USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume II > Part 19
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Some changes were made slowly and reluctantly to meet new conditions. Except as these developed, warned Governor Henry Roberts in 1905, "we have enough laws. .. . " He emphasized his belief that
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legislation was "not to be taken as a cure-all for every ill or a substitute for the obligations that self government imposes on the individual citizen."52 Fears were expressed that the state was about to abandon its "pay as you go" fiscal policies, but, in fact, it continued to practice a rigid economy. In consistency with this practice and within the existent framework of government, some forward-looking legislation was en- acted in years before World War I. The state remained tender to the encroachments of the Federal Government, but not insensitive to the forces of national progress.58
The prosperity of the nineteenth century carried over into the twentieth, but was interrupted by the Panic of 1907. The population increased about 23 percent, and most of the economic indices of the state increased even more. Railroad valuations increased 38 percent; the value of farm products, 41 percent; savings bank deposits, 60 per- cent; and the dollar value of manufacturing equipment, 70 percent. These were prosperous years which created unbounded confidence in the future expansion of industry. Speculation was rampant, and the Panic of 1907 was the result. For a brief period, gold went into hiding. The effect of the depression on the business and manufacturing enter- prises became pronounced in the latter part of the year and was re- flected in a decrease in the value of the gross manufactured product from 235 million in 1907 to 185 million in 1908 and in an average decrease in the hours of labor by 12.8 percent. By the early months of 1908, the economy was on the road to recovery. The years until 1915 witnessed a continuous economic growth.54 The shock of the Panic, nonetheless, had prompted the Assembly to take measures to conserve its resources and to review its provisions for health and welfare, and, in this, Connecticut acted in conformity to the national impulse.
Specific steps were taken by the Connecticut Assembly to protect its forests and to reforest its waste lands. The forests of the state had been all but denuded as a result of the expansion of the lumber indus- try, which, by the end of the nineteenth century was cutting more than one hundred million feet a year. The demands for telephone poles, railroad ties, and other industrial needs had resulted in the cutting of the woodlands at so rapid a rate that nature's provisions for the regula- tion of the flow of water had largely been destroyed. The state became
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cognizant of the importance of its forests to both its industry and its public health. The Agricultural Experiment Station added a forester to its staff in 1901 and began a land acquisition program as an object lesson in the tree planting and in the proper management of woodlands. The legislature continued to appropriate monies for the acquisition of waste lands and for their reforestration and for the control of forest fires. The process was slow, but by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, the 1,331,000 acres of forest lands represented 42 percent of the total land area of the state and had increased by 100,000 acres in that ten years. By the end of World War II, over 60 percent of the land area of the state was forested.55
In the care of the unfortunate, there was a further tendency for the state to discontinue its reliance on private institutions and to erect and to operate its own. For the care of the mentally ill, Norwich Hos- pital was authorized in 1903 to supplement the previously established Middletown institution. The fight against mental illness was to receive further impetus when, through the efforts of Clifford Beers, the Mental Hygiene Movement was inaugurated.56 A school for epileptics was opened in Mansfield in 1914, and, in the same year, the state purchased the school operated by the Knight family for over half a century and named it the Connecticut School for Imbeciles. A most intense effort was made to care for those afflicted with tuberculosis. To supersede the traditional method of appropriating money to private institutions, a comprehensive law for the care of those afflicted with tuberculosis was drawn in 1909. A state tuberculosis commission was appointed with authority to build three sanatoria. The first was established at Meriden in 1910, and shortly thereafter others were established at Newington and at Shelton.57 Although no radical changes had been made in the jail system, Connecticut, in the first part of the twentieth century, was relatively advanced in penal administration, having introduced the indeterminate sentence, the maximum sentence of 30 years for a third offense, the law authorizing operation for the prevention of procreation and the probation law.58 To separate first offenders from the more dangerous criminals, the Connecticut Reformatory for men was es- tablished in 1913; and one for women in 1917.59
As important as were these advances, the state did not extend its
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responsibility into the effective regulation of those institutions which, although private, were of importance to the public welfare. After the needs of the insurance companies had been met by the legislature, it was charged that control of the Assembly was handed over to Charles S.
(Courtesy of the Hospital)
NORWICH-NORWICH STATE HOSPITAL
Mellen, the head of the New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad, who was ably represented at the Capitol by J. Henry Roraback. Through the efforts of these two men, the general railroad act was virtually abolished and measures which they judged confiscatory were effectively blocked. Roraback's influence extended to the utility com- panies, which continued to secure special privileges through special charters. The establishment of a regulatory commission was delayed until its necessity could no longer be denied. When the century had opened there was hardly a city in the state which did not have a local
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organization dedicated to the promotion and the protection of busi- ness, and the Connecticut Business Men's Association had been organ- ized in 1899. Connecticut continued, in the early decades of the twen- tieth century, to be a business man's community and this was reflected in political affairs.60
The political party system was failing to serve the interests of the people of the community. On the one hand, the state Democratic Party was badly managed, disorganized, and ineffective.61 The alliance with labor which had developed was more indicative of things to come than of effective party organization, although, through it, the control of some of the municipal governments was gained.62 On the other hand, the Republicans "had grown corpulent and complacent in office." For 15 years, from 1895 to 1910, Republican leaders had succeeded each other to high office as one after another progressed to Lieutenant Governor and finally to Governor and then stepped aside to permit another of the faith- ful to assume his position on the "ladder of preferment."63 It was charged that the small towns, which remained the bulwark of Republican con- trol, were chosen fields for political manipulators. The "rotary system" of representation in the small towns made them more susceptible to management in the caucuses and in the primaries. "If a few can fix the primary to their advantage, the respectable citizens can be trusted to do gratuitously the rest of the fixing at the polls," charged Dr. Newman Smyth of New Haven, who gave expression to his opposition to "prac- tical politics" in his unsuccessful campaign in 1905 against Morgan Bulkeley and Samuel Fessenden for the senatorial position left vacant by Senator Hawley. The picture Smyth painted of Bulkeley's public life aroused a popular protest, but did not penetrate the inner councils of the Republican caucus. Bulkeley was the party's nominee.64 Dissension within Republican ranks was insufficient to give victory to the Dem- ocrats; defection from Republican ranks was required.
A rift developed in the Republican Party in 1910 over the selection of a nominee for Governor when Charles Goodwin, Secretary to the incumbent Governor and member of a socially prominent Hartford family, challenged Lieutenant Governor Everett J. Lake, the heir ap- parent and the choice of the "regular" faction of the party. Money appeared to flow freely as politicians beat a path to and from the Allyn
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House where both factions had their headquarters. Republicans were embarrassed at their own machinations when the first ballot of the con- vention revealed one more vote than the total number of delegates. Ballots found on the convention floor were further evidence of wrong
YOUR RED CROSS:
MUST CARRY
(Courtesy Conn. Devel. Comm.)
WATERBURY
doing. A recount was demanded. On the second ballot, Goodwin re- ceived 295 votes; Lake, 285. The charges of "purchase and sale" marred the party's posture of respectability at a time when the Democrats came up with their strongest candidate in years. 65
Simeon E. Baldwin was a member of one of Connecticut's more illustrious families, a graduate of Yale and of Harvard Law School, a lawyer, scholar, and Justice of the State's Supreme Court of Errors, and a Republican turned Democrat. In 1910, he stood as challenger of the
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Republican position. Baldwin did not exploit the unsavory practices of the Republican Convention, but shifted the campaign to national issues, attacking the tariff and the encroachment of Federal authority. Never- theless, he interpreted his majority of 3,600 votes as indicating "that a majority of the people, while standing by their party in general, were ready to sacrifice its chosen leader to testify unmistakably their disap- proval of its management. . . . " Baldwin did not seek to revolutionize Connecticut society while he was in office (1911-1915). Largely due to the inroads the Progressives made into the regular Republican Party, the Democrats controlled the Senate during Baldwin's second term, but still he continued to approach public affairs with a studied cautious- ness. 67
Indeed, there was much of Baldwin's political philosophy which seemed more in harmony with that of the Connecticut republicanism than with Wilsonian progressivism. He called for even greater economy in government and failed to endorse the income tax because of the fear of the effect a tax on bonds would have on the borrowing power of the state. A national magazine described Baldwin's first inaugural address as "a perfunctory endorsement of the party platform" which contained recommendations "which are progressive in their leaning, but not thorough." The more liberal element of his own party criticized Bald- win for his failure to press vigorously for progressive reforms; the former Republican Governor, Rollin S. Woodruff, gave unqualified support to Baldwin's program. The New York Times adjudged Baldwin the most conservative Democrat then in an important position.68
The criticisms notwithstanding there were advances during Bald- win's tenure of office. The honesty of elections was further assured in 1911 through the strengthening of the corrupt practices act. A plan was devised for redistricting the five congressional districts. The con- stitutional amendment passed by the 1909 session of the General As- sembly to prevent any further legislative sessions from continuing be- yond an early date in June was approved for submission to the people. Of lasting importance was the civil service law passed in 1913 which placed practically all of the state employees, except common laborers and holders of elective and appointive positions, on the merit system. The evils of special legislation were lessened by the passage in 1913 of
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several general laws, such as the one permitting banks and trusts to incorporate and another designed to increase the self-governing power of cities by permitting them through referendum to vote the issuance of bonds for civic purposes. Also, an amendment was approved in 1913 to forbid special legislation in any case where the matter could be covered by general law.69
More indicative of the state's willingness to assume greater super- visory responsibilities was the passage of the public utilities act in 1911. With the expansion of transportation and communication facilities and particularly with the increased use of electric power, the safeguarding of the extraordinary power that was granted by the several charters had become immensely complex. A special commission named in the 1907 session of the General Assembly had recommended the establishment of a permanent commission, and both parties in the 1910 campaign had endorsed the proposal. To counter the familiar charges that such an act would empower the commission to take private property without due process of law, it was provided that decisions of the commission would be subject to appeal to the Superior Court. The bill provided for a uniform method of incorporation, control of capitalization, defini- tion of territory, regulation of the right of eminent domain, examina- tion of financial conditions of the physical plant, and any other condi- tions deemed necessary to assure that such utilities would serve the public interest.70
Of equal importance was the move to take the state's highway program out of politics. The automobile by 1910 had become "a valu- able engine of commerce . . . a distributor of wealth" which had con- tributed much to the state's prosperity.71 Concentration on the improve- ment of roads dated from the creation of the Highway Commission in 1895. The initial objective was the provision of hard-surfaced, farm to market roads, for the movement of commerce and the development of the state's natural resources. Roadways were drained and trap rock was applied to designated areas. During the first ten years, the state con- tributed approximately one and one half million dollars and the towns approximately one million dollars for road improvement. By 1907, 150 towns had entered into the program. Characteristically, the state's re- sponsibility was at first limited to supervision. The towns selected the
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roads to be improved, advertised for bids, let the contracts, and provided for maintenance.72 Inevitably under such circumstances there resulted a series of non-permanent, unconnected roads which were frequently undertaken in response to the pressures of localities. James H. Mac- Donald, a member of the original commission who had been named Commissioner, was considered largely responsible by Baldwin for the inadequacies of the program. In 1910, the Republicans, who controlled the General Assembly, blocked an effort to remove MacDonald by stripping the Governor of his power to appoint the Highway Commis- sioner. MacDonald continued in office until 1913. The partisan nature of the question was revealed when the Republicans blocked the ap- pointment of William H. Caldwell, but accepted the nomination of Charles H. Bennet. The new commissioner was regarded as a sound engineer and is considered to have developed a permanent and sound highway program.73
Of the social problems confronting Connecticut at the turn of the century, none was of greater importance, perhaps, than the relative status of the wage earner. While the right to strike was recognized, un- employment was generally regarded as indicative of a lack of individual initiative, rather than as a social problem. State assistance to the un- employed was limited to that offered by the inadequate and understaffed agencies located in the larger cities. Relief was the work of local char- ities. Arbitration was viewed as a desirable method of settling labor disputes, but the State Board of Arbitration and Mediation lacked the power to call the necessary witnesses to carry on a thorough investiga- tion.74 Baldwin, as Justice of the Superior Court, handed down the decision in the William H. Hoxie vs. The New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad case which declared unconstitutional a section of the Federal Employees Liability Act which fixed the liability for ac- cidents caused by a fellow employee as the responsibility of the em- ployer.75 Governor Lilley, in 1909, recognized the possible justice of the act, but feared that it would place Connecticut at a disadvantage with states which did not adhere to the law.76 On the eve of the Panic of 1907, there were approximately 200,000 wage earners in the state whose average annual income was $481.37.77
There was developing, nevertheless, partially as a result of the
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efforts of citizen's groups, such as the Consumers' League, public aware- ness of the status of the wage earner. The League, which attracted to its membership the socially prominent, was outraged at the condition of the wage earner, but refused to assign the sole responsibility for his status to the factory owners. The Connecticut branch of this league, in 1902, investigated the actual conditions of the wage earner, published reports, and sponsored bills in the General Assembly. A permanency was given to the organization in 1907 when it employed as General Secretary Miss Mary Crowell Welles, who was a graduate of Smith and who held a doctorate from Yale. Despite the efforts of the League and of other groups, Connecticut was lagging behind other areas of the western world in its labor legislation, particularly in relation to the liability of an employer for an injury to an employee.78
Compensation to a wage earner in the event of an accident was coming to be regarded as a right to be guaranteed by society rather than a claim to be exacted of employers through court action. Although legal recourse had been taken in an effort to protect Connecticut industry from the application of the federal Employer's Liability Act, a special committee was appointed in 1907 to recommend such legislation as was believed proper "to regulate the liability of employers to accidents to employees." The Assembly of 1909 did not act favorably upon the modifications recommended by the committee. While Baldwin in his inaugural, recommended the enactment of the bill, he suggested that if the existent bill were not altered, employees might be more willing to accept the principles of workingmen's compensation.79 The Governor could hardly have been surprised when the two houses could not agree on such an act. In recognition, as he stated, of bringing into accord the theories of modern sociology and economics and the guarantees of in- dividual rights, he suggested insurance as a means by which working- men's compensation, in fact, became a reality in the 1913 session of the Assembly.80 Employers were made liable for accidents in their establish- ments regardless of the cause, and mutual insurance associations were established by the employers to finance the payments.81
The 1913 session was hailed for the labor legislation enacted. In addition to the Workmen's Compensation Act, the post of Industrial Investigator was established and an Industrial Commission was ap-
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pointed to investigate the conditions of the wage-earning women. The child labor laws were strengthened, and provisions were made for eliminating health hazards. To some, the state seemed likely to take the lead in an area in which it had lagged for so long.82
Connecticut, on the eve of World War I, gave evidence of being willing for those chosen as national representatives to reflect the popular will, but guarded jealously the traditions of Connecticut government. The Assembly of 1913 endorsed the direct election of United States Senators and transmitted to Congress a resolution calling for the direct election of the President and Vice President. On the other hand, Bald- win, in an effort to establish a more proportionate representation for the large towns, was unable to secure support for a proposal that the state Senators would be elected at-large as they had been from 1644 to 1818. The Assembly steadfastly refused to surrender any of its preroga- tives and defeated attempts to require a two-thirds vote of each house to override a Governor's veto and refused a proposed amendment to the constitution which would have prohibited the General Assembly from appointing any of its own members to any state office.83 Whereas the war itself created a climate wherein social ideologies flourished, the attention of the public was directed more toward the winning of the contest and its impact on their daily lives.
NOTES-CHAPTER XXIX
1 Norton, "Governors of Connecticut," Connecticut Magazine, 1903-04, pp. 209, 214, 216-7, 219-24; Melbert B. Cary, "The Connecticut Constitution" (New Haven, 1900), p. 36.
2 Jackson, Baldwin, pp. 84-86.
3 Newman Smyth, "Political Corruption in Connecticut," The Outlook, Vol. 79, March 18, 1905, p. 690; Norton, "Governors of Connecticut," Connecticut Magazine, Vol. 8, pp. 214, 219-24.
4 Ibid., pp. 209-13, 217-19.
5 Public Documents, 1880, Vol. I, pp. 13-15.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., 1889, Vol. I, pp. 16-17.
9 Public Documents, 1889, Vol. I, pp. 16-17.
10 Cary, The Connecticut Constitution, pp. 46-49.
11 Ibid .; Public Documents, 1884, pp. 4-5.
12 Norton, "Governors of Connecticut," Connecticut Magazine, pp. 209-24; Register and Manual of the State of Connecticut.
13 Cary, The Connecticut Constitution, pp. 41-46.
14 Ibid., pp. 34-42.
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15 Osborn, ed., History of Connecticut, Vol. II, Osborn, "Political Progress," pp. 29-32; Jackson, Baldwin, pp. 87-88, Hon. Lynde Harrison, "The Election Controversy in Connecticut," New Englander and Yale Review, Vol. 54, April 1891, pp. 354-65; Simeon Baldwin, "The Late Election in Connecticut," in ibid., pp. 366-73.
16 Ibid., and Harrison, "The Election Controversy," New Englander and Yale Review, Vol. 54, April, 1891, pp. 354-65.
17 Ibid., and Baldwin, "The Late Election," New Englander and Yale Review, Vol. 54, April, 1891, pp. 366-73.
18 Public Documents, 1893, Vol. I, pp. 7-8. 19 Ibid.
20 Charles H. Clark, "The Connecticut Convention," The Yale Review, Vol. 11, (old series), 1903, New Haven, August, 1902, p. 146; Public Documents, 1895, Vol. I, p. 27. 21 Ibid .; Public Documents, 1900, Vol. I, p. 9.
22 The Constitutions of Connecticut; Notes and Statistics Regarding Town Representa- tion in the General Assembly and Documents Relating to the Constitutional Con- vention of 1902 (Hartford, 1901), p. 107.
23 Public Documents, Vol. I, p. 4.
24 Cary, The Connecticut Constitution, pp. 15-33; Public Documents, 1893, Vol. I, pp. 3-6.
25 Cary, The Connecticut Constitution, p. 21.
26 Ibid., pp. 41-45.
27 Public Documents, 1895, Vol. I, pp. 27-28; Ratcliffe Hicks, Speeches and Correspond- ence of Ratcliffe Hicks (Cambridge, 1896), p. 43.
28 Public Documents, 1900, pp. 3-10.
29 The Constitutions of Connecticut, pp. 67-73.
31 John H. Perry, "Constitutional Convention of 1902," in Osborn, ed., History of Con- necticut, Vol. I, pp. 473-74; Constitutions of Connecticut, pp. 112-28.
32 Clark, "The Connecticut Convention," The Yale Review, August, 1902, p. 151.
33 Ibid., pp. 151, 159; Perry, "Constitutional Convention of 1902," in Osborn, ed., His- tory of Connecticut, Vol. I, pp. 473-80.
34 Journal of the Constitutional Convention of Connecticut, 1902 (Hartford, 1902), pp. 9-12.
35 Ibid., pp. 25, 381; Clark, "The Connecticut Convention," The Yale Review, August, 1902, p. 154.
36 Ibid., pp. 32-34.
37 Journal of the Constitutional Convention, p. 16.
38 Ibid., pp. 104-107.
39 Clark, "The Connecticut Convention," The Yale Review, August, 1902, p. 154.
40 Journal of the Constitutional Convention, pp. 113-14.
41 Clark, "The Connecticut Convention," The Yale Review, August, 1902, p. 153.
42 Journal of the Constitutional Convention, pp. 131-187.
43 Ibid., pp. 186-225.
44 Ibid., pp. 234-35.
45 Ibid., p. 295.
46 Ibid., pp. 225-443; Clark, "The Connecticut Convention," The Yale Review, August, 1902, p. 158; The Outlook, Vol. 71, May 24, 1902, p. 198.
47 Journal of the Constitutional Convention, pp. 434-35; The Outlook, Vol. 71, May 24, 1902, pp. 331-32.
48 Ibid., June 28, 1902, pp. 331-32.
49 Journal of the Constitutional Convention, pp. 54, 64, 95, 119, 249, 282, 327, 342, 362; The Outlook, June 27, 1902, PP. 531-32.
50 Public Documents, 1902, Vol. I, p. 6.
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51 Public Documents, 1904, Vol. I, Pt. I, p. 3; Rowland L. Mitchell, Jr., "Social Legisla- tion in Connecticut, 1919-1939," (Unpublished doctoral thesis, Yale University, 1954), p. 63.
52 Message of the Governor, 1905 (Hartford, 1904), in Public Documents, 1904, Vol. I, Pt. I, p. 37.
53 Mitchell, "Social Legislation in Connecticut," pp. i, 78, 280; Message of the Governor, 1909 (Hartford, 1909), in Public Documents, 1908, Jackson, Baldwin, p. 170.
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