not broadened.
Even in legislation concerning the employment of children there was only limited progress. Connecticut remained consistent in her pol- icy that each child should receive a minimum education before entering employment, but other legislative advances concerning the employment of children were resisted. After federal restrictions against the employ- ment of children under 16 years of age were declared unconstitutional, the state's restrictions on the employment of children between the ages of 14 and 16 were virtually eliminated. All doubts as to the state's posi- tion on child labor were removed when the Senate of the General As- sembly refused to ratify without a hearing a child labor amendment submitted to it by the United States Congress and when the House of the Assembly defeated it by the overwhelming vote of 231 to 7.51
The effect which the immigrant had on the Connecticut labor scene remains a matter of conjecture. The 80,000 Italians were the most numerous among the foreign born in 1920. The Polish immigrants came next with 46,000, and the Irish, who for the first time were not the most numerous group, followed closely with 45,000. Partially as a result of the Immigration Act of 1924, the proportion of foreign white stock in the population decreased during the decade. In the first year after the passage of the 1924 immigration law, 6,447 aliens came into
816
HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
the state, but this was only half as many as had come in the previous year. The fact that there were 19,000 aliens reported to be seeking em- ployment in the state in 1926 was not viewed with alarm, and one con- temporary comment minimized the social problem by pointing to the future needs of the state. Many of the immigrants were found in the building trades where the unions were strongest. On the other hand, since the immigrants comprised 40 percent of the gainfully employed and since only one in three immigrants was naturalized, the potential influence which labor could have on the choice of public officials and upon their inclination to favor labor legislation was disproportionately less than their number. In the 1920's, only the Irish were effective in political activities.52
The continued subservience of labor to industry was assured by the failure to prevent some of the abuses of the injunction. Not until 1927 was a bill presented to the Assembly which would have permitted the party enjoined to recover damages if a temporary injunction were not made permanent. The industries of the state did not even have to muster its forces. The bill was peremptorily defeated by the Assembly.53
In all, it was a combination of circumstances which contributed to the unfavorable labor climate: the domination of the General As- sembly by the business and farming communities and the corresponding lack of influence of the laborers, the aggressive and effective program of the business interests as compared to the ineffective and almost insipid programs of organized labor, and a public which was lulled into a political amorphism by the pervasive appearances of prosperity, all were contributory. The result was that the average work week and wages remained practically the same during the twenties. A proposed mini- mum wage was rejected by the Assembly in 1919 and again in 1921. In 1923, such legislation was not even proposed, for, not only were jobs less scarce, but the legality of such a proposal was called into question and subsequently denied by the Supreme Court.54 In the absence of legislation fixing minimum wages, they remained essentially the same throughout the decade, as did the hours worked per week. It was re- ported that skilled workers in the hardware industry worked 44, 48, 55, and more hours per week, both at the beginning and the end of the decade. The range in hourly wage from 52 to 90 cents also prevailed
817
THE BUSINESS MAN'S COMMUNITY
throughout the period.55 Moreover, while the hourly wage remained approximately the same as during the war years, there was less overtime pay; therefore, the weekly wage of the laborer decreased. Also, it was estimated that the dollar in 1924 was worth 60 percent of its 1913 value. As real wages thus declined, labor tended to blame the farmer for the high cost of living.56
Farmers Adopt Business Methods
Agricultural leaders denied vehemently that the farmer was solely responsible for the admittedly high prices. Labor, too, had a responsi- bility, it was claimed. It was argued that it was unreasonable for manu- facturers to expect the farmer to reduce the cost of living by selling produce at a loss in order that labor would be willing to take a lower wage. The scarcity of labor, the cost of machinery, the difficulties of transportation, and even daylight savings time were cited as having increased the cost of farm production as much as 20 percent. It was argued further that the middleman received the major part of the dollar which the consumer spent for produce with only 35 percent of it being received by the farmer.57
To an increasing extent, Connecticut farmers during the decade turned to organized marketing procedures. Dairymen and poultrymen led in the practice, and efforts were made to extend it in the marketing of perishables. The Connecticut farmer had taken advantage of his nearness to market to offer all quality of produce for sale, but the advent of the chain store and the competition of southern and western markets made uniform grading and packaging desirable. The ability of the dairy industry to withstand business depressions attracted other farmers to cooperative marketing. One fourth of the $28,000,000 value of crops raised and practically all of the 55 million gallons of whole milk and the 11 million dozen of eggs marketed annually at the end of the decade were sold through cooperatives. The decade's end saw Connecticut farmers devoting their attention to those products for which a market was readily available in the urban centers.58
It was recognized that if rural communities were to survive they would have to compete with cities in supplying good living conditions. To make a farm house a farm home became a slogan of the twenties. In
818
HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
-
(Courtesy Conn. Devel. Comm.) BRIDGEPORT-STATUE OF P. T. BARNUM AT SEASIDE PARK
1920, a rural youth between five and 20 years of age was as likely to go to school as was his urban cousin, and it was held that a greater number of rural youths would go to college than did, if they could afford it. The introduction of the radio brought entertainment as well as the market reports into farm homes. In 1928 farm and power leaders met and charted a course that was to result ultimately in the electrification of rural Connecticut. A beginning was made the next year, when 250 miles of line were strung in rural Connecticut to provide electricity to
819
THE BUSINESS MAN'S COMMUNITY
1,000 additional homes. The drift of population to the cities had slowed perceptibly. Since 1910, 65.6 percent of Connecticut's population lived in urban areas. This percentage had increased to 70.4 by 1930, but aroused little concern. Even the decrease in the number of farms from 22,655 in 1920 to 17,195 in 1930 was not viewed with alarm. Some had been absorbed to meet urban demands for reservoirs and parks; others became homes for those whom the automobile enabled to live a distance from their employment. If there were an alternative use, there was no insistence that the marginal lands of Connecticut be tilled.59
The Connecticut farmer reflected the optimism of the era. He had pulled through the post-war years to see the price for perishables, such as fruits, and for staples, such as potatoes, in every instance higher in 1925 than the average price for the previous five years. Intensive farm- ing, concentration upon perishables, and the introduction of marketing techniques enabled the farmer to enjoy a high gross income for most of the decade. The price of milk increased in 1928 and sales achieved a higher dollar volume in 1929 than in the previous year. The poultry in- dustry had grown to the point it was hardly affected by the first months of the depression of 1929. The value of the potato crop remained at about three and three quarter million. Vegetables had increased in importance by 1929 although problems attending their marketing had not been completely solved.60
Signs of prosperity appeared, too, in the balance sheets of industrial and financial institutions. Not only had the value of Connecticut's manufactured products increased by 76 percent over that of 1921, but it had increased in a greater proportion than the amount spent for wages (48 percent) or for materials (60 percent) during the same period. Moreover, the value of Connecticut's products had increased at a greater rate than that of the nation as a whole. The apparent well-being of Connecticut is further emphasized by comparison with Michigan, which was riding the crest of the automobile industry in the twenties. Al- though the value of products produced in Michigan was more than three times that of Connecticut's, the ratio of material and wages to the value of the product was 1 to 1.45 in Connecticut, while in Michigan it was 1 to 1.36.61 Meanwhile, the deposits in the savings banks had in- creased steadily during the decade and reached the amount of $626,-
820
HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
000,000 in 1929. The banks had approximately doubled their invest- ments in real estate.62 The Tax Commissioner reported that, item by item, the general increase in revenue reflected the increasing prosperity of the state during the period 1925 to 1929. What might have seemed as sure an index to a prosperous era was the increase in the amusement and admission taxes collected.63
There were signs, however, which in retrospect pointed to weak spots in the economy. Industrial expansion had continued, but had slowed perceptibly in the latter part of the decade.64 Connecticut's habits of thrift were apparent in the nearly one million savings accounts held by the banks and by the increase in the total amount of the de- posits. More indicative of the general economic situation may have been the fact that the number of accounts of over 10,000 dollars increased almost 400 percent in the years from 1923 to 1929 while the smaller accounts increased in number by only 14 percent.65 The maintenance of an economy in which prices continued to increase and wages re- mained more or less constant depended upon an expansion of credit. An orgy of buying on credit swept over the state in 1924 and continued to increase throughout the decade. A new form of credit, installment buy- ing, was introduced and the usual monthly credit was expanded. As the relations between customer and merchandiser grew less personal, the establishments checked on customers' credit through credit bureaus. Installment buying was introduced by the furniture industry, was per- fected by the automobile industry, and was expanded until most of the necessities were sold on some type of deferred payment. Inevitably, there were instances when purchasers did not exercise prudent restraint and instances when the privilege was extended too freely. The extended credit, increased installment buying, and introduction of small loan companies suggested that the consumer had exceeded safe margins.66 It was against this background that the New York stock market crashed on October 24, 1929. It was immediately reflected in the stocks of Connecti- cut companies and in the general economy.
The real extent and seriousness of the depression, however, settled but slowly upon Connecticut's consciousness. More than 50,000, or 7.5 percent, of the state's working force were looking for jobs by April, 1930. These were, of course, concentrated in the larger cities, the centers
821
THE BUSINESS MAN'S COMMUNITY
of the manufacturing and mechanical industries. The building trades and the iron and steel workers were first to be affected. The clothing industry and the textile mills, too, quickly responded to the depressed conditions.67 The greatest distress was to be found among the un- skilled.68 Unemployment was immediately reflected in the mercantile establishments, which were forced to cut prices to dispose of their in- ventories.69 The press, the Chamber of Commerce, public officials, and industrial leaders joined in the opinion that the slump was temporary and that the state's diversity of product and its resources would protect it from prolonged economic distress.70 Until the Fall of 1930 the "usual relief agencies" handled the problems attending the unemployment.71 In 1929, neither the state nor the cities had increased expenditures for poor relief appreciably. By 1930, however, both state and local govern- ments took steps to alleviate the distress. The amount of monies ex- pended by the state for the relief of those outside institutions was in- creased by 44 percent, yet the main burden was assumed by local communities. The monies spent by urban communities were almost doubled in 1930. These were the centers of distress. They were like- wise the areas in which the Democrats had sustained a thread of hope during the years of the Republican domination of the Governor's of- fice.72
Time for a Change
The Democrats had little chance of electing a Governor during the twenties, but the additional challenges during that decade to the cit- izen's concept of respectability in public office when coupled with the depressed economic conditions created a basis for a new ascendancy of the Democratic Party. As in earlier years, the continuance of command of public office led to carelessness. Republicans suffered embarrassment in 1924 when the state Treasurer, G. Harold Gilpatric, shot himself for fear of being apprehended for the embezzlement of the funds of a Put- nam bank with which he was connected. Before the conclusion of the course of events entrained by this, it was discovered that almost 1500 bills had been signed by Governors after the expiration of the time limit prescribed by the constitution. The Supreme Court of Errors viewed these acts as an arrogation of power by the executive branch of government. The Republican-dominated Assembly was called into
822
HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
session to give a semblance of legality to much of the legislation pre- sumably enacted in the past 15 years. The Public Utilities Commission, which was completely dominated by Roraback had permitted the New Haven Railroad to disregard a law which required the New Haven Railroad to remove one grade crossing for each fifty miles of track. The failure was overlooked until a dissident Republican, Albert Levitt of Redding, assumed the responsibility of driving Roraback from power. Levitt petitioned the Attorney General to begin ouster proceedings against the Public Utilities Commission. When this was refused, Levitt secured a writ of mandamus forcing the Attorney General to act. The Attorney General appealed to Supreme Court which ordered that he take action. On election day the Court was reexamining the case on the request of the Attorney General. While Levitt was unable to capitalize on the incident for his own personal advantage, the case was covered in detail by the national press to the embarrassment of the Republican Party. The party itself had lost some cohesion in consequence of the intervention of Roraback in 1928 to prevent the nomination of Con- gressman John Tilson for Vice President of the United States. The Party image was not lightened by the censure by the United States Senate of Hiram S. Bingham for carrying on his payroll one who was on the payroll of the Connecticut Manufacturers Association. During the Al Smith campaign of 1928 certain young men, unfettered by connec- tions with Roraback and ambitious for victory, were attracted to the Democratic Party.73
The beneficiary in this political milieu was Wilbur Cross, with whom began the renaissance of the Democratic Party in Connecticut. In political thought, he was a conservative; in speech, mildly pro- gressive; in personal conduct, a liberal, who yet conformed to the ac- cepted bounds of respectability. Cross combined the whimsical wit of his rural Mansfield with the cultured urbanity of Yale where he be- came a distinguished professor, editor, and administrator. He permitted himself to be wooed by the "new guard" Democrats to be a candidate for Governor, and, at the Party's convention, his stand against the "old guard" forced a compromise which fashioned a ticket that held the party together.74
An analysis indicated to Cross that a majority of voters was affiliated
823
THE BUSINESS MAN'S COMMUNITY
with neither party and that the independent vote would determine the victor of the next election. Cross reasoned then that the campaign should be waged on issues. He favored the repeal of the Volstead Act and prohibition, supported the improvement of dirt roads, proposed
GRIEVE, BISSET & HOLLAND INC. DRY GOODS
Valdort
-- 4
-
(Courtesy Conn. Devel. Comm.)
WATERBURY
steps for relieving the inadequate provisions for the treatment of tuber- cular patients, and endorsed old age pensions. For Governor, the Re- publicans nominated Lieutenant Governor Ernest E. Rogers, a former President of the Connecticut Chamber of Commerce, by which they lent credence to Cross' assertion that the Republican nominee would be but "a shadow of another man." The Republican call for a balanced budget had a familiar ring, but one out of tune with the depressed economic conditions. The ambivalent position on prohibition, adopted
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.