USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume II > Part 38
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To finance the increasing cost of government, the taxing program had to be stabilized and extended. Over $50,000,000 was needed in new revenue for the existent general fund operations and to provide the new programs recommended by the Governor. The gasoline tax was increased from four to six cents on the gallon. The corporation and unin- corporated taxes were continued, as was the sales tax inasmuch as there was not then an acceptable substitute. To assure the requisite revenue, the Administration had to enforce party discipline to prevent the reduc- tion of taxes on insurance companies. The insurance companies, it was held, during the depression had voluntarily submitted to a high tax, and it had been continued during the war. After 1945, the insurance companies had been gradually relieved by the Assembly so that they
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had succeeded in securing a reduction in their tax on interest and div- idends from six per cent to two and one-half per cent by 1955. It was proposed in 1955 to reduce the tax still further and to provide for it to reach one-half of one per cent in 1959 and to continue at that rate thereafter. The Republican House approved the bill. The Democratic margin in the Senate was reduced by one on this bill for the rather obvious reason that Philip Laing, a Windsor Democrat, was an employee of Aetna. His fellow Democrats listened to his charge that they had been "whipped in line" and blocked the bill on a roll call vote of 18 to 17. A bill to reduce the tax on premiums and annuities from one to one- half per cent met the same fate.6
The Primary Law
Of all the legislative proposals, that one which was of most con- cern to political leaders was the primary bill. Any such law it was feared, would diminish their control. Connecticut was the only state in the union which did not have some form of primary law, although fifteen of the states held primaries only for candidates for local offices. In the absence of a primary law, a number of Connecticut municipalities used the primary for the selection of candidates for municipal elections. There had been sufficient dissatisfaction with the caucus method of nominating candidates that both parties had advocated in their platforms the enact- ment of a direct primary law. The recommendations of the Legislative Council, however, were a far cry from a general primary law. The Council's proposal, which would have confined the primary to the elec- tion of members of the General Assembly and to that of candidates for local office, perhaps represented the extent to which party leaders wished to support the arrangement. Despite this lack of enthusiasm, largely as a result of the efforts of the Committee on Elections, a bill was reported for action. The skirmishes which had been going on behind the scenes flared into open battle when the bill came up for a vote in the House. A measure of support was gained from the Republican leadership on the assumption that such a bill would lessen the strength of William Bren- nan, who it was feared might control the Party's convention the next year. Thomas Dodd, then Congressman from the First District, who did
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not always see eye-to-eye with the Bailey-Ribicoff leadership, had gone on record by telegram as favoring the bill. Other leaders threw their influence into the contest. Ribicoff called it a "bad bill" which would promote "skullduggery and black mail." The House passed the bill 169 to 73. The Democratic leadership now faced the problem of holding the Senate in line, and there were defections. Duane Lockard, the Chair- man of the Elections Committee, favored the bill as did one of two other Senators. The proposition had aroused such public interest and the attempts "to-amend-it-to-death" had become so obvious that, in the opinion of Lockard, a Professor of Political Science at Connecticut Col- lege, the Party could not afford to be charged with the defeat of the bill. John Bailey, who had always been less than enthusiastic about the proposal, reversed his position and convinced the Democratic Senators that they should support it. Ribicoff announced that he would sign the bill. Connecticut secured a primary law, but not one which gravely endangered the organization's control of the nominating machinery on a town, district, or state level. Ironically, the new privilege was coupled with a provision that in any town over 5,000 in population the Party caucus could be eliminated in which case the town committee selected the local candidates and named its own members. The town committee could not assume responsibility for one of these functions alone, the two were inseparable parts of the alternative to the caucus. The town committee was thus relieved of the responsibility to the members of its Party implicit in the caucus requirement and in addition became self-perpetuating. Recourse from its decisions as to its own composition and as to its nominees could be had only through a primary challenge, a poor substitute and not synomous with an opportunity for member participation in decision. The opportunity for participation provided by the caucus may not have been exercised, but it required a cynical estimate of the quality of the citizen not to expect that its elimination would be recognized as a palpable disregard for democratic processes and an egoistic arrogation of political responsibility. Nonetheless, in the towns in Connecticut with more than 5,000 population, the caucus method has been retained by Democratic and by Republican groups. To balance against this, the primary opportunity has been used sparingly in municipal contests and in the selection of candidates for the Assem-
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bly. To challenge a nominee endorsed by a Party at a district or state convention required the challenger to have received on one of the ballots 20 per cent of the delegate votes, submitted a petition signed by a specified number of party members, and paid a filing fee equal to five per cent of the salary of the position for which he challenged the nom- ination. Its only effect in the selection of candidates for state or national offices seems to have been to have forced some compromise in an effort to avoid a primary. The only formal challenge for a state or national position was made in 1956 when the Democrat, Paul Amenta, a Senator from New Britain in the previous state Assembly, challenged Patrick Ward of Hartford, who had been nominated in the Democratic Con- vention as the candidate in the First Congressional District. Amenta's experience, rather than proving the efficacy of the primary, attested to the strength of the organization. Early in the campaign he gained a considerable popular following, but as the date for the primary approached his strength fell away rapidly. The 46 per cent vote which he attracted serves as a reminder of the hazards of the primary; and Amenta, an object lesson in what ambitious young politicians were not to do if they wish to progress within the Party.7
Breakdown in the Legislative Process
The Assembly seemed to proceed at a comparatively orderly pace until the last days of the session, then bedlam broke loose, and there resulted what veteran political observers described as "the worst exam- ple of law making" they could remember. The excessive trading was at the root of the situation. Bills having no relation were traded, an education bill for a road, a primary bill for a judgeship. In the wild scramble the last night of the session, the power of decision passed to the relatively few leaders. Bills of great importance were approved "with a wink of the eye," a half dozen or more unrelated bills were passed with a voice vote with only their numbers being read. Lobbyists crowded into both chambers and the public packed the galleries. Lead- ers of both parties were responsible. As they sought to gain political advantage, they held up bills of importance to society and contributed to an impossible situation. In addition, the effective leadership of the
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Republican Party fluctuated. It had shifted in the middle of the term. With Meade Alcorn out of the state, the Brennan forces exerted a greater and greater influence in legislative decisions, and there were rumblings in the corridors that he was about ready to seize control of the party. At the end of the session, Alcorn returned, the signals were changed and a number of positions, assumed to have been decided, were reversed. As the clock approached midnight, with less than five minutes remaining before the constitutional deadline for adjournment, the leaders of the House were screaming into their microphones for the Clerk of the House to read out the numbers of the tax bills. Their efforts were futile. The Speaker banged his gavel. The session was adjourned sine die. The Assembly had not voted the monies necessary to run the government, and in his address to the Assembly the Governor called a special session to remedy this specific requirement. The failure to have made financial provision pointed to basic structural flaws and focused attention on these problems and possible corrections. The tax bill had been in possession of the Chairman of the Finance Committee who ex- plained that he had not had time to prepare the bills. Republicans blamed Democrats and they blamed Republicans. "The only answer," said Charles Jewett, the Lieutenant Governor, is "to have people elected who will be responsible to the people and not to political bosses." Lock- ard, somewhat in embarrassed retrospection, it would seem, described the rank and file of the Assembly as "dazed, unspeakably tired, and con- fused." It was agreed that reforms were necessary. The Clerk of the House was of the opinion that the difficulty could have been avoided if the outmoded method of handling bills were revised. The Connecticut Public Expenditure Council recommended that the Assembly meet once each year, and that the budget be presented at least ten days before the ad- journment of the Assembly. Changes were made in 1957. Lobbyists were properly excluded from the floor of both Houses when they were in session, a more orderly procedure was provided for legislation which made it more difficult to "lose" bills, and a date was fixed beyond which bills other than those concerning appropriations, or of an emergency nature could be introduced. Whereas the changes went a long way to- ward correcting those conditions which had made law makers appear ludicrous in the public view, the alterations were not fundamental.18
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1955 Floods
The quiet of the Summer which followed the adjournment of the Assembly was interrupted by the havocs of nature. The hurricane Dianne released torrential rains on Connecticut on the night of August 18-19. In the West, the Mad, the Still, and the Naugatuck rivers swelled out of bounds, their waters raced through the cities and towns leaving death and destruction in their wake. In the East the Quinnebaug endan- gered towns, and in Hartford the Park River caused severe damages. Eighty lives were lost and another 200 persons were seriously injured, with 15,000 families suffering from the flood. There were 668 homes destroyed and another 2,460 were so damaged as to require major repairs. Estimates of damages by 507 industrial firms amounted to 88 million dollars and those of 1,436 commercial establishments to $36,000,000, while 922 farms estimated their losses at $2,500,000. Cities such as Winsted and Putnam were in disastrous condition. The State had only begun to recover when the waters of a second flood swirled through 60 com- munities causing additional heavy damage in 39 of these which had suffered from the August disaster.
To assist in recovery organized relief agencies, such as the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army, added their efforts to those of the neighbors of the sufferers, and the Federal Small Business Administration added its resources to those of the local banks. To this was added the assistance of the State. At a special session, the legislature petitioned Congress to inaugurate a flood control program. The first of the series of dams designed to control the waters of the rivers was completed at Thomaston in 1961. The legislature also voted $15,500,000 for repairs to state highways and bridges and $14,500,000 for local roads and bridges. State monies were provided to supplement federal funds avail- able for redevelopment, surplus housing was made available to devas- tated areas, and towns which suffered tax losses were reimbursed. To finance the program, the sales tax was increased one-fourth of one per cent and cigarette and liquor taxes were increased for a nine-month period. Even with this assistance, the major problem of restoration rested with the citizens of the state; and although the process necessarily con- tinued for a number of years, the major scars of the disasters began to disappear in a surprisingly short time.9
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Politics 1956-1957
The Eisenhower victory in 195610 was so complete as to sweep into office Republicans at all levels. Such majorities were returned in the General Assembly as to make it possible for the GOP to achieve a legis- lative record which would appeal to the voters of the state and make victory possible in 1958. The 31 to 5 majority in the Senate and the 249 to 30 majority in the House were more than enough to override any vetoes of the Governor. The Democratic leaders, however, gave them little out of which they could make an issue. The Governor at the opening of the session extolled the spirit of moderation which charac- terized the first years of his administration, reminded the Assembly members that this spirit did not "press a partisan advantage to its bitter end," and invited the Houses with their huge majorities to continue in the same cooperative spirit. He outlined his legislative program, but thereafter, with the exception of vetoing two bills on election laws, both of which were overridden, he remained in general aloof from the legislative mechanisms. When it appeared that portions of his program would be by-passed, he did not protest with cries of anguish. John Bailey, who had engaged in a running battle with the Republicans the last time they dominated the Assembly in 1947, did not issue a single formal statement during the entire legislative session. Rather he was content to encourage the Republicans to fight among themselves, an objective which was comparatively easily achieved inasmuch as the Baldwin-Alcorn group controlled the Senate and the Brennan-Zeller forces controlled the House. The Democrats' association with the "old guard" was effective and obvious. During the House debate on the school bus issue, leaders of the Democratic party were seen in coopera- tion with some of the Republican leaders directing the strategy of the floor fight from the Speaker's room which joins the House and for years was regarded as "off limits" for Democrats.11
The School Bus Bill
In a drama packed session, the House, after five and one-half hours of debate, gave final approval to one of the most controversial measures in Connecticut's legislative history, the school bus bill. Intense concern
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developed over this bill in the last month of the session and its course contrasted to the momentous regularity with which the House and Senate endorsed the decisions of the Republican caucus. At issue was whether towns were to be permitted to provide bus transportation for pupils in private non-profit schools. The controversy was begun when Senator Benjamin J. Kopacz introduced a bill which would have per- mitted any town to provide to such private schools bus transportation and those health and safety services normally provided in public schools. The Education Committee, which was dominated by E. O. Smith, rec- ommended rejection of the bill. Then the full scale battle was begun. The Senate made the bill the Order of the Day for Monday, May 13. The Lieutenant-Governor vacated his chair as President of the Senate and spoke against the bill. To quiet the fears of those who argued that the bill, as originally drawn, granted too great a degree of latitude, the services, which could be provided were specified to include medical, dental, nursing, and bus services only. In a subsequent amendment, in an effort to make the bill more palatable, all services except transporta- tion were deleted. When the measure reached the House, it overrode the ruling of the Speaker that it be placed on the calendar and shunted it back to committee where it was hoped it would die. In the Catholic Transcript, the Archdiocese of Hartford condemned the House mem- bers who had attempted to kill the bill and threatened reprisals against them at the polls. Within two days after the vote to recommit, sufficient signatures had been gained on a petition to force the bill out of com- mittee. On the following Sunday, a letter signed by Archbishop Henry J. O'Brien asking that parishioners watch carefully the results of the House vote was read in the Catholic Churches of the State. The bill was made the Order of the Day in the House for Wednesday, May 29. The unofficial count swerved back and forth as cloak room ballots were taken. As representatives prepared for the showdown they exerted all the pressures at their command. This was not just another legislative measure. Supporters of the bill argued that the bill simply extended those rights of welfare guaranteed by the constitution; that a large segment of the population was being denied its fair share of the taxes it was paying; that, in a period of critical shortage of educational facil- ities, the private schools were keeping down taxes. When the House
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convened, there were preliminary skirmishes over a resolution which would have denied the state or any subdivision thereof the right to use its funds to transport students to private schools, but would have made this the specific responsibility of the legislature. After a recess when the House reconvened on order, the galleries were packed. A motion to accept the committee's unfavorable report and reject the bill was lost, 153 to 106. The legislators turned to the consideration of the amendments proposed by the senate. When the Speaker upheld a point of order raised by the minority leader that the comments being presented by E. O. Smith were not germane, the Speaker was overruled 153 to 106. The vote on the amendments was 152 to 106. The battle was not over. An amendment was offered and withdrawn. Another was offered, and the Majority Leader called for a recess after which the second amendment was with- drawn. There was further jockeying for legislative position with the pro- ponents stalling for time while they mustered their forces for the final vote. After one hundred speeches lasting five and one-half hours dur- ing which the rulings of the chair were challenged four times, the fourth and final roll call was made. All eyes were riveted on the electri- cal voting machine as the red and green lights registered the yeas and nays. The vote was 133 to 133. The Clerk of the House announced the tie. Nelson Brown, the Speaker of the House, with predetermined haste announced in resonant tones: "The Speaker of the House votes yes, the bill is passed." The bill provided that upon a petition of five per cent of the electors of a municipality the question of the provision of trans- portation services by the town would be submitted to the electors in a referendum. If a majority voted in the affirmative, the municipality was to provide for its children attending private schools not conducted for a profit the same transportation service it provided for the children attend- ing public schools.12
Conflicts In Mental Health Administration
The overlapping authority of the Mental Health Council and the Trustees of the three state hospitals resulted in administrative difficulties which in 1957 were translated into conflict between the Commissioner of Mental Health and the Superintendent of Fairfield Hospital. Inas-
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much as nine of the twelve members of the Council, as it was originally constituted, were chosen from the Trustees of the institutions, the Coun- cil was not independent of institutional influence. Although the Com- missioner had been given general supervision of the hospitals, the Trustees retained their appointive powers. The difficulties of bringing the hospitals, which had enjoyed relative independence, under the super- vision of the Commissioner was complicated by the overcrowded con- ditions, the personality conflicts which accompany such transitions, and the new techniques of treatment introduced under the aegis of the Department of Mental Health. Dr. John Blasko, the Commissioner, in an obvious test of his authority, requested on May 29, 1957, the immedi- ate dismissal of Dr. W. G. Green, Superintendent of the Fairfield Hospi- tal, charging him with gross negligence, including abusive treatment of employees and attempts to block the use of needed psychological and occupational therapy techniques. The Trustees, who seemed to feel that Blasko had circumvented their authority in submitting his charges to the Council, immediately expressed a confidence in the Superintend- ent, conditional on the possibility that additional evidence might be sub- mitted. Blasko, who had come to believe that he had been hired to do a job, but had not the authority to do it, resigned immediately stating that the actions of the Trustees made it impossible for him to perform his duties. A three man investigating committee, headed by former Supreme Court Justice William M. Maltbie, did not sustain Blasko in his charges related to the general administration of the hospital, but recognized that the dispute could only be resolved by an examination of the hospital's professional policies. The Governor, acting upon this recommendation, requested the American Psychiatric Association to make the study. Meanwhile, Green and Blasko exchanged verbal blows, and the General Assembly enacted legislation to correct the situation. The Council was changed to a Board of seven members who were to be appointed by the Governor and the Commissioner was given clear administrative authority over the hospitals.13
The State Prison
Steps were taken toward prison reform and the resolution of some
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of the long standing problems of the state prison. The population of the prison had increased about 15 per cent since 1950, and the problems occasioned by the over-crowding had been indicated by the wardens each succeeding year. The situation at the prison was highlighted in the Summer of 1956 by serious disturbances among the inmates which resulted in the resignation of the Warden, in a grand jury investiga- tion, and in a study of prison reform by an especially appointed com- mission headed by Justice P. B. O'Sullivan. The Grand Jury, the Commission, and the new Warden, Mark S. Richmond, made a number of suggestions, many of which were translated into realities by the 1957 Assembly. Efforts were made to resolve some of the complaints of the inmates by the appointment of an independent Parole Board of three members. This Board was charged with the responsibility for parole previ- ously exercised by the Directors of the prison. In answer to other complaints, a Sentence Review Board, consisting of three Superior Court Judges, was established to review the sentence of any person sentenced to term of one year or more who filed an application for such a review. Prompt disposition of cases pending against an inmate was assured by the provision that inmates would be assured of trial within 120 days after the prisoner's request for final disposition of the charges. The part that rehabilitation was to play in the prison program was suggested in a new emphasis on prison industries for which an advisory citizens committee was created. During the biennium 1959-60, the number of inmates employed rose from 317 to 433; the gross sales, from $564,198 to $677,000; and the net profits, from $18,205 to $46,320. In addition, education and training for the inmates was extended to a significant degree.14
Preliminary steps were made toward the establishment of a sep- arate institution for the custody and treatment of sexual deviates. The care of the sexual deviates had been an issue in the Connecticut Gen- eral Assembly since 1947 when it was proposed that they be made the responsibility of the mental hospitals. The hospitals were not enthusiastic about accepting this responsibility and pleaded that they were not equipped to handle such problems. The Legislative Council, therefore, in 1948 recommended that sex offenders remain the province of the criminal courts. Despite repeated efforts nothing was done while the
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