USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume II > Part 7
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39 | Part 40 | Part 41 | Part 42 | Part 43 | Part 44 | Part 45 | Part 46 | Part 47
605
THE CIVIL CONFLICT
for forwarding military supplies and civilian goods, there arose a num- ber of independent shipping lines. As steamers became more available, these new lines began to challenge the older firms, which therefore maintained their freight rates at the 1859 level while doubling pas- senger fares in an attempt to push the new lines to the wall. The move- ment of goods during the war, however, demanded all the transporta- tion available and the independents were able to survive. Their future was imperiled, however, in 1865, when the Hartford and New York Steamboat Company secured a discriminatory tax benefit of two cents a ton on all shipping, steam or sail, above 50 tons burden. Not freedom, but control, was to characterize water transportation in the postwar period.85
Railroads, "in a state of arrested development" when the war be- gan, were little, if any, better able to perform the services of a common carrier at the war's end. The railroads took advantage of the shortage of water and rail transportation and increased their rates as much as the traffic would bear. By 1862, most of them were clear of debt, divi- dends were mounting, and stocks were in demand. Stocks of the New Haven, for example, advanced 20 points in the first year of the war, and in the next five months advanced another 40 to 185 points. Rail- roading in Connecticut reached its "golden age of profits" in 1864.86 These increased earnings, however, were not plowed back into the roads. Roadbeds went unkept and rolling stock was permitted to de- teriorate. Efforts toward consolidation were spurned, except in the instance of the merger of the New London and Northampton with the Hamden and Hampshire.87 The flagrant disregard of the public interest resulted in a legislative investigation, but the railroads successfully con- vinced the committee that the scarcity of labor and materials made any major repairs impossible at that time. The spectre of state control loomed over the deliberations concerning rates, but the railroads had powerful friends and were permitted to continue relatively unchecked until the end of the war. The roads, however, had amassed a capital re- serve which could be used for improvement and expansion in the post- war period.
The strength of Connecticut's economy was in the reserve capital available in the years after Appomattox.
606
HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
The fiscal policies of the state encouraged the accumulation of the capital needed for the expanding economy. In 1861, the farmers op- posed any increase in taxes, which left the business and financial institu- tions untouched. The latter resolutely opposed any taxes on their assets. The tax problem was further complicated by the difficulty of taxing savings banks and insurance companies and by the exemptions which were enjoyed by various bond and railroad securities. Accordingly bonds in the amount of $2,000,000 were issued to finance the first en- listments.89 In subsequent years, taxes were increased, but never sufficiently to meet the extraordinary expenses. The state's indebted- ness continued to mount until, in 1864, the funded debt amounted to $8,000,000 and the unfunded to $1,249,660. Apparently, this deficit fi- nancing was not necessitated by lack of capital. William Eaton, who, in 1863, was seeking to place the state on a "pay as you go" program, claimed that money was so plentiful it was seeking investment. "T'won't do to say money is plentiful in every man's pocket," countered the Chairman of the Finance Committee, who proceeded to recom- mend a continuation of deficit financing.30 Eaton's recommendations were adopted almost in total a year later, but then the war was near an end. The state's policy of borrowing and not levying taxes had per- mitted industry to accumulate more capital than would have otherwise been possible.
Private capital was also built up in a number of other ways. The investments and savings of soldiers constituted one of the most impor- tant sources of capital. The total saving cannot be calculated, but an index to its extent is the fact that $57,000 is known to have been dis- patched in one month by the soldiers rendezvoused at New Haven. In- surance companies amassed large sums. The Connecticut Mutual trebled its business during the war: the number of policies written in- creased from 26 to 82 million. The Travelers, which was formed in 1864, wrote 27,000 policies in its first year.92
NOTES-CHAPTER XXIII
1 William John Niven, Jr., "The Time of the Whirlwind; A Study in the Political, Social, and Economic History of Connecticut from 1861 to 1875" (doctoral thesis), (micro- film, Ann Arbor, 1954), pp. 8-10; Lane, Political History of Connecticut, pp. 141-45.
607
THE CIVIL CONFLICT
2 Ibid., p. 152; Samuel G. Buckingham, The Life of William A. Buckingham, The War Governor of Connecticut (Springfield, Mass., 1894).
3 Lane, Political History of Connecticut, p. 149.
4 Ibid., pp. 157-58.
5 Ibid., pp. 157-67; Buckingham, William A. Buckingham, pp. 31-43.
6 Lane, Political History of Connecticut, pp. 176-77.
7 Hartford Times, quoted in Lane, Political History of Connecticut, p. 179.
8 Ibid., pp. 180-81.
9 Ibid., pp. 176-81; W. A. Crofut and John M. Morris, The Military and Civil History of Connecticut during the War, 1861-65 (New York, 1868), pp. 38-69.
10 Lane, Political History of Connecticut, pp. 157-201; Buckingham, William A. Bucking- ham, pp. 202-23.
11 Diary of Sidney Stanley, Jan. 10, 1866, quoted in Lane, Political History of Connecti- cut, p. 215.
12 Ibid., pp. 215-36; Buckingham, William A. Buckingham, pp. 247-70.
13 Niven, "Time of the Whirlwind," pp. 73-74.
15 Ibid., pp. 73-78.
16 Allan Nevins, The War of the Union; the Improvised War (New York, 1959), pp. 170- 77.
17 Ibid., p. 170; Crofut and Morris, Military and Civil History, pp. 38-69.
18 Ibid., p. 62.
19 Niven, "Time of the Whirlwind," pp. 32-34; Lane, Political History of Connecticut, p. 175.
20 Niven, "Time of the Whirlwind," pp. 31-32.
21 Crofut and Morris, Military and Civil History, pp. 92-100.
22 Buckingham, William A. Buckingham, pp. 141, 154-57.
23 Coite repaid this sum subsequently, Niven, "Time of the Whirlwind," pp. 39-41.
24 Ibid., pp. 41-42; Buckingham, William A. Buckingham, pp. 204-208.
25 Crofut and Morris, Military and Civil History, pp. 120-202; J. G. Randall, The Civil War and Reconstruction (New York, 1937), pp. 578-83.
26 Douglas Southall Freeman, Richard E. Lee, A Biography (New York, 1934), Vol. II, P. 343.
27 Crofut and Morris, Military and Civil History, pp. 203-21; Randall, Civil War and Reconstruction, pp. 290-316.
28 Crofut and Morris, Military and Civil History, pp. 264-87. The Connecticut Eighth, Eleventh, Fourteenth, and Sixteenth regiments participated in the battle of Antietam. 29 Randall, Civil War and Reconstruction, pp. 314-15.
30 Crofut and Morris, Military and Civil History, pp. 288-97; Freeman, Lee, Vol. II, pp. 443-74. The Eleventh, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Twenty-First were also at Freder- icksburg although they were not heavily engaged. The Seventeenth had moved from Baltimore across the Rappahannock at Stafford Court House.
31 Buckingham, William A. Buckingham, pp. 248-49; Niven, "Time of the Whirlwind," PP. 42-45.
32 Lane, Political History of Connecticut, p. 202.
33 Ibid., pp. 207-208; Niven, "Time of the Whirlwind," pp. 42-45; Buckingham, William A. Buckingham, pp. 250-51.
34 Randall, Civil War and Reconstruction, p. 411.
35 Niven, "Time of the Whirlwind," p. 46.
36 Lane, Political History of Connecticut, pp. 208-11; Buckingham, William A. Bucking- ham, pp. 256-67.
608
HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
37 These included the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Seventeenth, Twentieth, Twenty-first, and Twenty-second regular regiments and the Twenty-Seventh of the nine-month Volunteers.
38 Crofut and Morris, Military and Civil History, pp. 297-340. The Twenty-eighth Vol- unteers were stationed at Pensacola and the Twelfth and Thirteenth regiments and the Twenty-third, Twenty-sixth, and Twenty-eighth Volunteers were at New Orleans. The Ninth Regiment and the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Volunteers were at Baton Rouge.
39 This included the Connecticut Eighth, Eleventh, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth. They were later joined by the Twenty-first and Twenty-second. Crofut and Morris, Military and Civil History, pp. 330-40.
40 Freeman, Lee, Vol. II, pp. 483-84, 501-02.
41 Ibid., p. 504.
42 Crofut and Morris, Military and Civil History, p. 358. The Fifth and Twentieth of the Twelfth Corps and the Fourteenth and Twenty-seventh of the Second Corps advanced in company to Chancellorsville, while the Seventeenth of the Eleventh Corps proceeded by a shorter route.
43 Ibid., pp. 361-77.
44 Ibid., pp. 378-96; Randall, Civil War and Reconstruction, pp. 515-24; Freeman, Lee, Vol. III, pp. 18-161.
45 Crofut and Morris, Military and Civil History, pp. 397-401; Randall, Civil War and Reconstruction, pp. 528-31; Robert V. Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools of War (New York, 1956), pp. 159-66.
46 Crofut and Morris, Military and Civil History, pp. 401-19; Randall, Civil War and Reconstruction, p. 581. The Twelfth, Thirteenth, Twenty-fourth, Twenty-fifth, and Twenty-sixth Volunteers were the most actively engaged Connecticut regiments. The remainder of the western force was on duty at other points.
47 Lane, Political History of Connecticut, pp. 240-41.
48 Ibid., pp. 242-48; Crofut and Morris, Military and Civil History, pp. 456-60; Bucking- ham, William A. Buckingham, pp. 274-84; Niven, "Time of the Whirlwind," pp. 51-52.
49 Lane, Political History of Connecticut, pp. 252-54.
50 Niven, "Time of the Whirlwind," p. 51.
51 Journal, House of Representatives, May, 1864, p. 31.
52 Lane, Political History of Connecticut, pp. 248-52.
53 Ibid., p. 255.
54 Ibid., pp. 255-56; Niven, "Time of the Whirlwind," p. 52; Journal, House of Repre- sentatives, May, 1864, pp. 30-31.
55 Ibid .; Niven, "Time of the Whirlwind," p. 52; Crofut and Morris, Military and Civil History, pp. 601-02.
56 Niven, "Time of the Whirlwind," p. 53.
57 Randall, Civil War and Reconstruction, pp. 539-47; Crofut and Morris, Military and Civil History, pp. 569-611. In this campaign the First and Fourteenth Connecticut Regiments and the Second Connecticut Artillery were in the thick of the fight with the Eighth, Eleventh, Thirteenth, and Twenty-first in supporting roles.
58 Crofut and Morris, Military and Civil History, pp. 603-28; Randall, Civil War and Reconstruction, pp. 547-50.
59 Ibid., p. 568. The Eighteenth Connecticut regiment had returned from its furlough on April 9, in time to participate in this campaign, Crofut and Morris, Military and Civil History, pp. 638-45.
60 Ibid., pp. 714-29; Randall, Civil War and Reconstruction, pp. 566-70.
609
THE CIVIL CONFLICT
61 Crofut and Morris, Military and Civil History, pp. 692-707.
62 Ibid., pp. 755-74. The remnants of the Sixteenth Regiment, which had escaped cap- ture, remained on Roanoke Island.
63 Ibid., p. 794.
65 Crofut and Morris, Military and Civil History, pp. 61-69.
66 Ibid., pp. 149-50.
67 Ibid., pp. 150, 463-73.
68 Ibid., p. 151; Niven, "Time of the Whirlwind," pp. 56-59.
69 Crofut and Morris, Military and Civil History, pp. 183-86.
71 Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools of War, pp. 233-35.
72 Ibid., p. 235.
73 Ibid., pp. 236-48. 74 Niven, "Time of the Whirlwind," p. 93.
75 Ibid., pp. 93-95.
76 Ibid., pp. 82-84.
77 Ibid., p. 86.
78 Ibid., pp. 81, 91; Lane, Political History of Connecticut, p. 202.
80 Ibid., pp. 89-90, 103.
81 Ibid., pp. 86-91.
82 Ibid., pp. 112-13.
83 Ibid., pp. 106-18.
84 Ibid., pp. 122-28.
85 Ibid., pp. 127-30.
86 Ibid., pp. 129-30.
87 Ibid., pp. 130-35.
89 Journal, Senate, 1861, pp. 510, 530, 550.
90 Niven, "Time of the Whirlwind," pp. 145-47.
92 Emerson David Fite, Social and Industrial Conditions in the North During the Civil War (New York, 1910), pp. 126-29.
Chapter XXIV The Period of Readjustment
T HE FIRST post-war legislature quickly wound up the tag ends of the military effort and consigned it to memorialization. The sole additional recognition of military service was the exten- sion to members of the regular arm and the reserve corps of the bounty of thirty dollars and family allowances, which had been extended only to volunteers of state organizations during the war.1 The Assembly failed to approve Governor Buckingham's recommendation that pay- ments be made to families of prisoners of war and refused a bill which would have made the state liable for the debts which the towns had in- curred in the prosecution of the war.2 The towns were left to make any payments due draftees or those who furnished substitutes. The As- sembly was quick to confirm, however, the possibly extra-legal acts passed by several of the towns during the war. The Assembly also authorized the towns to use fifteen percent of their assessments for the erection of monuments honoring their heroes.3
The state debt had increased to $10,523,000 since 1861, but was safely within the state's ability to pay. The indebtedness was only four and one-half percent of the grand list, for this had increased $40,000,000 during the conflict and $17,000,000 of the increase had been during the last year of the war.+ Moreover, the debt could be liquidated without cut- ting into the capital available for industrial expansion by virtue of a tax system under which the farmer was paying in 1865 four times the amount of his taxes in 1861, while the mutual insurance companies and manufacturers had warded off all but one moderate increase in their taxes.5
During the same period, the deposits of the savings banks of the
611
THE PERIOD OF READJUSTMENT
state had increased approximately $10,000,000, or by fifty percent. The resources of other banks in the state appear to have risen accordingly. Twenty-three of the banks had joined the national banking system. The remaining 49 banks in the state, according to the Governor's re-
(Courtesy Conn. Devel. Comm.)
NEW HAVEN
port, held, in specie on hand, in notes in circulation, and in deposits, an amount equal to that of all banks in 1861. The total capital of the Con- necticut banks in the national banking system was slightly more than half that of the banks operating under state charters. The ability of the financial institutions in the state to finance an expanding economy, then, had increased by at least fifty percent since 1861. The soundness of these banks is indicated by the approximately one to one ratio of investments to capital and deposits. The monies invested in United
612
HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
States securities, the notes in circulation, and the discounts totaled $19,- 459,442, while the capital and deposits totaled $18,371,652.6
The banks were the leaders and greatest beneficiaries of the post- war boom. Commercial banks and State banks could charge all the in- terest the traffic would bear and could invest without hindering legal restraints. Savings banks had been founded to encourage small accounts and were forbidden by law to accept an account of more than $1,000 from a single individual. This restriction was ignored and deposits in these banks increased on the average of four million a year from 1865 to 1867, and more thereafter. Savings banks were also restrained by law from investing more than fifty percent of their deposits in real estate. The business and factory expansion of 1866 depleted their monies available for this use and the housing boom in 1868 made the demand on the savings banks greater than their resources. The banks of the post-war period were insensitive to social responsibility. They were confident of the future, resentful of efforts to control speculation, in- sistent on a free money market and a higher rate of interest. They were not deterred from disregarding a law or interpreting it to their advan- tage. A bonus of from forty-five to fifty dollars a thousand was custom- ary to secure a loan. The doctrines of laissez-faire were pointed to in justification, and the public interpreted such practices as freedom of contract. Debtors had little choice. In 1872, the banks sought absolu- tion of their sins from the legislature.7 The law, ostensibly to protect the small borrower, continued six percent as the legal rate of interest, but a greater rate could be charged if it were agreed to in writing. All contracts, usurious under former laws, were validated.8 The law had been made to conform to the business ethic.
Drastic changes were necessary in the transportation system before it could meet the demands of the industrial changes which were in progress. The shipping boom which resulted from the opening of southern markets at the end of the war soon faltered amidst the political strife of reconstruction. Additional capital was therefore available for the further development of railroads in the state. The establishment of a network of through transportation was dependent upon legislation authorizing the construction of bridges to span the river. Such legisla- tion was opposed by the powerful shipping interest and by the inland
613
THE PERIOD OF READJUSTMENT
towns whose principal commercial ties with New York and Boston were by water routes. Permissive legislation was supported by the coastal cities, which after the decline of southern trade, were anxious to strengthen their ties with commercial centers by an improvement of the railroad system. Since the issue of bridging the river was to be re- solved by legislative action, both groups sought to exert influence on the Assembly through powerful lobbies. After three years of bitter debate, the construction of bridges was authorized. This was a first step in the expansion of the railway system and an illustration of harmony between politics and industry which was to become a characteristic pattern.9
The transition of Connecticut industry from a war to a peacetime base was not one of uninterrupted success. The rural and agricultural towns, such as Canton and East Hartford, where powder mills had mushroomed during the war, were hardest hit by the cutbacks of the military contracts. Many companies, especially those in the munitions industry, disappeared entirely. The Colt Company bridged the gap by renting a portion of their plant to those engaged in the rising tool ma- chine industry. In general, the industries which were the most success- ful in meeting the challenge of the post-war era were those with ade- quate capital and labor, in proximity to power and transportation facili- ties, and with the foresight and ability to diversify their production.10
Specialization, in some cases the basis for a successful enterprise, in many instances proved calamitous. Francis A. Pratt and Amos Whit- ney combined their talents before the war to begin the manufacture of machine tools and continued to enjoy success. Others, who developed skills during the war, successfully transferred their abilities to the pro- duction of consumer goods. On the other hand, capitalists, eager for quick profits, poured money into the textile industry in eastern Con- necticut only to find within a decade that they had overspecialized. The relatively unskilled labor group which had coalesced around this industry was to place the area at a disadvantage for years to come.12
Wage earners had not benefited significantly from the expansion in the economy. There was full employment during the war, but low wages, high prices, and shortages of critical commodities had resulted in a lower level of comfort.13 The ten-hour law passed in 1855 was being
614
HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
flagrantly violated in the post-war years, especially in the textile mills of eastern Connecticut.14 It is estimated that between twelve and fifteen thousand women and over three thousand children below the age of ten were employed from 66 to 75 hours a week. Factory inspectors disre- garded the law and constituted scant protection for laborers. One Re- publican appointee, in fact, was imprisoned for five years for brutally beating his own child. The number of unions in the state had increased from two to six during the war. In the post-war period, as unfavorable working conditions persisted, Workingmen's associations sought to gain favorable legislation through political action.15 Both parties bid for the workingman's vote, and, in 1867, the General Assembly recog- nized eight hours as constituting a lawful day's work. This was an im- portant principle in the subsequent history of the labor movement, but its immediate effectiveness was lessened by the continuation of the liberty of contract clause which made longer hours lawful if they were mutually agreed to by the contracting parties. Frequently, employment was dependent upon the acceptance of such a contract.16
Lincoln had kept the radicals under control in the last years of the war. They supported him, although reluctantly, in the Presidential campaign of 1864.17 Lincoln had used the patronage whip to keep fed- eral office holders in line.18 In his efforts to maintain control, the Presi- dent had a willing ally in James Dixon, the conservative stalwart from Connecticut, who had remained in favor at the White House even though he had supported McClellan in the presidential campaign of 1864. Dixon was friendly with his Senate colleague, Lafayette Foster, and had great influence with the Congressional delegation and the Re- publican press of Hartford and Norwich.19
The Radicals, however, had attained great strength. They had been the unrelenting prosecutors of the war and were further strength- ened by the final victory. The assassination of President Lincoln tended to confirm their policies in the public mind. Governor Buckingham, who supported the Radicals firmly, had grown in public esteem throughout the war and was returned by the electorate in 1865 for his final term as Governor. The powerful insurance companies of Hartford and the textile industry of eastern Connecticut made their financial and their political resources available to the Radicals. In addition,
615
THE PERIOD OF READJUSTMENT
US
(Courtesy Conn. State Lib.)
NEW LONDON-HARBOR SCENE
victory had intensified nationalism in the North, and the Radicals, identified as apostles of burgeoning nationalism and of a stringent policy toward the South, profited.20
The Democratic Party believed that suffrage was a privilege con- ferred or withheld by a state and supported the President's plan of reconstruction, as did the conservative Republicans. The radical Re- publicans, on the other hand, were willing to use Federal power to ad- vance the cause of the Negro and, as events were to prove, the cause of
616
HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
the Republican Party. The differences became more apparent when Johnson launched a plan of reconstruction in the Summer of 1865. The breach widened as the Radicals sought to push through a more extreme program and assumed chasmal proportions when Johnson vetoed the Freedmen's Bureau in the Spring of 1866.21
In the state campaign of 1866, the Democrats clearly supported the President, but the Republicans did not adopt an unequivocal position. The Republican standard bearer was Joseph Hawley, a Brevet Major General, a founder of the Republican Party in the state, and the Editor of the Hartford Press. Hawley personally subscribed to the tenets of the radical elements of his party, but was so sensitive to the conservative attitudes within the state that he refused to articulate his position. He listened complacently while the Chairman of the Republican conven- tion combined an endorsement of Johnson with a pledge to support the actions of Congress. In his ambivalence, Hawley seemed to have over- reached himself. The Democrats denounced him as a deceiver of the people and the Radicals wearied of his fence straddling. It seemed to the latter that it was time to take a stand. After Johnson's veto of the Freed- men's Bureau, the Connecticut congressional delegation had almost immediately swung to the support of the Radicals and Johnson had lashed out at them for criticizing his veto.
The Democrats moved to secure Johnson's endorsement of their ticket. There is little doubt that the wealthy Democratic nominee, James E. English, who had served as a Congressman during the war, had sympathetic audiences with both Gideon Welles and the President. These conferences fell short of securing a formal endorsement, but English encouraged the propagation of the idea that the President would take retaliatory measures against those who voted contrary to his program. Some of the conservative Republicans, notably Henry Cleve- land, the Hartford Postmaster, began to abandon the listing ship and endorsed English. Other Republican political leaders, with Hawley among them, went to Washington to right their political craft. The President expressed a preference for those who supported his views, but announced that he would not enter into a purely local election. The Republicans publicized this as support by the President of the entire ticket. The distraught Cleveland requested Johnson to accept his
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.