USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume II > Part 35
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The Republicans quickly seized the initiative. Baldwin identified the party as the protector of constitutional government when he announced that it would present its own plan which would effect economies, but would not call for a complete overhaul of the government and would not
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centralize power in the Governor. It was formally announced after a GOP caucus that any constitutional changes would have to be accomplished in accordance with established procedure. Republican spokesmen insisted that they were still interested in reorganization and favored home rule and the abolishment of dual jobs.
Bowles meanwhile, had done little to improve the chances of reorgani- zation. When he refused comment on the charge that he was backing away from the elemination of an independent aeronautics unit, he laid himself open to the charge of yielding to pressure and being insincere. When, somewhat belatedly given the course of events, Bowles announced his willingness to compromise, he repeated his penchant for classifying peo- ple-this time as sincere and insincere-for which he was sharply rebuked by the Courant. The Governor now favored independent agriculture, con- servation, and aeronautics units, agreed to go slow on constitutional revision and to merge agencies such as the Public Utilities Commission merely for housekeeping purposes. Although the Republicans claimed that they were far ahead on a realistic program for reorganization, there seemed to be a basis for compromise.17
A month of negotiation ended in one of the most violent political storms in the state's history and with little accomplished in the way of reorganization of the state's government. Alfred F. Weschler, the Demo- cratic Senate leader, declared on May 23, that "it may be imperative and essential that the Governor call the legislature into special session .. . to determine whether the Republicans are sincere" in their platform, "We may want to put them on the spot." "By his assumption," the Courant editorialized "that he and the Governor are the judges who will determine the sincerity of the opposition, Mr. Weschler is talking political Jabber- wocky of the kind that has helped fill the average persons with disgust for politics and politicians." The Republicans were outraged by Weschler's statement, and on the 25th, amidst cheers and votes of confidence in the leadership, Conway announced that "if the Governor wants to call us back into special session, let him." The next day the Republican charges against the Governor became so vituperative that the Democrats walked out of the House and reported that the actions of the opponents were a disgrace to the office of Governor. The GOP refused to continue talks on reorganization and went home. Bowles in a radio appeal asked that
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they desert their leadership and return. When the Senate convened on May 27 there were no Republicans. The Assembly had passed bills recreat- ing the Public Works Department, strengthening the budget and purchas- ing divisions within the finance department; establishing uniform terms for state offices, excepting the police and the Adjutant General; and pro- viding for the unification of a few minor functions, the Democrats charged. It was an object lesson, the Governor believed, "that we cannot get decent government until we break the GOP control of the House of Repre- sentatives." The campaign had begun.18
The significance of the Report of the Commission on State Organiza- tion rests in its audacious outline of governmental weaknesses, weaknesses which again and again were evidenced in the next decade to condemn: political leaders who had placed party before governmental reorganiza- tion; bureaucrats who had approved the principle, but never the applica- tion of reorganization; and electors who by apathy had permitted the limited self-interest of pressure groups to determine decisions. If the respected Commission were indeed fitted for its task, it yet failed to under- stand the implications of its recommendations. By design or by desire, when their prestige was needed most, its members remained out of the line of political fire in what was essentially a political battle. If the Commission's recommendations to shortcut established constitutional pro- cedures were not in reality a realization of the futility of the immediate achievement of the objectives, no better way could have been found to have scuttled the entire plan. The inability of the Chairman of the Com- mission to provide estimates of the savings which might be expected from the organization was inexcusable from one who signed a report which held that the recommendations would produce a more economical and efficient government. The report itself attests to the breadth and depth of the con- ceptual theories which gave direction to the efforts of the technical staff, but the report failed to bridge the gap between theory and practice. There was an inability of staff members at times to substantiate their generalizations and these were failures in scholarship which provided wedges through which reams of criticism flowed.
Finally, Governor Bowles failed to provide effective political leader- ship. Ironically, his greatest failure was in the area in which it was pre- sumed he had the greatest professional competence, that is, with the
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techniques of presentation. The electorate, with whom the final decision was to have rested, was never effectively informed of the urgency for change or permitted to educate themselves on the substance of the report, let alone the implications of its meaning. The responsibility for seeing the report through was a responsibility to be assumed jointly by the Assembly and the Governor, but when the Republican party withdrew its identi- fication with the report, it came to be regarded as an attempt of the Executive to seize more power. In fact, the most salient feature of the report was that it called for strengthening simultaneously the executive, the Assembly, and the courts, and for the establishment of new controls in the hands of the citizens. This objective, however, was not kept in the foreground, and the report was identified as designed to promote economy and efficiency, terms more familiar, but not completely understood, par- ticularly as they related to the recommendations. The Courant might take editorial pride in the observation that "if Connecticut takes ten years to adopt something as fundamental as this report, including the revision of the constitution, it will not be too long." Significant changes were made in the next decade, but history might show that in this piecemeal approach there has not been maintained a proper balance of strength between the executive, judicial, and legislative branches. Despite the failure to enact the recommendation, the Commission's analysis was indeed a "monument that increases in stature as time goes on."
Election 1950
The contestants in the 1950 gubernatorial campaign were indicated early and awaited only the formal actions of their respective party con- ventions. Governor Bowles, of course, was the Democratic nominee. John Davis Lodge, a younger son in one of New England's most distinguished Republican families, a lawyer by training, an actor by profession, and a politician by desire, had gained early support for his candidacy. He had settled in Connecticut after a distinguished war record and had repre- sented the Fourth district in the United States Congress. He was formally offered the support of the Republican leadership in the latter part of April. Despite moments of apparent confusion within the Republican ranks, he went into the convention with overwhelming support as compared to that
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for J. Kenneth Bradley, former Chairman of the Party, or for former Governor Shannon, or for William A. Purtell, the President of the Connecti- cut Manufacturers Association. The organization had counted its votes skillfully and the state was to await one of its longest campaigns.20 Politics were interrupted briefly with the outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950. The manufacturing plants of the state had not only increased since World War II, but a large portion had been equipped with new machinery. The state was well equipped to handle the war orders and at the same time maintain its competitive position in the production of non-military goods. The production of consumer goods, which had begun to increase before the war, began to rise rapidly with many of the factories putting on extra shifts. Armament orders came in slowly, the principle gains be- ing made in fabricated metals, primary metals, machinery, and trans- portation and electrical equipment. Although the shortage of metals began to slow the production, more people were working in Connecticut in December, 1950, than ever before in its history, and the state was on its way to its greatest economic expansion.21
The campaign began with Lodge's attacking Bowles' record as Gov- ernor, evolved into a brief discussion of the issues, and ended in a free swinging affair with little resemblance to the genteel ways of Boston or the comfortable living of Essex. Lodge questioned the sincerity of Bowles and found astonishing inconsistencies in his administration. Lodge charged that Bowles had failed in his promise to build 56,000 houses, had failed to reduce prices, had changed his mind about a state income tax, and had altered his position on state reorganization. A portion of the record, at least, was on the Governor's side, but it involved subtleties not easily explained to the electorate.
Bowles had stated that there was a need for 56,000 homes, and had said that prices could be controlled by the cooperative action of consumers and retailers. He did change his mind on the income tax and on state reorgani- zation. The latter change, however, it would seem, was one of tactic rather than belief. Some of the steam was taken out of the housing as an issue as a result of the special session of the Assembly which met in Sep- tember of that year. Although the Republicans manifested their coolness, both toward the special session and toward the Governor, the housing issue was potentially too explosive for them to want to be identified as being in
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opposition to it. The Republicans agreed to double the amount of money for assistance in the purchase of homes, but refused to increase the funds available for rental projects. Near the end of the campaign, Lodge in a mood of righteous indignation challenged the Governor's "attempts to mislead our citizens by pretending that he, and he alone, is responsible for the public housing which has been built in Connecticut." There was gen- eral agreement as to the necessity of providing more assistance for edu- cation, particularly for teachers' salaries. The Governor, however, advocated the establishment of community colleges in all of Connecticut's larger cities. Lodge attempted to counter Bowles' claim that the Republicans had blocked favorable legislation by accenting the ridiculously obvious fact that each beneficial labor law had been enacted when the Republicans at least controlled the House of Representatives.
It was inevitable in a campaign which revealed an apparent lack of enthusiasm for Lodge that the campaign would turn into an attack on his opponent. Inasmuch as Lodge had not been active in State politics, Bowles could only attack the Republican Party while Lodge could attack the candidate, Bowles. Joseph Adorno, the Republican State Treasurer, pressed the charges against the Governor relentlessly. He charged Bowles with burdening the state with the greatest debt in its history, and sug- gested that Governor Bowles should pursue his Presidential ambitions at his own expense. Lodge picked up the refrain by declaring that "if all the grandiose schemes of Governor Bowles had been put into effect, the state would have been plunged into bankruptcy." Bowles, in turn, charged Adorno with trying to blackmail him by refusing to pay the state em- ployees unless Bowles gave Adorno authority to borrow the funds necessary. As the campaign neared its conclusion, Bowles summarized his views of the Republican campaign by stating that it "tries to substitute free beer for better housing, spangled dancers for better schools. ... It tries any- thing that will draw attention from a candidate who has nothing to offer and no place to go. It has been devoted exclusively to what they are against, avoiding what they are for." Lodge provided a similar evaluation of the Democratic effort. The Democratic Party, he said, "convinced that it cannot win at the polls, has resorted to slurs and smears in an effort to gain votes. The Democrats are short on ammunition, and have aban- doned any attempt at a frank discussion of issues and principles." The
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Republican attack appeared to be paying off; and the beloved "Veep," Alben W. Barkley, was rushed into the state in an attempt to stem the tide. His efforts were too little. Lodge's 439,000 votes gave him a plurality of 17,000.22
Connecticut owed more to Chester Bowles, perhaps, than it would acknowledge, and the Democratic Party more than it would ever care to admit. Although he failed to achieve the reorganization of the government during his administration, he, more than any other, was responsible for the idea that if Connecticut were to retain her historic independence, her government had to be made strong and workable. He was not the first Governor to advocate reforms, but none attacked the problems of society simultaneously on more fronts or advocated alterations with greater zeal. His aggressiveness aroused the fears of the conservatives and caused them to coalesce to stem what they believed to be a radical tide, but in the combat they absorbed ideas which pushed them further in the direction of a moderate position toward which they were already tending. Within the Democratic Party Bowles was in a very real sense the last in the New Deal tradition. His audaciousness, and his aggressiveness became object lessons in what not to do, but in concept his ideas provided a blue print for advance. In its realization, Connecticut chose "the middle way."
NOTES -CHAPTER XXXV
1. Hartford Times, Feb. 2, 1949; Hartford Courant, Jan. 2, Feb. 20, Mar. 3, May 5, May 20, 1949; Governor's Message, Journal of the House, (Hartford, 1949), p. 36.
2. Ibid., p. 36, Part 2, p. 596; Public Acts, 1949, p. 268; Hartford Courant, Jan. 10, Mar. 25, June 10, 1949; Hartford Times, Jan. 10, Feb. 2, Mar. 1, 22, Apr. 13,
3. See Report of the Public Works Department, Housing Division, Digest of Administrative Reports (Hartford, 1958).
4. Public Acts, 1949, p. 279.
5. See Reports of the State Housing Authority 1948-51 and Reports of the Public Works Department, 1951-58 in Digest of Administrative Reports, 1948-58.
6. Journal of the House, Jan., 1949, p. 62; Public Acts, 1949, pp. 5, 268.
7. Hartford Courant, Apr, 28, May 1, 1949.
8. Public Acts, 1949, p. 295; Department of Labor and Factory Inspec- tion, Digest of Administrative Reports, 1949-50, p. 229; State of
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Connecticut, Department of Labor Bulletin, Feb. 1949, p. 1, June, 1949, p. 5, July, 1949, p. 6, Sept. 1949, p. 6; Connecticut Industry, XXX, July 1952, p. 44.
9. Journal of the House, Jan. 1949, p. 201; ibid., Special Session, June, 1949, pp. 1-38; Report of the Department of Finance and Control, Administrative Digest, 1947-48, 1948-49, 1949-50; Hartford Cour- ant, June 15, 16, 17.
10. General Statutes, 1947, p. 579; Journal of the House, Special Session, Nov., 1949, p. 9; Hartford Courant, Jan. 28, Feb. 17, 1949.
11. Ibid., Feb. 6, 7, 20, 21, Mar. 3, 6, 10, 23, 27, Apr. 30, May 5, 8, 15, 20, June 2, 3, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 1949.
12. Journal of the House, Special Session, Nov., 1949, p. 9; Hartford Courant, Nov. 2, 3, 11, 27; Public Acts, Special Sessions, 1949, Public Act No. 6.
13. Ibid. Public Act No. 6.
14. Carter Atkins, Chairman, Report to the General Assembly and Gov- ernor on Organization of State Government (Hartford, 1950), pp. 1-78.
15. Journal of the House, Part 1, Jan., 1949, p. 64; Hartford Courant, March 1, 2, 5, 9, 1949.
16. Ibid., Mar. 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 22, 1949.
17. Ibid., Mar. 26, 29, Apr. 2-8, 13, 14, 18, 19, 26, 1949.
18. Ibid., May 24, 25, 26, 27, 1949.
19. Ibid., Mar. 5, 9, 1950.
20. Ibid., Apr. 30, June 4, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 1950; Hartford Times, July 29, 1950; Register and Manual, 1950, p. 67.
21. Monthly Labor Bulletin, July, 1950, p. 6, Aug. 1950, p. 1, Dec., 1950, p. 10.
22. New Britain Herald, Sept. 5, 12, 19, Oct. 4, 17, 21, 30; New Haven Register, Oct. 30, Nov. 2, 1950; Hartford Times, Sept. 26, Oct. 4, 7, 10, 14, 17, 1950.
Chapter XXXVI The Middle Way
J OHN DAVIS LODGE was identified as one who would check dan- gerous radicalism and direct the course of public affairs within the accepted precepts of the "middle way." He failed to exert, however, that strong leadership in legislative matters which it was expected would result from his being the first Connecticut Governor to be elected to a four year term. Legislation frequently languished. He came to office as leader of a Party which was united in victory; as a result of an effort to purge the party of leaders antithetical to his concepts of democracy, he left the party divided. Thereby Lodge contributed to the development of the Democratic Party as a dominant force in Connecticut politics.
The Lack of Political Leadership
The new Governor failed to demonstrate the will or the ability to exercise the political leadership incumbent upon one in the position to which he had been elected. The Democrats controlled the Senate by a thin 19 to 17 margin and the Governor's concept of political responsi- bility would not permit a single patronage deal to neutralize the Demo- cratic senatorial majority and give the Republicans complete control of the legislature. As he spoke on inaugural day amidst the uncertainties of the early months of the Korean War, John Davis Lodge envisaged his destiny as that of a war governor and this he interpreted as requiring an administration in which "harsh unadorned necessity" should rule every decision. When this was applied to a legislative program, not only was every non-essential ferreted out, but also many programs which the Gov- ernor professed to have wished to have seen begun were denied. The
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Governor's aloofness from legislative affairs might be explained by this concept of the requirements of the times or by his desire to avoid the strife between the executive and the Assembly which had characterized Bowles' administration. His aloofness reached ridiculous proportions when he refused to fight for any program, even for those which were included in the Republican platform. He surrounded himself with a "personal guard," and quickly ran afoul of the reporters who covered the Capitol beat as he appeared to assume that the affairs of his office were of con- cern only to himself and his coterie and not to the people of the state. Republican legislators complained they could never talk to the Governor alone, and there were other complaints that he handled his mail poorly. His actions gave the outward appearance of restoring the Assembly to its 'proper and traditional" place, but in reality he failed to assume the responsibilities of political leadership. Even the favorably inclined Hart- ford Courant wrote that "it would help if the Governor indicated what he wanted." 1
A Steel Mill Rejected
An abortive attempt to establish a steel mill in Connecticut elicited great interest early in the session. The idea of a steel mill had gained momentum since 1946 and seemed to be near reality when, on January 11, 1951, the Federal Government issued a certificate attesting to the necessity of building such a mill and permitting a write-off of most of its cost through a tax plan which allowed it to be depreciated within a five-year period rather than extended over the customary 20. Since, under the terms of the certificate, the ground for the new plant had to be broken by May 10, 1951, the legislature had to grant to an agency of the state government the right of eminent domain to assure the acquisition of the property within the specified period. There was strong support for the plan, including that of organized labor and veterans' organizations. The opposition to the authorization by the citizens of the Waterford area, where it was suggested that the mill would be located, was best expressed by the former Lieutenant Governor, the former Trinity professor, the Pulitzer Prize winner, Odell Shephard, who observed that "a steel mill here would be like a cancer-it just doesn't fit."
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The opponents of the plan gained a tactical advantage when rumors began to spread that the consulting engineers engaged to study the eco- nomic feasibility did not support the plan. The Governor had been in possession of the engineers' report since March 5, but, as requested by Clifford Strike, refused to make it public. Strike was the Chairman of the Governor's Steel Advisory Committee and President of the New England Steel Development Corporation, a subsidiary of the New England Coun- cil which had initiated the idea of a steel mill in New England. The motives of this gentleman, who was also President of the F. H. McCraw Construction Company which was favored to construct the mill, were suspect. When he refused to discuss the contents of the report on March 6, and when the report was finally released on March 8 and then hastily withdrawn, the suspicions of the members of the Assembly increased. Newspaper reporters who had seen the report were hastily summoned to discuss it, providing they agreed not to publish information concerning it. One reporter, who would not agree to such restrictions, did not attend the conference and published the essence of the report, which revealed that the consensus of the investigators was that the disadvantages out- weighed the advantages. This was bitterly disappointing to the New England Steel Development Corporation. In a vain attempt to alter the conclusions of the engineering firm, more information was furnished, pres- sure was exerted, and harsh words were exchanged, but the revised report of April 20 was only slightly altered. Whereupon the New England Cor- poration engaged the services of another engineering firm to check on the findings of the first.
The members of the legislature and the public were completely lost in the arguments exchanged between the two firms. Meanwhile, the Beth- lehem Steel Corporation, which was regarded as the most likely of the steel companies to operate in Connecticut, had been studying the details of the proposition and announced on April 26 that it was not interested in the Connecticut project. The next day there was made public a study which revealed the tremendous adjustments which needed to be made in the communities in Eastern Connecticut if a steel mill were located there. The bill granting the necessary right to eminent domain was never reported out of committee. The certificate of necessity was renewed several times, but on August 11, 1952, it was permitted to expire with the
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notation that the time was not then propitious but that it was believed that eventually New England would have its own steel mill.2
Further Efforts to Alter State Government
Even in the proposals for the reorganization of the state government which Lodge supported at least moderately, his own party went against his leadership. The reform of county government, a ban on dual job holding, the redistricting of the Senate, and the reduction and the equalization of the House of Representatives were reforms which Lodge believed could possibly be achieved despite the "accommodation" made necessary by the war. The ban against legislators holding positions as judges of probate, trial judges, or prosecutors was a step in the right direction, but there remained loopholes which continued to provide mem- bers of the assembly with many opportunities. A measure was also en- acted which granted a greater degree of home rule to the communities. In 1951, as previously, any attempt to alter the ancient and outmoded structure of government became hopelessly lost in the political maneuver- ing of the parties and their individual members. The Democrats sought to take the initiative on reorganization by passing in the Senate their own bill which called for the establishment of seven new departments and a thorough study of county government. The sincerity of their opposition to the proposed Agricultural Department, however, might be questioned. They claimed that the provision which required that the Governor select this commissioner from a list of three names submitted by a commission challenged the appointive power of the Governor. The Courant accur- ately pointed out that the method was the same as that suggested by the Organization Commission in Bowles Administration for the selection of the Commissioner of Education. Of similarly doubtful purpose was the Republican proposal to rewrite the constitution. The idea had value with- in itself, but any implication that such a procedure would answer the need for reorganization was a palpable absurdity. Near the end of the session, the Hartford Courant urged the Governor to exert his leadership to rescue at least a portion of the reorganization proposals, particularly as they pertained to the overhaul of the fiscal structure. Despite the Gov- ernor's appeals, the House rejected the proposal to reduce the House of Representatives to one representative from each town by a vote of 139 to
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